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'FREEDOM AND PEACE ARE INDIVISIBLE'

ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH DISSIDENT INPUT TO THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT, 1985-1989*

There are certain 'miraculous years' which attract the attention of scholars and beat out the rhythm of European history. The year 1985 is not traditionally one of them, and in the symphony of dissent it is usually treated as a moment of silence before the spectacular finale of 1989. Staying with the musical metaphor, I propose to see the 1980s rather as a long crescendo finishing with the climactic 'velvet revolutions'. In this narrative, the spring of 1985 marks the tipping point of a Europe-wide cooperation of social movements for peace and human rights. That year saw the emergence of the most important peace initiative born in eastern Europe, the publication of several important and inspiring texts, as well as an unprecedented intensification of trans-border contacts, both across the iron curtain and within the Eastern Bloc. So far, however, all this remains underresearched.

Compared to the number of studies dedicated to the emergence of the dissident movements in central and eastern Europe in the 1970s, the rise of Solidarity in 1980 and the wave of 'velvet revolutions' in 1989, the 1980s remain a relatively unexplored period. This is especially true in the Polish dissent historiography, and one of the key reasons is methodological. That decade is of interest mostly for historians who, in central and eastern Europe,[1] are trained within national paradigms. This 'methodological

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[1] The differentiation between 'central' and 'eastern' Europe is made consciously throughout the text. The latter is synonymous with the eastern bloc, while the former refers to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

nationalism' as some scholars term it,[2] is a useful approach and will remain fundamental because it is also closer to the real-world, local experience of politics and social issues. However, because of the limitations of their nationally focused methodological apparatus, many historians fail to notice the shift in dissident action, towards a more international – or better – transnational strategy that occurred during the 1980s. As the scholar and dissident Bohdan Cywiński rightfully remarked, the Polish 'Freedom and Peace' Movement (*Wolność i Pokój* – WiP), one of the major phenomena of late 1980s dissent, was special because it was 'sitting astride the barricade' – it was at the same time of the east and of the west.[3] In other words – it was a transnational movement in terms of its focus, strategy and ideas.

In the remainder of this chapter, I fill in this historiographical gap to some extent by looking at interactions across the iron curtain and across internal bloc borders, which in the 1980s led to the emergence of a pan-European peace movement. In looking at the contacts between the western peace movement and the central European dissidents in the 1980s, my aim is not merely a recapitulation of the various open letters and encounters. I show the circulation of ideas across the divided Europe and argue that the dissident movements played an important role in this dialogue. In fact, they influenced the peace movement so that it changed its course from disarmament to the idea of 'indivisible peace' – that freedom and peace cannot be separated or played out against each other.

Forced to select only the most important elements of the transnational network of peace groups, I focus on the Czechoslovak Charter 77 and the Polish WiP as well as the Societal Resistance Committee (KOS), although East German and Hungarian groups also played a role. On the western side I look at those parts of the peace movements that were, first of all, willing to discuss fundamental issues and secondly, were interested in maintaining contacts with the independent groups in the east. Here I mean especially the European Nuclear Disarmament (END), (understood, according to Peter Baehr's distinction, as the political organization, not the mass social move-

[2] Cf. Smith and Kutz-Flamenbaum, who go as far as to claim that 'the assumption that conflicts are bounded by national polities blinds the researcher to the ways these conflicts are shaped by a larger world system.' Jackie Smith and Rachel Kutz-Flamenbaum, 'Prisoners of Our Concepts: Liberating the Study of Social Movements', in Simon Teune, ed., *The Transnational Condition: Protest Dynamics in an Entangled Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 211-227, at 211 and 218.

[3] Bohdan Cywiński's contribution to the panel 'Jednostka wobec państwa, państwo wobec wyborów etycznych jednostki' at the conference 'Bezpieczeństwo i Tożsamość', Warsaw, 8 Oct. 2011.

ment,[4]) as well as other western European organizations that were independent but linked to END (i.e. the Dutch IKV – Inter-church Peace Council, the French CODENE – The Committee for the Denuclearization of Europe), as well as the German 'Greens'.

I shall begin with a review of the theoretical and empirical literature constituting the 'transnational approach' to position my work within it. I then move on to the story of the dialogue between the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents and the western peace activists, showing the way in which the definition of peace and the priorities of the peace movement were altered because of the transnational exchange.

Astride the Barricade: Why Do We Need a Transnational Approach?

It is only recently in dissent studies that there has been a realization that while the iron curtain and the inter-state borders of the eastern bloc were quite tight, they were not hermetic.[5] During the cold war the 'diffusion of western media, cultural items and practices into eastern Europe was an important interface across the ideological divide',[6] and one should also add that this was not a one-way process. This means that trans-border exchanges, influences, inspirations and dialogues existed, and it does not suffice to put together single-country case studies to understand the influence of dissent.[7] Phenomena that may have seemed very important domestically were at times not even noticed beyond borders. And, conversely, events of seemingly little domestic importance acquired *transnational* significance, which could sometimes have indirect domestic consequences in what resembles the 'boomerang' theorized by Margaret Keck and

[4] Peter Baehr, 'E. P. Thompson and European Nuclear Disarmament (END): A Critical Retrospective', *Online Journal for Peace and Conflict Resolution*, March 2000. For a larger discussion of the END see: Patrick Burke, 'European Nuclear Disarmament: A Study of Transnational Social Movement Strategy', Ph.D. thesis, University of Westminster, 2004, available at http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/8504/1/Burke.pdf (last visited May 2011).

[5] Robert Brier, 'Transnational Culture and the Political Transformation of East-Central Europe', *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, 3 (2009), 337-357.

[6] Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, 'Preface,' in Hara Kouki and Eduardo Romanos, *Protest Beyond Borders* [New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2011], ix-x, at ix.

[7] This is still a largely dominant approach, especially among central and eastern European historians of dissent. See: International conference *The World towards 'Solidarity' Movement 1980-1989*, IPN, Wrocław 21-23 Oct. 2010.

Kathryn Sikkink.[8] Simon Teune defines transnationalisation as 'pluri-local relations of entanglement beyond national borders'.[9] In approaching this field, I look for common ground between studies in transnational movements and transnational (intellectual) history in order to devise a theoretically informed historical and *transnational* narrative of central European dissent in the 1980s. In terms of content, I support the already existing studies of the 'second wave of transnational protest', focusing on peace movements with a non-western perspective, emphasizing the role of the dissidents and young opposition movements. This research also tries to reinforce Padraic Kenney's studies of the 1980s opposition with an analysis of the circulation of their ideas. To Robert Brier's focus on prominent dissident intellectuals, it adds a wider panorama of less known figures.[10]

This chapter, rather than discussing theoretical implications of such an approach, focuses on telling the *story* of central European dissent from a transnational perspective. I trace local events (meetings), social facts (the establishment of movements) and actions (publishing letters) and try to show both their transnational roots and transnational implications (most importantly, their reception and interpretation abroad).

In an attempt to show the importance of dissident intellectual input to the peace movement, I analyse the *circulation* of ideas and notions. Circulation, according to the conceptualization of Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma, must 'be conceived as more than simply the movement of people, ideas and commodities from one culture to another';[11] it is a dialectic process in which novel qualities and meanings are created. Summing up, I look at the transnational (that is, trans-local entanglements of locally rooted actors) to understand where the inspirations for similar practices and ideas came from, to pinpoint the ways in which intellectual value added was

[8] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

[9] Simon Teune, 'Protest in the Transnational Condition', in Teune, *The Transnational Condition*, 1-19, at 2. The definition draws on Ludger Pries, *Die Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt: Sozialräume jenseits von Nationalgesellschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008).

[10] Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); Robert Brier, 'Adam Michnik's Understanding of Totalitarianism and the West European Left: A Historical and Trans-national Approach to Dissident Political Thought', *East European Politics and Societies*, 25, 2 (2011), 197-218.

[11] Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma, 'Cultures of Circulation: The Imaginations of Modernity', *Public Culture* 14, 1 (2002), 191-213. See also Debra Spitulnik, 'The Social Circulation of Media Discourse and the Mediation of Communities', *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 6, 2 (1997), 161-187.

produced in dialogue across borders and to grasp the way various local actions had trans-local consequences.

Towards a Dialogue: Disarmament on the Agenda

In 1976, the USSR began deploying a new model of mobile, middle-range nuclear missiles known under their NATO code name SS-20. Three years later, NATO responded with the so-called 'double track decision' to deploy Pershing and Tomahawk middle-range missiles while simultaneously offering the Warsaw Pact negotiations about a limitation on this type of weapon system. Together with two other circumstances – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the election as US President of the 'hawk' Ronald Reagan – the turn of the decade saw a definite move from détente towards what many call the 'second cold war'.[12] Within the emerging 'nuclear crisis' in Europe, *disarmament* and *peace* became dominant terms in political discourse, leading to the formation of a massive western European movement of protest against the new missiles as well as the nuclear arms race in general.

