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THE POLITICS OF SECURITY ACROSS THE 'IRON CURTAIN'

PEACE MOVEMENTS IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY IN THE 1980S

This chapter analyses the peace movements in both parts of Germany during the 1980s from a perspective that transcends the ideological and geopolitical divides of the cold war. In particular, it explores what the debates over the peace movements might tell us about the security relationships within NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In so doing, this chapter wants to get us to think about the ways in which conceptualising these movements beyond the divisions that the cold war created – the divisions into a *free* western Europe and an eastern Europe whose elites claimed to be in the process of realising a socialist *peace* – might enable us to gain novel insights into the transition that occurred in 1989.

I am interested in highlighting how the protests in both German polities responded to the same historical conjuncture: the domestic political and social consequences that arose from the modernisation of nuclear weapons from the mid-1970s into the 1980s. Through this optic, this chapter seeks to investigate the conditions of possibility for the non-violence of the 1989 revolutions in both east and west.²

The political conditions in both parts of the country differed fundamentally from each other. While protesters in the Federal Republic were, in general, able to enjoy the freedom to express their views in the context of a pluralist liberal democracy, their counterparts in the GDR faced severe

¹ Cf. the conceptual suggestions by Christoph Kleßmann, 'Verflechtung und Abgrenzung: Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 29-30 (1993), 30-41; and Martin Sabrow, 'Confrontation and Cooperation: Relations between the Two German Historio-graphies', in Christoph Kleßmann, ed., *The Divided Past: Rewriting Post-War German History* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 128.

² See the landmark contribution by Martin Sabrow, ed., *1989 und die Rolle der Gewalt* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012).

and significant personal and political costs for their actions. Nevertheless, what is striking about the protests is the extent to which they were linked and connected, not only in terms of the themes they addressed and the exchange of ideas and concepts across the 'iron curtain', but also in the ways in which governments perceived them as mirror images in the cold war for ideas. Whereas the peace movements appeared as the results of communist infiltration in the west, the GDR government interpreted the independent peace movement in the east as a consequence of an infiltration of the country by 'dangerous bourgeois-capitalist pacifists'.

The historiography on the end of the cold war has so far focused primarily either on the role of the two superpowers or on the direct impact of social movements and pressure groups on political processes. The most interesting scholarship has highlighted the importance of transnational actors in influencing Gorbachev's policies and the input of human rights activism following the Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) from the mid-1970s onwards.³ Historians have, however, rarely discussed two-way influences, and they have often concentrated on high politics rather than on what might be termed the micro-politics of the cold war, in other words the set of assumptions, political rules and processes that undergirded diplomacy and governmental decision making on a societal level. Or they have written the organisational histories of peace groups in the GDR.⁴

The body of historical research that has engaged with peace movements, in particular Jeffrey Herf's pathbreaking study *War by other Means*, has emphasised the West German peace movement's links with the communist

³ Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Did Peace through Strength End the Cold War?', International Security 16, 1 (1991), 162-188; Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also the more recent work by Helmut Altrichter and Hermann Wentker, eds., Der KSZE-Prozess: Vom Kalten Krieg zu einem neuen Europa 1975 bis 1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011); Anja Hanisch, Die DDR im KSZE-Prozess 1972-1985: Zwischen Ostabhängigkeit, Westabgrenzung und Ausreisebewegung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012); Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁴ Thomas Klein, "Frieden und Gerechtigkeit!": Die Politisierung der Unabhängigen Friedensbewegung in Ost-Berlin während der 80er Jahre (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007); Maria Nooke, Für Umweltverantwortung und Demokratisierung: Die Forster Oppositionsgruppe in der Auseinandersetzung mit Staat und Kirche (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2008) and Marianne Subklew-Jeutner, Der Pankower Friedenskreis: Geschichte einer oppositionellen Gruppe innerhalb der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR 1981-1984 (Osnabrück: Der Andere Verlag, 2004); Matthias Kluge, Das Christliche Friedensseminar Königswalde bei Werdau: Ein Beitrag zu den Ursprüngen der ostdeutschen Friedensbewegung in Sachsen (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2004).