The 'peace movement', as it grew to be called, was a diverse and amorphous coalition of very different societal and political groups. It did on the whole, however, have a certain left-wing leaning, which together with its critical attitude towards the immediate actions of the western governments – NATO – and its visible anti-Americanism, made it a very popular topic of eastern European media coverage. Groups with openly pro-Soviet attitudes or sympathies for some Soviet policies - while a small minority in the peace movement at large - nevertheless played a visible role (most notably within the British CND).[13] What is more, the official (state sponsored) eastern European peace organizations were perceived as legitimate partners for a dialogue over peace issues, and the legitimacy of the communist governments was not questioned.[14]

While large parts of the peace movement were suspicious of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, protests emerged exclusively in response to NATO's nuclear armament plans and it was the dual track decision that it tried to

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[12] Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger and Philipp Wentker, eds., *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011).

[13] Benjamin Ziemann, 'A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War and Their Elective Affinities', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 49, (2009), 351-388.

[14] Maciej Śliwa, 'Ruch "Wolność i Pokój" 1985–1989', MA thesis, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1992, 27. Also: Burke, 'European Nuclear Disarmament', 111-112.

reverse. Western unilateral disarmament, moreover, was a widely popular demand of the peace movements. The idea behind it was that a one-sided disarmament by the west could be a gesture of good will, enhancing trust and allowing the return to détente policies. To the immediate critical argument that the Soviets maintained conventional arms supremacy in Europe and that they would strategically benefit from such a move, the standard reply was the slogan 'better red than dead'. Garton Ash mentioned Heinrich Albertz, 'one of the grand old men of the West German peace movement' and quoted him as stating, when asked about the Polish crisis: 'There is nothing more important than peace.' 'This sentence' – Garton Ash claimed – 'commanded widespread assent among young peace activists in the free countries of western Europe. If it came to the choice, they said, we would rather live under Soviet domination than risk a nuclear war.'[15] It was the fear of nuclear Armageddon that provided a justification for the peace movement's claims. A German intellectual agreed that among the western pacifists there was indeed 'a tendency to articulate the conflict with the regimes in the east cautiously, in the light of the ultimate goal of peace'.[16]

Because of this attitude and the way it could be used by communist propaganda, the peace movement was highly problematic for central European dissenters, requiring a response from them. From the beginning of the 1980s, the dissidents were gradually taking on the 'peace question', engaging in a dialogue with their western activist counterparts and in this dialogue attempting to alter certain previously unquestioned notions. The following story of this dialogue – by tracing both the actual exchange of texts and the circulation and diffusion of ideas – aims at showing the importance of the dissident input.

Initial Standpoints

END was a coalition of groups gathered around a common manifesto – the *Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament* (1980),[17] which emphasized the societal demand for nuclear disarmament and inter-bloc détente. The END

[15] Timothy Garton Ash, 'Solidarity and the Peace Movement', in his, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980-1982* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1983), 332-337, at 335-336.

[16] H. J. Schädlich in: Krytyka, 'Po dwóch stronach muru. Rozmowa z J. Fuchsem, H.J. Schädlichem i J. Strasserem', *Krytyka [samizdat]* 25 (1987), 206. All translations from Polish and Czech are by the author.

[17] END Committee, 'Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament (END),' in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, eds., *The Geopolitics Reader* (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), 95-96.

Appeal's diagnosis of the international situation in the coming years was extremely pessimist:

> We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely […] We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent.[18]

The crucial motive for action in the west seemed to be *fear of nuclear annihilation*. Prominent figures of the peace movement strongly rejected the idea that their actions were in any way driven by fear. And yet an analysis of their rhetoric calls for the use of this word, without necessarily implying any normative judgments by that.[19] Not meaning to say that eastern Europeans were in any way more 'courageous', Václav Havel pointed out that 'people in the West are, for various reasons, more afraid of war than we are.'[20] What he meant was that for many of the eastern 'independents', peace was the goal, but not an absolute one.

That was the crucial difference in the east-west dialogue over peace. From the fear of a nuclear war and the belief in its high probability grew the focus on disarmament. The western activists insisted on 'protesting for survival' – for peace as the absence of war, because in their view the prevailing international conditions *were* in fact *a state of war*. Eastern dissidents, apart from the East Germans perhaps, saw things rather differently.[21] They acknowledged the *possibility* of a nuclear war, but a possibility was *not yet reality*. The war in Afghanistan was a reality, but the western 'peace movement', as Havel could not help pointing out, hardly noticed it.

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[18] END, 'Appeal', 95.

[19] Cf. Susanne Schregel, 'Konjunktur der Angst: "Politik der Subjektivität" und "neue Friedensbewegung", 1979-1983' in Bernd Greiner, ed., *Angst im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2009), 495-520; also: Petra Kelly, 'Acceptance Speech: The Right Livelihood Awards', available at www.rightlivelihood.org/kelly_speech.html (last visited June 2011); Harry Kreisler, 'Conversation with Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian: Conversations with History', Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, available at www.globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/ KellyBastian/kelly-bastian4.html (last visited April 2011). On the Soviet fear of the N-bomb see: Nicholas Thompson, 'Nuclear War and Nuclear Fear in the 1970s and 1980s', *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, 1 (2011), 136-149, at 138.

[20] Václav Havel, 'Anatomy of Reticence,' in Paul Wilson, ed., *Open Letters: Selected Prose 1965-1990* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 291-322, at 310.

[21] Cf. Collective, 'The Berlin Appeal: Make Peace without Weapons', available at www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter12Doc11Intro.pdf (last visited March 2011).

> [F]ive years ago, one important European country attacked a small neutral neighbour and since that time has been conducting on its territory a war of extermination which has already claimed a million dead and three million refugees […] Seriously, what are we to think of a peace movement, a European peace movement, which is virtually unaware of the only war being conducted today by a European state?[22]

In the east, peace movements eventually emerged from sources that were different than fear of 'the bomb'. They were the result of a growing anti-militarist sentiment, which found most visible expression in individuals refusing to perform military service and this later turned into an organized movement.[23] The focus here was, therefore, domestic at the beginning – and closer to human rights. While western movements such as END were giving voice to the idea of disarmament, eastern oppositionists were trying to reformulate the definition and the implications of peace. First, peace was seen not as a value in itself, but rather as the outcome of specific domestic and societal conditions – rule of law, democracy and the respect for human rights and civil freedoms. Later, this idea, known as *indivisible peace*, was justified by an opposition leader from the younger generation: 'the main threat to peace is not in arms, but in the division into irreconcilable political systems.'[24] As a consequence, this implied a fundamental revision of the political idea of peaceful coexistence and détente which had formed the basis for European disarmament movements.

1980-84: From Reticence to Dialogue

In the years 1980-1981, many observers and activists suggested that cooperation between the largest eastern European opposition movement – the Polish Solidarity trade union – and the emerging peace movements in the west would be natural; however, no such dialogue between them occurred.

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[22] Havel, 'Anatomy', 312.

[23] This in turn is linked to the cultural changes within the young generation of the 1980s, most visibly articulated in different forms of alternative culture, i.e. punk music. For Czechoslovakia, see: Miroslav Vaněk et al., *Ostrůvky svobody: Kulturní a občanské aktivity mladé generaced v 80. letech v Československu* (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2002); Miroslav Vaněk, *Byl to jenom rock'n'roll? Hudební alternativa v komunistickém Československu 1956-1989* (Praha: Academia, 2010). For Poland: Krzysztof Lesiakowski, Paweł Perzyna and Tomasz Toborek, *Jarocin w obiektywie bezpieki* (Warszawa: IPN, 2004). Anna Smółka-Gnauck, *Między wolnością a pokojem: Zarys historii Ruchu "Wolność i Pokój"* (Warszawa: IPN, 2012).

[24] Jacek Czaputowicz, 'Wolność i pokój są niepodzielne', *Czas Przyszły* [samizdat], Sept. (1987), 9-15.

There were several different reasons for this muteness. Garton Ash, not very enthusiastic about the western 'peaceniks', quotes one Solidarity member as suggesting that the westerners 'were afraid of what they might find'.[25] E. P. Thompson 'contended that END did attempt to make contact with Solidarity and tried to publish END's ideas in the Solidarity press, but received no encouragement from the Polish movement.'[26] There was, perhaps, not enough understanding on both sides and, when the peace movement acted too slowly after the introduction of the Martial Law, the missed opportunity was regretted. Garton Ash, moreover, showed that for Solidarity, abstaining from discussions of international affairs, foreign policy, or global peace was 'a precondition for any peaceful compromise with the communist regime'.[27]

Gillian Wylie provides a more detailed analysis of the reasons for Solidarity's reluctance to 'talk peace'.[28] These included the practical difficulties inherent in the east-west communication in the early 1980s as well as the aforementioned Solidarity focus on domestic issues. Another reason was the confusion around the meaning of the very word 'peace' as a mantra of communist propaganda.[29] Wylie also points to possible reasons on the part of the western left: the praise Solidarity received from western right-wing politicians or the trade union's perceived Catholic identity. But more importantly, many strands of the old and new left in Europe were not at all certain that a dialogue with independent groups in the east was necessary and desired. Other reasons that Wylie gives are rooted in the Poles' own attitudes. Thompson, for example, in his characteristic categorical manner claimed that Polish intellectuals and activists were suffering from the 'dulling of the Internationalist Nerve'.[30] Another obstacle for the western

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[25] Magda Wójcik quoted in: Garton Ash, 'Solidarity', 332-333.

[26] Gillian Wylie, 'Social Movements and International Change: The Case of "Détente from Below"', *International Journal for Peace Studies* 4, 2 (1999), available at www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4_2/wylie.htm (last visited 1 April, 2011), quoting *END Journal* 8 (1984), 25.

[27] Garton Ash, 'Solidarity', 333. The only exception here was the 'Message to the Nations of Eastern Europe' issued by the Solidarity general assembly in August 1981. Its history and impact, although significant, especially in the USSR, remains relatively unknown and requires further research.

[28] Wylie, 'Social Movements'.

[29] Kacper Szulecki, 'Hijacked Ideas: Human Rights, Peace and Environmentalism in Czechoslovak and Polish Dissident Discourses', *East European Politics and Societies* 25, 2 (2011), 272-295, at 284.

[30] Wylie, 'Social Movements'. This accusation is repeated for example in: Ivan Slinkman, 'O niektórych osobliwościach dialogu Wschód-Zachód', *Vacat* [samizdat] 21 (1984), 12-23.

disarmament activists was that the Poles seemed to… oppose the idea of nuclear disarmament. And finally, early on, eastern opposition was firm in arguing that human rights should be prioritized over peace issues.

That was how the situation of mutual 'reticence' could be characterized in 1980, and these points may well be generalized to the whole of the central European dissident movement. When in 1980 E. P. Thompson visited Prague, Charter 77 representatives were reluctant to meet with him.[31] In this situation, the END Appeal was a very important step in setting the groundwork for dialogue. Firstly, unlike the older Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the END no longer echoed the Soviet propaganda in arguing that the nuclear arms race was solely the fault of the USA. The Appeal proposed a 'balance of guilt' – a point that many eastern Europeans could agree on. Secondly, END demanded a bilateral disarmament, thus countering the accusation of being 'naïve' (the typical description of the peace movement from an independent eastern perspective).[32] Thirdly, the Appeal called for a 'Europe-wide campaign'. Leaving aside the technicalities, this marked a very important shift. END was interested in a pan-European dialogue of social movements and so was willing to engage the eastern independents as well.

To describe this, the authors of the END Appeal used an expression that seems to be borrowed from Havel's Power of the Powerless: 'we must commence to act *as if* a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists.'[33] However, the points of contention remained clear. The END Appeal maintained that the limiting of civil liberties was the *consequence* of the arms race and militarization, not the *cause*, as the dissidents would see it. Additionally, it claimed that 'twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilization by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.' To dissident intellectual ears this sounded like a declaration of utopian pacifism that not only openly

[31] Milan Hauner, 'Charter 77 and European Peace Movement', in Jiri Suk, Oldřich Tůma and Marketa Devata, eds., *Charter 77 : From the Assertion of Human Rights to a Democratic Revolution, 1977 - 1989: The Proceedings of the Conference to Mark the 30th Anniversary of Charter 77, Prague, 21-23 March 2007* (Praha: Ustav Pro Soudobe Dejiny AV ČR, 2007), 163-194.

[32] In fact, the END Appeal indicated the need for a bilateral disarmament and emphasized that the USSR ought to halt its armaments. However, on an applied level, probably because in 1981 any pressure on the Soviets seemed unrealistic, the actual actions of the END focused on disarmament in the NATO states. It seems that when the Appeal was published, that issue was not yet entirely resolved within the movement. The support for unilateral disarmament was an argument against the peace movement that eastern independents continued to put forth up until 1985-86.

[33] END, 'Appeal', 95-96. Cf. Havel, 'Anatomy'.

acclaimed what they saw as the fallacious 'peace at all costs' appeasement policies, but was also willing to defend the petrified Yalta division of Europe to prevent the dubious 'nuclear holocaust'.

The END Appeal was founded on a 'theory of the cold war' – sometimes referred to as *exterminism* – whose main author was E. P. Thompson, one of the founders and perhaps the most prominent intellectual leader of END.[34] The text emphasized the irrationality of the nuclear arms race and the approaching catastrophe, while downplaying the importance of other factors influencing peace, such as for the nature of domestic political systems. The threat of a nuclear war and the fear of annihilation were the driving forces of the peace movement and the reason for its mass appeal. As did the END Appeal, speaking of 'both halves of Europe', Thompson was also implicitly accepting the Yalta geopolitical spatialisation of the continent.

Whereas the Polish opposition, especially after December 1981, was preoccupied with their domestic crisis, in Czechoslovakia the dissident community quickly understood the need for addressing the peace movement,[35] seeing in it not only a potential ally, but also a potential foe if used by the communist propaganda. The first direct reference to the western peace movement was made by Charter 77 in 1981.[36] Addressing the question of peace, the Czechoslovak dissidents were nevertheless reluctant to resign from the language of human rights. Some months later the Chartists wrote: 'Although we grasp the particularity of the current threat […] we are bound not to leave the principal issue of human rights',[37] and they also referred to a 'human right to live in peace'.[38] Here the notion of *indivisible*

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[34] See: E. P. Thompson, 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization', *New Left Review,* I, 121 (1980); END, 'Appeal'. For a brilliant critical discussion of Thompson's oeuvre, coming from an author once involved in the disarmament movement, see: Baehr, 'Thompson'.

[35] In this realization they were perhaps helped by the politically active circle of émigré intellectuals gathered around the social-democratic, exilic periodical *Listy*, published in Rome by Jiří Pelikán. The latter and Zdeněk Mlynář, another key columnist of *Listy*, were up-to-date not only with the opposition activity in Czechoslovakia, but with the new currents in the western European left. The Polish equivalent of *Listy*, the London based *Aneks*, did not play such a role. Cf. Jiří Pelikán, 'Žít s raketami?', *Listý* 6, prosinec (1983), 1-4.

[36] Charta 77, 'O míru a mírovém hnutí' (16 Nov. 1981), in Vilém Prečan, ed., *Charta 77 1977-1989 – Od moralni k demokraticke revoluci. Dokumentace* (Scheinfeld, Praha and Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 234-235.

[37] Charta 77, 'O nedělitelnosti míru' 13/82 (29 Jan. 1982), in Prečan, *Charta* 77, 236-237, at 237.

[38] Charta 77, 'Poselství solidarity mírovému hnutí v NDR' 18/82 (21 Apr. 1982), in Prečan, *Charta* 77, 238.

peace appears for the first time in dissident discourse, along with a clear reference to the naïveté of pure pacifism.[39]

This is the first moment when the attempt at a *re-negotiation of the meaning of peace* becomes visible. At first, however, open letters and statements (such as those issued by Charter 77) were inherently monologues. It was only in an exchange of letters between a Czech intellectual, writing under the pseudonym Václav Racek,[40] and Thompson which symbolically initiated a dialogue.[41]

Racek's calm but devastating critique of Thompson's views was reprinted in the western press, as well as in exile journals and in samizdat. In his letter from 12 December 1980, Racek attacked Thompson's exterminist perspective, pointing out that the belief that Soviet armaments were 'of a defensive nature […] not aggressive and imperialist, but bureaucratic and

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[39] The notion of *indivisible peace* comes from the Czechoslovak president Eduard Beneš at the time of the Munich Agreement. Although Paul Milyukov claims that the phrasing is of Soviet origin and was popularized by the British, it then had a different meaning. The one used after the second world war was the Czechoslovak understanding, which first reappeared in 1967 in the Manifesto of the Czechoslovak Writers Union, initiating the process of change that culminated in the Prague Spring. By then the concept had been disseminated in the west (the Manifesto was re-published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde*, *Herald Tribune* and *The Sunday Times*), but its career began only after the Charter held it up. It gained enormous popularity in the 1980s east-west dialogue. In 1985, the Initiative for East-West Dialogue made it the title of their book on European peace movements in which it reprinted a text by the Polish KOS under the same title – 'Peace is indivisible'. See: Paul Milyukov, '"Indivisible Peace" and the Two Blocs in Europe', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 15, 45 (1937), 577-587; Hubert Ripka, 'Indivisible Peace', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 16, 46 (1937), 71-81; Svědectví, 'Manifest Československych spisovatelů aneb jaká je pravda', *Svědectví* 33, IX (1967), 6; Initiative Ost-West Dialog, *Der Frieden ist unteilbar: Für ein Europa jenseits der Blöcke* (Berlin: Oberbaum Verlag, 1985).