regimes in East Berlin and Moscow, has sought to negate peace and disarmament activists as autonomous actors, and has insisted that the sponsorship of peace movement activism, if not the peace activism itself, was a function of ideological cold warfare.⁵ As Benjamin Ziemann has argued forcefully, peace historians have, by contrast, tended to exaggerate peace protesters' direct influence on political decision-making as well as their effectiveness in shaping and directing public opinion more generally. Only more recently have historians begun to analyse the debates about peace and security in the 1980s from a more holistic perspective, although they have only rarely paid attention to the connective history of the campaigns.⁷ Likewise, the history of the East German peace movement has been written mostly from the perspective of German unification in 1989-90. Many former activists have chosen to re-interpret their campaigns as civil-rights, rather than peace activism. And many historians have read the history of the civil-rights movement of 1989-90 backwards in order to show its importance, or ignored it altogether in order to highlight the totalitarian character of the GDR.8

⁵ Jeffrey Herf, War By Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991); Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke, eds., Die verführte Friedensbewegung: Der Einfluss des Ostens auf die Nachrüstungsdebatte (Munich: Olzog, 2001); Matthias Ploetz and Hans-Peter Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung? DDR und UdSSR im Kannpf gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss (Münster: Lit, 2004). As a critique see Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann, 'Do All Paths Lead to Moscow? The NATO Dual-track Decision and the Peace Movement – a Critique', Cold War History 12, 1 (2012), 1-24.

⁶ See on this: Benjamin Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War.' Introduction, in idem, ed., *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War* (Essen: Klartext, 2008), 11-38, at 17, cf. my review of the work of Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb*, 3 vols (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993-2003), www.hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2004-3-007 (last visited 3 Jan. 2012).

⁷ See Christoph Becker-Schaum, et al., eds., "Entrüstet Euch!" Nuklearkrise, NATO-Doppelbeschluss und Friedensbewegung (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012); Eckart Conze, 'Modernitätsskepsis und die Utopie der Sicherheit: NATO-Nachrüstung und Friedensbewegung in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik', Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History, online edition 7, 2 (2010), available at www. zeithistorischeforschungen.de/16126041-Conze-2-2010ZHF (last visited 3 Jan. 2012); Philipp Gassert et al., eds., Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011); Kacper Szulecki, 'Hijacked Ideas: Human Rights, Peace and Environmentalism in Czechoslovak and Polish Dissident Discourses', East European Politics and Societies 25, 2 (2011), 272-295.

⁸ See the review article by Gerd Dietrich, 'Literaturbericht: Opposition, Widerstand und Bürgerbewegung in der DDR', *H-Soz-Kult*, available at www.hsozkult.geschichte.huberlin.de/rezensionen/type=rezbuecher&id=1764 (last visited 1 June 2011) as well as Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, *Endspiel: Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009).

Parallel Histories of Peace Activism

Protests against nuclear weapons reappeared in West German politics in the mid-to-late-1970s in the context of discussions over the deployment of medium-range and cruise missiles as well as novel 'neutron bomb' weapons. Various organisations mobilised thousands of supporters, while the Social Democratic (SPD) and Free Democratic (FDP) coalition government discussed the deployment in the context of mainstream politics. The protests culminated in large nationwide demonstrations before, during and after the NATO summit in Bonn. On 22 October 1983, 300,000 activists protested in Bonn, 350,000 in Hamburg and 100,000 in West Berlin. Thousands of protesters formed a 108 km-long human chain on roads between the US forces European Command in Stuttgart and the city of Ulm on the Baden-Württemberg / Bavarian border. Although rarely acknowledged in the literature, the West German protests continued after the deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles in the winter of 1983-84, albeit on a smaller scale. Peace camps and blockades, still bringing together significant numbers of activists, continued in West Germany from the mid-1980s to the late 1980s, albeit less visibly on a national level. Moreover, many activists gave their protests new forms by campaigning within party and trade union organisations.