[40] Racek's real name is Miloslav Bednář. He is a philosopher and was never part of the Charter movement. The fact that Thompson chose to engage in public dialogue with Racek shows both his determination to persuade eastern independents, as well as the constitutive quality of the label 'dissident' from which Racek benefited. Would Thompson perhaps have ignored the letter had it come from a western philosopher? Perhaps he suspected that it was Havel or Benda hiding behind the pseudonym? This is just speculation, but within the dialogue over peace many new voices from central Europe are seriously considered by western intellectuals and audiences, up to a point in the second half of the decade when very young and relatively unknown oppositionists were invited to comment on both domestic and international affairs in major western newspapers, or to meet key western politicians upon their visits to central Europe. See: Kacper Szulecki, 'The Figure of the Dissident: How Oppositionists Become Celebrities', paper presented at the Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen, 23 Nov. 2010.

[41] Václav Racek, 'List do Edwarda Thompsona', *Aneks* 33 (1984), 35-39; also Hauner, 'Charter 77'.

ideological' was unacceptable[42] and that 'ascribing an exterminist doctrine to both military blocs […] is rooted in a dangerous naïveté, widespread in the west' which makes the current peace movement resemble the appeasement advocates of the 1930s.[43] He accused Thompson of having a 'poor political foundation' if he sincerely believed that mere easing of tensions between the two superpowers could enhance democratization (on *both* sides of the iron curtain, that is). Finally, Racek argued that 'every disarmament movement makes sense and is a source of hope only if it also advocates for human rights.'[44]

Whereas Thompson's direct reply to the letter is rather disappointing and polemic,[45] his perspective changed perceptibly as a result of Racek's persuasion. In a meeting with Hungarian intellectuals in a Budapest flat in 1982, his views were much closer to those voiced by Racek than his own from 1980.[46] Later, his article *END and the Soviet 'Peace Offensive'*, published in *The Nation* in 1983, showed another important modification of his standpoint. Thompson notes that the Soviet leaders might not have had aggressive aims, but their deterring nuclear policies were very useful in petrifying the status quo in Europe. He also pointed out that 'the Soviet peace offensive' was only made for export and was accompanied by a harsh internal 'cold war' at home.[47] As a commentator noted, 'Thompson did not always have an understanding for the life of the Europeans in the Soviet Bloc, this article therefore signals an important evolution in his views.'[48] The peace movement's key intellectual was gradually accepting the role of the Soviets in the arms race and, more importantly, the impact that it had

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[42] That 'bureaucratic nature' is a notion that Thompson seems to have taken from an exchange with the Medvedev brothers: E. P. Thompson, 'Exterminism Reviewed', in his, *The Heavy Dancers* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 135-152, at 139.

[43] All the time Racek is targeting Thompson's views as expressed in *Notes on Exterminism*. Perhaps in light of the END Appeal, his critique would be less harsh. Quoted in: Racek, 'List', 36-37.

[44] Racek, 'List', 38 and 37. Cf. Jacques Rupnik, 'Wojna i pokój: Wstęp', *Aneks* 33 (1984), 5.

[45] Cf. *New Statesman*, 24 Apr. 1981. Hauner writes politely that 'Thompson tried several ways to dispel Racek's fears … but to no avail'. Judt was much blunter, calling the reply a 'patronizing dismissal' which speaks of 'the Czech dissidents' "naïve" desire for liberty'. He goes on to say that according to Thompson 'the benighted dissidents … had a "more inverted and more partial view of the world" than Thompson and his like-minded western colleagues'. See: Hauner, 'Charter 77', 8; Tony Judt, 'The Case of E. P. Thompson', *The New York Review of Books,* 15 Feb. 2007.

[46] E. P. Thompson, '"Normalizacja" Europy', *Aneks* 33 (1984), 21-34.

[47] Quoted in: Slinkman, 'O osobliwościach', 18.

[48] Slinkman, 'O osobliwościach', 18.

on the domestic situation in the Warsaw Pact states. The initial re-negotiation of the meaning of peace was thus achieved – domestic issues were acknowledged by the END leaders as needing to be discussed in relation to peace issues; they were no longer separate. But they were not yet considered as causally linked in the way the dissidents proposed. For that shift, they had to wait until at least 1986.

In April 1983, Thompson was finally directly approached by a Chartist. The former socialist politician from Brno, Prague Spring veteran, and later Charter 77 spokesman and political prisoner Jaroslav Šabata, sent an open letter to the END leader in which he for the first time laid out his idea for a peaceful Europe.[49] It is important to note that while Thompson's diagnoses of the structural and psychological mechanisms behind the Cold War were inspiring (although debatable), END was by that time heavily criticized for its failure to provide 'either a credible foreign policy or defence alternative'.[50] What Šabata put forth was just such an alternative – a *heretical geopolitics* from eastern Europe. Its key point was the 'democratic transformation of Europe' – resulting from a coalition of western peace movements and eastern independent human rights movement – and eventually aiming at the unification of Europe.[51] This, according to Šabata, was only possible with a united Germany and the removal of foreign military troops from both western and eastern Europe. As Hauner points out, that was the first time that 'the hitherto taboo subject of German unification had appeared as a discussion item in the non-governmental East-West dialogue; and it was to stay there until the collapse of the Wall'.[52] The democratiza-

[49] See: Jaroslav Šabata, 'Letter to E. P. Thompson,' in Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, eds., *Voices from Prague: Documents on Czechoslovakia and the Peace Movement* (London: Palach Press Ltd., 1983), 52-70.; The idea of 'heretical geopolitics' is discussed in: Kacper Szulecki, 'Heretic Geopolitics in the Late Cold War Era: Jaroslav Šabata, The Prague Appeal and the "Future Tense" Circle against the Yaltan Division of Europe', paper presented at the workshop *Außenbeziehungen in kulturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive: Zum Zusammenhang von Nationsbildungsprozessen, Geschichtskonstruktionen und inter-/transnationalen Strategien in osteuropäischen Staaten*, 5-6 Apr. 2011, Konstanz.

[50] Baehr, 'Thompson'.

[51] Quoted and discussed in: E. P. Thompson, 'Dopis Edwarda Thompsona Jaroslavu Šabatovi o míru, mírovém hnutí a lidských právech', *Listy* XIV (1984), 26-31.

[52] Hauner, 'Charter 77', 10. The notion that the 'German Question' should be discussed by the peace treaty was raised soon after Šabata's letter to Thompson in May 1983 at the END Conference in Berlin. Šabata made note of that shift in a later text, however, his voice, coming from the east and from a nation with a traditionally anxious attitude towards Germany, was perhaps more significant. He wrote: 'What we should do on this matter is to take all national resentment by the horns by radicalising the "German" proposal made at the Berlin Convention.' See: Jaroslav Šabata, 'Which way forward in Europe', *East European Reporter* 1, 1 (1985), 24-27.

tion of Europe was presented by Šabata as the precondition for a stable 'democratic peace' on the continent – a liberal idea which Thompson (also a leftist) made a note of.[53] It might be said that with the insistence on human rights and democracy, and the idea of 'internal peace', the Moravian dissident was moving the debate beyond the *realist* paradigm of both cold war statesmen and their western peace-movement critics *and* proposing a *liberal* or 'idealist' perspective.

Thompson's reply, although seemingly enthusiastic ('I could not answer by anything other than: YES! [...] if your ideas were expressed as a prayer rather than a letter, I would add to them – Amen'),[54] was in fact an expression of important disagreement. Thompson was not happy with the suggested unification of Europe, which he perceived as the possible emergence of an 'all-encompassing Eurostate',[55] whereas he believed that 'distinct differences in socio-economic and political systems will remain [on both sides of Yalta].'[56] Nor was he excited, in his strikingly British way, about the unification of Germany or even a final settlement between the two Germanys, for which he saw the demilitarization of Europe as a *precondition*.[57] Šabata's concepts would, however, become an important element in the east-west dialogue ever after and were expressed in full form in the 1985 Prague Appeal.

Whereas Charter 77 continued to address the western peace movement with a series of other letters and appeals until 1984,[58] Poland's 'older' dissidents and Solidarity activists remained preoccupied with the underground union struggle (or serving their prison sentences). However, a milieu of 20-30 year olds, often 'veterans' of Student Solidarity Committees (SKS) and later the Independent Student Association (NZS), turned to

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[53] E. P. Thompson, 'Decaying Ideological Rubbish', in *Heavy Dancers*, 295-346, at 301.

[54] Thompson, 'Dopis', 26. Interestingly, the text of the letter that was republished in Thompson's collected works is very different from the Czech version and does not contain that last ironic comment, although it is much longer. Compare: E. P. Thompson, 'The Two Sides of Yalta', in *Heavy Dancers*, 169-182.

[55] Thompson, 'Dopis', 30.

[56] This passage, evidently sceptical about the unification and democratization of Europe, is also very different in the Czech version – luckily for Thompson's reception in Czechoslovakia perhaps. See: Thompson, 'Two Sides', 181.

[57] There is not enough space in this chapter to discuss the debate on geopolitical issues, the 'German Question' and the emergence of the discourse of central Europe. For a wider discussion refer to: Szulecki, 'Heretical Geopolitics'.

[58] Charter's interest in peace issues and its output during the years 1980-1983 was summed up in Jiří Hájek, 'Charta 77 a současné mírové hnutí', *Listy* 13, 4 (1983), 12-14; as well as Vilém Prečan, 'Charta 77, Její vztah k otázkám míru a k soudobým mírovým hnutím', *Listy* 14, 2 (1984), 14-22.

different topics and activities. Many such younger oppositionists became affiliated with the Societal Resistance Committee (KOS), an underground group from Warsaw, and its fortnightly samizdat periodical *KOS*. The KOS group was the only part of the post-Solidarity opposition to sign the END Appeal, and thus entered the transnational END network – although not without ideational restraints. In May 1983, the final days of the 'state of war' in Poland, KOS published a declaration entitled *Solidarity in Defence of Peace*. Using the widespread fame and reputation of Solidarity, the authors of the declaration advanced their theory on peace, polemically engaging the western peace movement: 'States controlled by totalitarian political systems are a threat to world peace' whereas 'the form of totalitarianism currently constituting the largest threat for peace is the totalitarian communist system.'[59] They declared that:

> The defence of peace cannot be separated from the defence against totalitarianism, from the struggle for freedom and democracy
> It cannot be separated from combating poverty. Poverty in the Third World enhances totalitarianism's expansion, while within totalitarian states it enables the control over societies.
> It cannot be separated from the fight for human and civil rights […].
> We continue our struggle against totalitarianism, and in that we see our input to the struggle for peace […].
> We declare our solidarity with all the people, nations and organizations for whom the defence of peace and life on Earth is the most important issue.[60]

In a way, the 1983 KOS declaration was the 1981 END Appeal *a rebours*, a negative image written from an eastern European perspective. As such, it was welcomed with a degree of warmth – after all, it was the first time legitimate heirs of Solidarity had made a clear statement about peace issues. On the other hand though, it showed how far apart the initial standpoints of the Polish opposition and END were – and that distance was clearly greater than between the westerners and Charter 77 or the Hungarian Dialogue group. Disarmament is not mentioned at all in the declaration, nor is any responsibility of NATO implied (on the contrary – it is denied as 'propagandist hysteria').

Together with the declaration, KOS sent a letter to 'the members of peace and anti-nuclear movements in west Europe', and it was an important supplement to the declaration. The Letter's introduction was very much in line with the END Appeal. We read that the KOS members have 'respect and understanding' for the protest against 'armament madness' – 'Like you,

[59] Komitet Oporu Społecznego (KOS), 'Solidarność w obronie pokoju – Deklaracja', 20 May 1983, AO IV/25.02.01, KARTA Archives, Warsaw.

[60] KOS, 'Solidarność w obronie pokoju – Deklaracja', 20 May 1983, AO IV/25.02.01.

we also say NO to the arms race.'[61] However, discrepancies in viewpoints were also present. Unilateral disarmament is said not to 'serve the cause of peace' and the authors point to the propagandist usage of the peace movement in eastern Europe. Apart from introducing facts and constructing a positive framework for dialogue, the authors attempt an interesting rhetorical manoeuvre. 'We treat your protest as the defence of an elementary human right – the right to life.' In this way, END and other peace movements were being *constructed as an offshoot of human rights movements* – a fact which at that point in time would probably have been surprising if not highly debatable for their members.

The Letter ends with a heartfelt promise of an east European peace movement, also discussed in an essay by Dawid Warszawski: *Pacifism – Traps and Hopes*.[62] Warszawski, whose work was disseminated in western Europe, stated that the western peace movement needed the eastern independents – because only a democratisation in the east could in fact bring about peace. But more importantly maybe, the eastern independents – the Polish opposition in particular – needed the peace movement, because it was an important part of western public opinion and its attention was vital to supporting the dissident's domestic struggles. Warszawski thus proposed the establishment of a non-violent *dissident peace movement* in the sense that it should act openly, seek recognition in western public opinion and mobilize the society.

From then on, the problems of peace and disarmament were discussed almost every two weeks in the *KOS* periodical and the replies of different peace and human rights organizations from Poland and abroad were published under the heading *A Dialogue in Defence of Peace*. This process would eventually lead to the establishment of the first quasi-movement in April 1984, the Ranks of Peace and Solidarity, a joint initiative of the KOS

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[61] Komitet Oporu Społecznego (KOS), 'List KOS: Do uczestników ruchów pokojowych i antynuklearnych w krajach Europy Zachodniej', *KOS* [samizdat] 32 (1983). Some months later, the Committee issued a statement on the deployment of nuclear warheads in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Even though, due to 'the consistent fight of the Polish society with the regime', no new missiles would be stationed in Poland, KOS saw the 'additional growth of Soviet military supremacy in Europe' as a threat to the country's security. It thus called for the 'support for protest actions in both countries and the continuation, on both sides of the iron curtain, of the solidary struggle for a Europe free from nuclear weapons and all violence.' See: Komitet Oporu Społecznego, 'Oświadczenie Komitetu Oporu Społecznego w związku z zapowiedzią umieszczenia na terytorium Czechosłowacji i NRD sowieckich rakiet z głowicami atomowymi', 31 Oct. 1983, AO IV/25.02.02, KARTA Archives, Warsaw.

[62] Dawid Warszawski is the pen name of the journalist and political analyst Konstanty Gebert, which he uses until this day. Dawid Warszawski, 'Pacyfizm - pułapki i nadzieje,' *KOS* [samizdat] 32 (1983), 2-3.

and the radical Fighting Solidarity.[63] The reply from END that eventually arrived in late 1983 disappointed the Poles and confirmed all anti-pacifist prejudices instead of removing them. The Poles were accused of being unjust in their treatment of the USSR and were informed that unilateral disarmament of the west was a good way to break out of the vicious circle.[64] This single inconsiderate gesture can account for the prevailing hostility of the Polish independents towards END during the several years after the exchange.[65] In the second half of 1983, eastern European dissidents welcomed the news that Lech Wałęsa was to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. That fact helped in the rehabilitation of the word 'peace'.[66] Transnationally, Wałęsa's prize provided an additional boost to the argument for the inherent link between peace and human rights. One of the heroic dissident figures of that time – Zbigniew Bujak, a Solidarity leader who remained in hiding between 1981 and 1986 – stated that 'Wałęsa's Nobel Peace Prize is an indication that the fight for human rights is a path towards the erosion of the sources of war. And that is the path everyone fighting for peace ought to take.'[67]

1983 also saw the first public action on peace issues. The decision to deploy Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia caused a large scale protest in circles and places previously not associated with oppositional activity. A young Charter 77 signatory from Brno, Petr Pospichal, organized a petition against the nuclear missiles, which was signed by over a thousand people – a very large number for Czechoslovak realities. Pospichal remained in close contact with the nestor of the Brno opposition scene, Jaroslav Šabata. The latter was already at that point aware that a peace movement was also needed in Czechoslovakia. Pospichal saw in the organizational experience of the 1983 petition both the roots of the movement that would appear in the second half of the decade as well as the popularity that the issue of peace and disarmament had among the younger generation of Czechs.[68]

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[63] Solidarność Walcząca, 'Zawiązało się "Ogniwo Szeregów Pokoju i Solidarności"', *KOS* [samizdat] 53 (1984), 2; it was noticed and welcomed by the western pacifists: END, 'Independent Peace Moves in Poland', *END Journal* 10 (1984), 8.