In the GDR, independent peace groups first emerged in the context of the debates about the churches' attitudes towards conscription and the GDR government's more accommodating policies towards religion from the 1970s onwards. From the late 1970s and early 1980s, galvanised by the growing fears about the arms race and the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) hard-line stance on domestic politics, the peace groups began to form a movement that came to be linked through a number of GDR-wide 'peace workshops' and 'peace decades' (Friedensdekaden) that sought to capitalise on official peace campaigns by highlighting fears about nuclear weapons within new political environments. Most prominent amongst these were the campaigns 'Swords into Ploughshares' from 1980 onwards as we all as the 'Berlin Appeal: Create Peace without Weapons' in 1982. After 1983, the Protestant church held peace seminars that harkened back to smaller scale localised events organised by former Bausoldaten in the mid-1970s. Bausoldaten (literally 'construction soldiers') were those who had refused on ethical grounds to serve in the army with weapons and were instead placed in units concerned with the building of military infrastructure.

⁹ An excellent overview of these groups is provided by Ehrhart Neubert, *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1997), 366-418.

Bausoldaten were unique to the GDR and did not exist in other eastern European countries. The arrangement initially emerged out of a practical problem and was never really formally advertised by the GDR government.¹⁰

The first group to leave the fold and protection of the Protestant church entirely and organise independently was the 'Initiative for Peace and Human Rights' (IFM), founded in Berlin in 1985. 11 All these campaigns were supported by an increasingly lively movement across the GDR and a growing samizdat press, such as IFM's journal *Grenzfall* and the *Umweltblätter*. The latter was published by the *Berliner Umweltbiliothek* ('Berlin Environmental Library'), which had been founded in the wake of the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, and it sought to connect the issues of environmental and peace protests. 12 Although rarely explicitly acknowledged in the historiography, networks of activists around these groups and journals continued to campaign well into 1989 under the heading of peace *and* civil rights. This was true for the protests against the manipulation of the May 1989 elections in the GDR and continued into the autumn of 1989. 13

From the mid-1970s onwards, peace activism in East and West Germany was closely connected through the international context in which it emerged. It was not only the result of NATO's decision in 1979 to request the removal of a new generation of Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles from Europe and, if this did not happen, to threaten the deployment of intermediate range missiles. It also accompanied growing tensions in world politics: the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the declaration of martial law in Poland in winter 1981 in order to crush the emerging opposition around the independent trade union Solidarność, as well as the US interventions in Honduras and Guatemala. Fundamentally, the debate had its origins in the modernisation of nuclear weapons technologies beginning in the late 1960s and the implications this had for the US security guarantee for western Europe. At the time, negotiations between the Soviet Union

¹⁰ Bernd Eisenfeld and Peter Schicketanz, Bausoldaten in der DDR: Die Zusammenführung feindlich-negativer Kräfte in der NVA (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2011), chs. 3.2, 3.3 and 5.4.

¹¹ See the overview in Konrad H. Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 33-44.

¹² Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ed., *Freiheit und Öffentlichkeit: Politischer Samisdat in der DDR: Eine Dokumentation* (Berlin: Robert Havemann Gesellschaft, 2002); Melanie Arndt, *Tschernobyl: Auswirkungen des Reaktorunfalls auf die Bundesrepublik und die DDR* (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 2011).

 $^{^{13}}$ See, for example, 'Die Opposition der DDR geht an den Start', die tageszeitung (taz), 15 Aug. 1989.

and the United States on the limitation or even reduction of long-range strategic nuclear weapons had only just begun.¹⁴

More generally, peace activism in both parts of Germany emerged when the governments attempted to prepare the populations for a new stage in the superpower conflict through heightened propaganda against the respective cold war enemy as well as an increase in civil defence propaganda and drills. In the GDR, this went hand in hand with efforts to create a combatready and more militarised society through greater attention to military education in secondary schools and a new emphasis on conscription. These debates not only reinforced both societies' sense of alarm about the renewed tensions, they also led to a growing uneasiness and splits within the governments – a development that created a multitude of links between governmental, party-political and societal activism. It is true that the Soviet Union had been seeking to exploit these splits since the mid-1970s by combining a proposal to the United Nations for a treaty on the world-wide non-use of force with a propaganda campaign in western Europe. 16