[64] KOS, 'List do KOS-a od pacyfistów angielskich', *KOS* [samizdat] 47 (1984), 5.

[65] As late as 1987 at the END Convention in Coventry Stanisław Puzyna, the Polish delegate, noted that 'the END movement is strongly anti-American and at the same time strongly linked to the USSR's foreign policy'. Stanisław Puzyna, '6. Konwencja ruchu Europejskiego Rozbrojenia Nukleranego: Coventry, 15-19 VII 1987', *Czas Przyszły* [samizdat] 1, Dec. (1987), 31-57.

[66] KOS, 'Nobel '83', *KOS* [samizdat] 47 (1984), 3.

[67] Zbigniew Bujak, 'Oświadczenie Zbyszka Bujaka: Warszawa, 7 X 1983', *KOS* [samizdat] 41 (1983), 1.

[68] Interview with P. Pospichal, *Čelákovice*, 18 May 2010.

For Poland, an essay published in 1984 by an American sympathizer of Solidarity – Ivan Slinkman (a pseudonym of the political scientist David Ost) – provided important input for the Polish opposition to rethink some of its arguments and explore the differences between the eastern and western standpoints. Slinkman bashed Polish oppositionists as Polono-centric, as lacking understanding for global issues and concerns and as prejudiced against the western left and the peace movement.[69] Dawid Warszawski, whom Slinkman pointed out as the most alert supporter of the initiated dialogue, tried to persuade the American that the situations in the east and the west were indeed incomparable, and so were the US and the USSR. In a sentence that has been echoed in other statements since, he declared that 'your point of departure, is our longed point of arrival',[70] namely, democracy. The exchange between the two intellectuals created a map of divergences, but provided the easterners with a repertoire of convincing arguments. The important point of the critique that remained was that the Polish opposition would be unable to engage in universal debates on peace, until it at least was able to produce an independent peace movement of its own.

1985: The Emergence of 'Freedom and Peace' and the Prague Appeal

In the spring of 1985, several groups of people in different places, it seems, arrived at very similar ideas. Building on the transnational exchange of ideas and reacting to the transnational conditions of the time, the Czechoslovak dissidents issued what was to be one of the most important documents in the history of east European dissent. For their part, Polish activists established a new movement – 'Freedom and Peace' (WiP), a self-described pacifist Polish organization – which would begin putting the ideas of that document into action and which became a reference point for similar initiatives in the entire eastern bloc.

Judging from the eastern European dissidents' texts and personal accounts of these east-west contacts, it seems that the processes (described above) leading to the events of 1985 had been quite instrumental from the start – a process I have described elsewhere as a form of discursive hijacking.[71] The peace movement was an ally helping to publicize the dissident

[69] Slinkman, 'O osobliwościach'.

[70] Dawid Warszawski, 'O niektórych osobliwościach myślenia postępowego' *Vacat* [samizdat] 21 (1984), 25-29. American statesmen understood this better. Compare: Richard T. Davies, 'Introduction into the Founding Declaration of the Freedom and Peace Movement', available at www.tezeusz.pl/cms/tz/index.php?id=2085 (last visited April 2011).

[71] Kacper Szulecki, 'Hijacked Ideas'.

cause. It was an external pressure group that was very much needed at that time. But to perform the role that the eastern independents foresaw for it, it had to be altered into a variant of a human rights advocacy network. Already in 1983, KOS and Warszawski wrote that there was a need for 'a Polish peace movement with which the western peace movement could – had to – establish a dialogue' because

> the Polish society desperately needs to keep the interest of public opinion in the west with "the Polish question" […] [for] by ignoring western public opinion we risk the loss of an asset that could in the future turn out to be priceless.[72]

The creation in 1985 of WiP was thus a conscious manoeuvre, at the same time creating a real partner to talk with western pacifists and providing a means to fight the communist propaganda at home.[73] In public declarations, this exchange was to be reciprocal. But in internal statements, it was far more instrumental. When the idea of a peace movement was first discussed, Maciej Kuroń – son of the famous dissident leader Jacek Kuroń – argued: 'we have to think how the western peace movement can help us here, and not how we can help the western peace movement.'[74] Some, especially the conservative affiliates of the newly formed peace group, suggested that in its strategy 'the slogans of peace should be articulated last'.[75] One of the leaders of the nascent movements, Jacek Czaputowicz, pointed out:

> The political slogan of the peace movements in the west is unconditional disarmament, the postulate of the reduction of armaments. The entire cunningness of such a movement in Poland could be […] to put forth identical claims. Our propaganda uses the peace movements for its own interest […] by siding with them, we bring back a kind of political balance.[76]

Domestically, apart from the propaganda issue, the establishment of WiP was also a move to mobilize new sections of the society. A former WiP activist admits that pacifism was chosen as an issue not only because of actual convictions, but also because 'pacifist ideas have, contrary to the

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[72] Warszawski, 'Pacyfizm'.

[73] Jacek Czaputowicz, interview with the author, Warsaw, 16 March 2010.

[74] Quoted in: Vacat, 'Społeczeństwo polskie a ruchy pokojowe: 19.03.1985', *Vacat* [samizdat] 32/33 (1985), 70. Jacek Kuroń was probably the only prominent dissident in Poland who understood the need for a peace initiative and paid attention to peace issues. Some argue that the idea to establish WiP was actually his, or at least a result of his strong influence. See: Rafał Kalukin, 'Sandwicze kontra ZOMO', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 21 Aug. 2010.

[75] Konstanty Radziwiłł quoted in: Vacat, 'Społeczeństwo', 71.

[76] Vacat, 'Społeczeństwo', 71.

common opinion, a lot of potential, especially among the youth, but not only the youth.'[77] The establishment of WiP was a very important practical step in the east-west dialogue. But ideationally, more important impulses came almost at the same time from Czechoslovakia. On March 11, Charter 77 published the Prague Appeal, intended as an open letter to the Amsterdam convention.[78] The English translation appeared some weeks later in the first issue of the newly established *East European Reporter*. The exilic periodical soon became a multifunctional platform – integrating central European (Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish, as its editors)[79] dissent and providing western publics with reliable and fresh updates on the dissident's activities, publications etc. The Polish underground press reprinted a translation of the Appeal later that year – which is just one piece of evidence for the intensified circulation and communication that kicks-off in 1985.

The Prague Appeal made a coherent argument for the need to merge peace and human rights advocacy. In a non-confrontational manner, it introduced the notion of indivisible peace, as well as the distinction between *internal* and *external* peace – that only peace within countries (between governments and societies) can bring international peace. It also pointed to the Helsinki Accords and the CSCE as a pan-European Project which could secure peace in Europe in harmony with human rights and political freedoms and without the two antagonistic military blocs. Most famously it proposed the idea of *Helsinki from below* – the need for grassroot cooperation and the creation of links between independent civil initiatives, thus giving 'real life' to the Helsinki Accords.[80]

The Appeal gave a new direction to the activities of large parts of the eastern European opposition, but more importantly acted as a source of inspiration for the emerging east-west network and so, was the key docu-

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[77] Jan Żuro quoted in Padraic Kenney, *Wrocławskie zadymy* (Wrocław: ATUT, 2007), 141.

[78] Charta 77, 'Pražská výzva', *Informace o Charte* 8 (1985); Charta 77, 'The Prague Appeal', *East European Reporter* 1, 1 (1985), 27-28.

[79] Although the focus was on central Europe in the narrow sense of Milan Kundera's essay – Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland – the periodical's sponsors insisted that the title read 'East European Reporter'.

[80] The term 'Helsinki from below' appears in Czechoslovak literature (as well as Padraic Kenney's *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003]). The term was introduced to me by J. Šabata, while the western peace activists speak of a 'détente from below'. Seemingly, this is the same idea. There are just two nuances. Firstly, eastern dissidents were not very happy with the concept of détente and not willing to use the word. Additionally, the role of the Helsinki Accords is underlined in the expression 'Helsinki from below', a component which 'détente from below' did not have.

ment that effectively enabled the 'hijacking' of the peace movement by the dissidents. Why was it so important? It might seem that the ideas contained in it had already been articulated. The difference was in the non-confrontational tone of the document, as well as in the authority that its authors had due to a lasting dialogue with the western peace movement. Šabata's vision, which was recognized by Thompson after their exchange of letters in 1983-84, definitely played a role. But so did Havel's reputation and the general dissident 'magic' of Charter 77. What is more, the document's strident argument made it appealing and last but not least, it was published at exactly the right time.

Yet there was one more factor. The Appeal also had a peculiar 'appendix'. In May 1985, Havel published the famous essay *Anatomy of Reticence*, also addressed to the Amsterdam Convention.[81] The essay explained the nuances of the east-west relations, the misunderstandings on peace issues, the problems that eastern European dissidents encountered and sketched the perspectives for joint actions. In a genre characteristic for Havel, an essay, which in fact introduces a character (the eastern peace activist) who becomes a protagonist of a seductive drama, the Czech writer was able to reach a level of understanding with the western audiences that no manifesto or appeal could ever match: 'and now try to imagine, my dear western peace activist that you confront this half-exhausted citizen with the question of what he is willing to do for world peace.'[82] However, Havel was not just being nice and sympathetic. On the contrary, *Anatomy* is underpinned with a certain regret and accusation that the Prague Appeal is free of. Havel mocks the western peace movement's own reticence towards the eastern independents:

> When it comes to the 'dissidents' in Eastern Europe, the prevailing mood seems to be one of reticence, of caution, if not of outright distrust and uneasiness. […] Absorbed in their provincial concerns, exaggerating human rights (as if human survival were not more important!) […] for [the peace movement] the dissidents tend to appear as a fifth column of western establishments east of the Yalta line.[83]

All this is not meant as scorning the 'naïve Westerners', rather a therapeutic exercise to create mutual trust: 'I think that a mutual exchange of such hard truths, with no punches pulled, is the first precondition for any meaningful European rapprochement.'[84]

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[81] Havel, 'Anatomy'.

[82] Ibid., 299.

[83] Ibid., 291-292.

[84] Ibid., 296.

In sum, what Havel did was to take the ideas of the Prague Appeal and explain them, illustrate them and play them out in a flamboyant 30 page essay that is both witty and inspiring. All this had an impact on the END process as well. WiP also sent a letter to the Convention, introducing themselves and stating similar points to the Prague Appeal by which they were apparently inspired.[85] However, unlike KOS and despite its clear orientation on peace, the new Polish movement was not willing to sign the END Appeal, which due to its anti-nuclear focus seemed fairly uninteresting. A new agenda was already emerging.

1986-1989: Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords

Even before 1985 a genuine interest in east-west independent contacts had begun to emerge within the western peace movement. Around 1983 in Germany, the idea of 'individual peace treaties' between the GDR and the FRG (and West Berlin) was born. The notion of changing the level and scope of contacts and finding new channels for the relaxation of cold war tensions would eventually be termed *détente from below*. The 3rd END Convention in Perugia marks a shift after which the idea of east-west cooperation gains priority or at least starts to live a life of its own in the institutional form of the Initiative for East-West Dialogue (founded back in 1983). At Perugia, a controversial protest performance by some activists emphasizing the need to collaborate with independent groups in authoritarian states caused a major dispute among the conference participants and fuelled the on-going debate that had divided END since its inception: should there be cooperation with the official peace clubs in the east and what was then to be the status of contacts with the independents.[86] The perspective after Perugia noticeably changed such that the 1985 END Convention in Amsterdam was dominated by eastern European issues. [87]

Different western European organizations independently and through the Initiative for East-West Dialogue led by Dieter Esche began to intensify the contacts with dissidents. The Dutch IKV was the first to establish strong links in eastern Europe, especially in Poland. The reasons here were perhaps pragmatic and ideational. One was that a Dutchman of Polish descent Jan Minkiewicz, who was the Solidarity, KOS and later WiP contact per-

[85] Jacek Czaputowicz, interview with the author, Warsaw, 16 March 2010.

[86] Patrick Burke, 'A Transcontinental Movement of Citizens? Strategic Debates in the 1980s Western Peace Movement', in Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney, eds., *Transnational Moments of Change* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 189-206, at 189.

[87] Igor Lewy, 'Nie tylko pokój', *Vacat* [samizdat] 34, Sept.-Oct. (1985), 75-78.

son, lived in Amsterdam.[88] The other was that as a Christian organization, the IKV was received with somewhat less reticence than 'leftist pacifists'. It was also not anonymous – contrary to other strands of the peace movement, it actively sought contacts already earlier, with the Solidarity, and kept in touch with the Cracow based liberal Catholic group formed around the *Znak* monthly.[89] But even they were at first kept at arm's length. This was visible when Faber and Wolfgang Müller, another IKV leader, visited Warsaw in April 1985.[90]

After meeting veteran opposition figures Wałęsa, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Kuroń, Faber was interviewed by Czaputowicz for the samizdat periodical *Vacat*, and the conversation was a rite-of-passage and a peculiar test for the Dutch activist in which he needed to challenge the prejudices of the Polish oppositionists towards the peace movement.[91] He was asked specifically if IKV maintained contacts with the official peace groups in the east, if he saw Solidarity as a potential partner for the peace movement, and what he could say about the accusations that the peace movement was financed by Moscow. Face-to-face contacts helped break the ice. Faber passed the test, and, as was already mentioned, the IKV provided a link between the nascent Polish initiative and END. Another link was made up of the contacts previously established by the KOS group, which (among others) included a partnership with the French peace group CODENE.

There was a growing feeling that the disarmament focus and language of the 1980 END Appeal was becoming out-dated. Based on that feeling, the European Network for East-West Dialogue began work on a new document. The Prague Appeal's suggestion that the Helsinki process was something that should be used by the independent groups on both sides of the iron curtain rather than be discarded, served as a departure point for what was initially called *Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords: A Memoran-*

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[88] Kenney writes that Minkiewicz urged Kuroń in a letter in 1984 to take a fresh, unbiased look at the western peace movements and soon after that (Spring 1985) he received phone calls from the younger Warsaw oppositionists – one of them was Czaputowicz – asking if he would consider representing WiP. Kenney, *Carnival*, 96; on the role of 'dissident interpreters' like Minkiewicz, Kavan and the Smolar brothers, see: Szulecki, 'Hijacked Ideas', 282.

[89] Ben ter Veer, Mient Jan Faber and Jan ter Laak, 'List otwarty do Jacka Kuronia: Styczeń 1985', *Vacat* [samizdat] 32/33 (1985), 65.

[90] Christie Miedema, 'The Transnationality of Dutch Solidarity with the Polish Opposition 1980-1989', *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire / Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis* 89 (2011), 1307-1330.

[91] Mient Jan Faber, 'Nie jesteśmy za jednostronnym rozbrojeniem' *Vacat* 27, IV (1985), 38-41.

dum to European Peoples and Governments.[92] It is interesting to compare an early, western-initiated version of the *Memorandum* with its final, eastern-influenced version.

In an early sketch of the *Memorandum*, the authors proposed a structure which emulated that of the Helsinki Accords[93] in which *Human Rights and the Self-determination of Peoples* (III Basket) come last.[94] Each part discussed different specific topics. A link was also made to the END Appeal and the draft indeed looked like an update of that document. Disarmament issues for example, played an important role and were discussed in minute detail. On the other hand, human rights concerns appeared only on page 27 of the 40 page draft. The authors also believed that although independent groups in the east were a natural partner for the peace movement, this 'should not exclude contacts with official eastern peace councils'.[95]

The final version of the *Memorandum*, prepared on the eve of the Vienna CSCE Summit in April 1986, was the result of an intensive transnational creative process at a previously unknown scale. Dozens of groups and hundreds of individuals took part in both 'halves of Europe'. In Czechoslovakia it was naturally Charter 77 (which was more isolated) and although sending comments on the first draft quite late, they were too significant to be ignored. In Poland it was WiP, KOS and the Polish Helsinki Committee (the latter, clearly a human rights organisation).

Comparing the early draft with the final published version shows the importance of the eastern European input as well as the shift that a part of the western peace movement's political elite made – away from just the disarmament postulates of the END Appeal and towards peace issues understood broadly and with a strong link to human rights and freedom. The Prague Appeal is openly acknowledged as an 'important stimulus' in the *Preface*.[96] 'We oppose any tendency to play off peace against freedom' – so the cover states. The structure of the text is completely altered with the idea of *détente from below* introduced early on, while the section on

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[92] Śliwa suggests that the Prague Appeal was 'the immediate driving force' that led to the works on the *Memorandum*. See: Śliwa, 'Ruch', 30.

[93] The authors listed are: Dieter Esche, Georg Breuer (Ind. Peace Initiative), Sylvie Mantrand (CODENE), Christian Semler (Initiative Ost-West-Dialog), Wim Bartels and Wolfgang Müller (both IKV) as well as Jan Minkiewicz (then already WiP spokesman).