The decisive surge in protest activity occurred only after the social democrat Egon Bahr, together with Willy Brandt (one of the main architects of Ostpolitik), openly criticised chancellor Helmut Schmidt for following US policies too closely and thus giving up German national interests for the sake of the alliance. This criticism first emerged after documents had been leaked that the US government had developed and intended to deploy a new kind of weapon, a 'neutron bomb', which could destroy human beings but would leave buildings intact. While the Schmidt government had endeavoured to prevent such a debate about nuclear weapons, it was a member of his own government who breached the consensus of staying silent and thus opened up geopolitics for public scrutiny. 17 The link between organised and movement politics could also be seen in the GDR, albeit on different levels and with different intensity. It was only in the context of the complex and problematic discussions between the East German government and the churches about their role in socialism that significant political space emerged in which peace activists were emboldened to

¹⁴ Leopoldo Nuti, 'The Origins of the 1979 Dual Track Decision - a Survey', in idem, ed., Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975-1985 (London: Routledge, 2008), 57-71.

¹⁵ On the background, see Christian Sachse, *Aktive Jugend – wohlerzogen und diszi*pliniert: Wehrerziehung in der DDR als Sozialisations- und Herrschaftsinstrument (1960-1973) (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000).

Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1976/II, Document 307, 1397-1404.

¹⁷ Egon Bahr, 'Ist die Menschheit dabei, verrückt zu werden?', *Vorwärts* 29 (21 Jul. 1977), 4. On the background see Kristina Spohr Readman, 'Germany and the politics of the neutron bomb, 1975-1979', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 21, 2 (2010), 259-285.

vent their opinions. This created the conditions in which groups were able to develop policies that diverged from the official statements of the SED.¹⁸

For instance, it was in this context that the glaring contrast between the GDR and the Soviet Union's roles as 'peace states' and the practice of militarising GDR society was first voiced. The peace movements that began to appear in both German polities at this time were responses to the threats to personal and national security that, activists argued, were being ignored by their governments. Whereas both governments defined 'security' in terms of an equilibrium of forces between east and west that made the stationing of new weapons necessary, peace activists argued for an 'alternative' form of security that highlighted personal needs. ¹⁹

Both populations were already highly sensitised to their 'security' as well as towards environmental issues that transcended national boundaries. And yet, what is striking is the extent to which activists interpreted the events from a pronouncedly German perspective; engagement with protests around the world remained marginal and rhetorical in the west, and even the East German activists showed little reaction to the upheavals in Poland. Rather, it was the GDR government's tightening of security in the wake of the Polish events and the further infringements on freedoms that fuelled their protests.

Peace movement activism was especially controversial in the German-German context. The GDR government regarded itself as a peace state – independent peace activism was, therefore, by definition impossible. If it occurred, this meant that not peace, but the undermining of real existing socialism was the aim of activists and hence had to be countered.²¹ In West Germany, too, 'peace' had almost become a taboo word. Until the early 1970s peace campaigners were confronted with accusations that they acted as communist propagandists with direct support from the GDR.²² And

Detlef Pollack, 'Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR: Oder: War die DDR-Gesellschaft homogen?', Geschichte und Gesellschaft 24 (1998), 110-131.

¹⁹ See, for example, the Krefeld Appeal (16 November 1980) available at www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1129 (last visited 4 Jan. 2012).

²⁰ Jens Ivo Engels, Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Ideenwelt und politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung 1950-1980 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), ch. 10.

Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR, ed., Unser Staat (East Berlin: Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR, 1989), 185.

²² Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, 'Im Kampf um "Frieden" und "Freiheit": Über den Zusammenhang von Ideologie und Sozialkultur im Ost-West-Konflikt', in Hans Günter Hockerts, ed., *Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte im Zeitalter des Ost-West-Konflikts* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 29-48.

while peace activism itself and the renewal of policies of détente in the mid-1980s made 'peace' more respectable, the term retained at least some of its negative associations until 1989-90. Hence, at a meeting between the East German Bishop of Saxony, Johannes Hempel, and the Secretary of State for Church Affairs in the GDR, Klaus Gysi, Hempel told Gysi about chancellor Helmut Schmidt's comments: Schmidt was, Gysi reported, quite relieved to hear that there was no independent peace movement in the GDR, as he was already struggling to make political sense of its West German counterpart.²³

Arguing for Peace

Peace movements in the Federal Republic and the GDR challenged their governments' 'geopolitical privacy' (Michael Mann). 24 While they operated in fundamentally different systems, both criticised a specific form of 'democracy' that was based on bureaucratic party-political rule and relegated issues of national security to the governmental and administrative apparatus that had emerged after 1945. Benjamin Ziemann has highlighted the key difference in perceptions between governmental and social movement actors: while the West and East German governments and their supporters highlighted the stability of the arms race, though admitting manageable risks, protesters voiced a different interpretation of the cold war and the arms race by emphasising the real and present dangers that nuclear weapons posed. They were thus able to develop an alternative perception of the reality of the cold war.²⁵ In order to do this, movement activists in both the Federal Republic and the GDR envisaged an understanding of violence that went beyond the injury of human bodies by privileging the psychosomatic impact of fears as a much deeper and fundamental form of violence.²⁶

²³ Klein, "Frieden und Gerechtigkeit!", 82: Information über das Gespräch Staatssekretär Gysi mit Landesbischof Hempel am 12.3.1982 in der Dienststelle des Staatssekretärs, fol. 40, DY30/ IV B2/14/18, Sammlung Partei und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (hereafter: SAPMO-BArch).

²⁴ Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 32. On the general point on reading activism and governmental policy together see Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements', 17-18.

²⁵ Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements', 19, following Thorsten Bonacker and Lars Klein, 'Politischer Protest zwischen latenten Strukturen und manifesten Konflikten', *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen* 32 (2004), 192-213.

²⁶ For an example from the GDR, see Dieter Stollberg, 'Die alltägliche Angst', in Herbert Gornik, ed., *Wege aus der Angst* (Freiburg: Christophorus, 1987), 39-48.

Accordingly, rather than looking for governmental solutions to these concerns, activists sought to transform society by transforming themselves through the themes of reconciliation, tolerance and solidarity.²⁷ Paradoxically, however, peace activists continued to mirror, not transcend, cold war politics via their opposition. On the surface, much of this activism and rhetoric appear as the result of a specifically Protestant culture - so much so that one commentator has gone so far as to call the protests in Germany in 1989 a 'Protestant Revolution'. 28 This reflects the importance of Protestant Christians for the campaigns.²⁹ Yet the broad participation of Catholics in the East and West German protests makes it difficult to take this argument much further. It makes more sense to interpret the peace movements' moral, if not religious, language as a distinctive blurring of the boundaries between religion and politics with the aim of creating legitimacy for the movement and transcending the traditional boundaries of respectable politics.³⁰ Fundamentally, East and West German peace activists highlighted their personal fears and the hope of overcoming these fears through political activism. Imagining an apocalypse of nuclear death lay at the root of these fears and was frequently linked to a pairing of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, often elided as 'Euroshima'. 31

²⁷ See, for example, Markus Meckel, 'Zur Selbstverständigung von Friedenskreisen', in idem and Martin Gutzeit, eds., *Opposition in der DDR: Zehn Jahre kirchliche Friedensarbeit: Kommentierte Quellentexte* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1994), 129. Conceptually see Belinda Davis et al., eds., *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the US in the 1960s and 1970s* (New York: Berghahn, 2010) and her important 'What's Left? Popular and Democratic Political Participation in Postwar Europe', *American Historical Review* 113, 2 (2008), 363-390.

²⁸ Trutz Rendtorff, ed., *Protestantische Revolution? Kirche und Theologie in der DDR: Ekklesiologische Voraussetzungen, politischer Kontext, theologische und historische Kriterien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993).