[94] European Network for East-West Dialogue, *Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords (Draft): A Memorandum to the European Peoples and Governments* (Berlin 1985). I thank Padraic Kenney for sharing this document.

[95] *Ibid.*, 38.

[96] European Network for East-West Dialogue, *Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords: A Memorandum Drawn Up in Common by Independent Groups and Individuals in Eastern and Western Europe* (Berlin: European Network for East-West Dialogue, 1986), 3.

human rights proper follows security, but precedes economy (breaking with the original Helsinki Accords setup). The *Memorandum*, although it failed to visibly influence the inter-governmental CSCE process before 1990, began 'a firm shift in the optics of western European and American peace movements towards cooperation with eastern Europe and human rights advocacy'.[97]

Face to face contacts across the bloc divide were becoming more frequent, enhancing the exchange of ideas and enabling further exchanges regarding the divergent standpoints on peace issues. Western peace activists were travelling to the east and meeting their counterparts. CODENE members met WiP affiliates in November 1985, and the German 'Greens' debated with the Polish activists and issued a joint statement as a result.[98] Simultaneously, although travelling to the west was still very difficult for the Poles and almost impossible for the Czechs and Slovaks, interesting tours were taking place. Czaputowicz travelled to the west in the autumn of 1985, but it was the then 23-year-old student from Warsaw and WiP activist Piotr Niemczyk who managed to establish important new contacts and break some remaining ice. Kenney writes:

> Minkiewicz showed Niemczyk around the Dutch social movement scene, where Niemczyk made a great impression. He looked like one of them in his military castoff-style clothes and high leather punk boots. Niemczyk was arrested shortly after his return home, as was Czaputowicz. Both were charged, among other things, with harming Poland through their contacts with western peace organizations. This was for them a sign that they had struck a raw nerve, and it was one they would continue to probe throughout WiP's existence.[99]

Czaputowicz and Niemczyk's imprisonment, instead of taming the new movement and muting the transnational dialogue, seemed to invigorate it further. In their story and their 'cause', freedom and peace were blended in a tangible way. They were peace activists from eastern Europe who were imprisoned for their struggle – a fact that called for solidarity, and so, human rights advocacy on behalf of the 'disarmament' END and other movements.

Although contacts and exchanges were getting more intense, for reticence to give way to trust and understanding their scale had to be amplified. The first opportunity arose in 1987 when the WiP's Warsaw activists

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[97] Śliwa, 'Ruch', 31. Cf. Jacek Czaputowicz, 'Wyjście z zaścianka', *KOS* [samizdat] 104 (1986), 4.

[98] WiP / Die Grünen, 'The Common Declaration of the Freedom and Peace Movement and die Gruenen from West Germany,' available at www.tezeusz.pl/cms/tz/index.php?id=2088 (last visited Sept. 2011).

[99] Kenney, *Carnival,* 96.

proposed the organization of an east-west peace seminar – this time in Poland. The idea, seen as too radical and received coldly by much of the Solidarity leadership, was nevertheless acted upon, and between 7 and 10 May 1987, some sixty foreign activists met over two hundred Polish oppositionists to discuss peace, human rights and environmental issues under the general heading *International Peace and the Helsinki Accords*. The seminar was a ground-breaking event in the history of the eastern European opposition and its transnational contacts.[100]

The idea of an international conference held in eastern Europe was then replicated in Budapest (November 1987), Moscow (December 1987), Kraków (August 1988 – with over a thousand participants) and two disrupted seminars in Prague (1988). They were attended by many leading figures of the western peace movement – Joanne Landy chaired the Warsaw panel *Peace has a Name – Giving New Life to the Helsinki Accords*; Mary Kaldor helped organize semi-clandestine meetings in Prague,[101] where there were representatives of END, IKV, the German 'Greens' and many others. Śliwa summed up the 1987 Warsaw seminar:

> It was the largest direct encounter between the Polish opposition and the representatives of European and American social and political movements ever. At the time, it was seen as a change in the course of the western European left, and a significant shake up in its good relations with the eastern officials. Perhaps that is overstated, but it is clear that after the Warsaw meeting and at the following END conventions in Coventry and Lund, the eastern European vision of peace understood through the prism of human rights – was dominant.[102]

[100] Also indirect contacts such as exchanges of letters intensified and were regarded with attention on both sides of the iron curtain. A good example is the interview Joanne Landy gave to a WiP periodical in 1987, which spawned polemics from both Orłoś and Niemczyk and a reply from Landy. The exchange was published both in the Polish underground press and the *Peace Magazine*. Thanks to the *East European Reporter*, *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, *La Nouvelle Alternative* and even *Newsweek*, such exchanges were becoming more frequent and dynamic towards the end of the decade. See: Kazimierz Orłoś, Piotr Niemczyk and Joanne Landy, 'Poles Apart: Letters from Warsaw and New York City,' *Peace Magazine* 4, 1 (1988); Joanne Landy, 'Odpowiedź na list P. Niemczyka wraz z uwagami o tekście K. Orłosia,' *Czas Przyszły [samizdat],* Sept. (1987), 62-67.

[101] Joanne Landy, 'Worth Every Disrupted Minute: Interview', *East European Reporter* 3, 3 (1988), 22-24.

[102] Śliwa, 'Ruch', 32.

Conclusion: Did the dissidents change the peace movement?

The shift towards cooperation with eastern European independent groups and towards human rights, downplaying nuclear disarmament, was not welcomed unanimously. The Perugia and Amsterdam END Conventions rather marked an internal fissure within the already very diverse peace coalition. The Helsinki memorandum of 1986 was received with reserve in some circles due to its clear option for human rights and 'détente from below'. As a peculiar example, a German END group accused the authors of being 'western-centric' because of the emphasis they put on human rights in eastern Europe.[103] The older END activists were opposing the east-west independent collaboration, especially to the extent that it was precluding simultaneous collaboration with the official peace clubs. But the two détentes, from above and from below, were mutually exclusive for the dissidents.

In its last, rather desperate attempt to regain control over the peace network, the END Liaison Committee organizing the 1988 Lund Convention sent out invitations to [...] the Communist parties from all east European countries except Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian, Yugoslav and East German independent peace groups boycotted the event, while almost all dissident groups made bitter remarks in letters and statements. It also caused an outcry in END's own ranks. Landy wrote that 'many delegates were distressed by the lack of prominence given to East-bloc independents at the [...] Convention, and the failure of Convention organizers to press East-bloc governments to allow independents to come to England.'[104] Eighty-two activists, including Faber, Landy, Kaldor, Petra Kelly and E. P. Thompson signed a letter expressing both opposition to the Liaison Committee's policy and solidarity with the eastern independents.

Finally, the main organizers of the 1988 Lund Convention declared that it would promote 'civil détente' rather than continue down the path of the Liaison Committee.[105] Kuroń and the Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, who for unknown reasons were granted passports and could attend the Lund meeting, 'had a major impact on the tenor of the convention' by

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[103] END German-German Working Group, 'A Response to the Document "Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords"', *Bulletin of the European Network for East-West Dialogue* Trial September (1987), 16-18. The group also suggested that nuclear armament is the cause of human rights abuse, both in eastern and western Europe.

[104] Joanne Landy, 'To defend END's non-alignment, we must oppose admission of the Hungarian peace council to the Liaison Committee', *Bulletin of the European Network for East-West Dialogue* Trial, September (1987).

[105] Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, 'Storm over the Peace Movement,' *Bulletin of the European Network for East-West Dialogue* Trial, September (1987), 53-54.

'discussing developments in the eastern bloc from the perspective of democratic activism'; they also repeatedly expressed their satisfaction at the degree to which the peace movement had internalized the notion of 'indivisible peace'.[106]

On the whole, by 1988 the European 'disarmament' movement became much more interested in human rights and détente from below than mere nuclear disarmament – and the role of ideas and activities of the eastern European dissident groups is clear (especially Charter 77 and WiP, but also the East German pacifists, Hungarian Dialogue, the Slovenian Peace Movement Working Group, as well as the younger Czechoslovak dissenters from Independent Peace Association (NMS), the Jazz Section and the John Lennon Peace Club). This is a somewhat forgotten heritage of central European dissent, rooted in the lived experience of authoritarianism, as well as evidence of the dissidents' transnational impact. The dialogue ended quite abruptly after 1989 when former dissidents took up positions of power within their states and once they had a chance of doing politics 'from above', there was little enthusiasm anymore for 'Helsinki from below'.

[106] Landy, 'Every Minute', 24.