²⁹ On this typology of the role of religion in predominantly Protestant and Catholic societies and this conceptualisation see Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements', 33-34, following Werner Kaltefleiter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, 'Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements', in idem, eds., *Peace Movements in Europe and the United States* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 186-204, at 196.

³⁰ See Daniel Gerster, *Friedensdialoge im Kalten Krieg: Eine Geschichte der Katholiken in der Bundesrepublik, 1957-1983* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012); idem, 'Von Pilgerfahrten zu Protestmärschen? Zum Wandel des katholischen Friedensengagements in den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1990', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 51 (2011), 311-342; Jan-Ole Wiechmann, 'Der Streit um die Bergpredigt: Säkulare Vernunft und religiöser Glaube in der christlichen Friedensbewegung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1977-1984)', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 51 (2011), 343-374.

³¹ See Benjamin Ziemann, 'A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War and their elective affinities', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 49 (2009), 351-389, at 378. On the spatial dimensions see the pathbreaking study by Susanne Schregel, *Der*

The experience of the cold war and the memories of mass death in the Second World War thus appeared to fall into one.³² By drawing on these tropes, activists, paradoxically, adopted and furthered a discourse of victimisation that characterised more mainstream memories of the Second World War.³³

This formed part of the discussions across eastern and western Europe in which activists critiqued the danger of nuclear armaments in the context of the debates about the 'exterminist' nature of the cold war system, a system that threatened to destroy humankind through technical errors or wilful annihilation by one of the superpowers. The GDR activists made similar remarks on the threats stemming from nuclear weapons and, after the Chernobyl incident in 1986, of nuclear power stations as technological threats to global survival. Moreover, especially after Gorbachev had announced a new way of organising state socialism in 1987, an increasing number of activists questioned whether Soviet troops should still be on East German soil and cast themselves as victims of an occupation regime. The context of the context of the cold war system, a system that threatened to destroy humankind through technical errors or wilful annihilation by one of the superpowers. The cold war system, a system that threatened to destroy humankind through technical errors or wilful annihilation by one of the superpowers. The cold war system, a system that threatened to destroy humankind through technical errors or wilful annihilation by one of the superpowers. The cold war system, a system that through technical errors or wilful annihilation by one of the superpowers. The cold war system, a system that through the cold war system, a system that the cold war system, a system that through the cold war system, a system that through the cold war system, a system that the cold war system, a system th

Through such images of destruction and victimhood, peace movements not only tapped into and perpetuated German discourses of victimisation, they also constructed their fears as the only appropriate way of dealing with a pre-war situation. Accordingly, as Benjamin Ziemann has demonstrated in an important article on peace movement posters, many images, symbols and texts used by the peace activists showed the world immediately before the nuclear strike in order to highlight what it was they sought to protect.³⁷

Movement activists regarded their protests and workshops as a way to create peace in the present and their activist community as a way of living

Atomkrieg vor der Wohnungstür: Eine Politikgeschichte der neuen Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik 1970-1984 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011).

³² Benjamin Ziemann, 'The Code of Protest: Images of Peace in the West German Peace Movements, 1945-1990', *Contemporary European History* 17, 2 (2008), 237-261, at 253-254.

³³ Michael Geyer, 'Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons', in Hanna Schissler, ed., *Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany*, 1949-1968 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 376-408.

³⁴ Ziemann, 'Quantum of Solace', 367.

³⁵ See, for example, Werner Rüddenklau, *Störenfried: DDR-Opposition 1986-89* (Berlin: Basisdruck, 1992), 92 and Melanie Arndt, 'Verunsicherung vor und nach der Katastrophe: Von der Anti-AKW-Bewegung zum Engagement für die "Tschernobyl-Kinder", *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 7, 2 (2010), 240-258.

³⁶ Erhard Crome and Jochen Franzke, 'DDR-Bürger und Perestroika: Eine Rekonstruktion unter Verwendung von Stimmungsberichten des MfS', *Berliner Debate INITIAL* 8, 1-2 (1997), 155-170.

³⁷ The following interpretation follows Benjamin Ziemann, 'Code of Protest', 254-255.

the peace then and there.³⁸ Hence, images of peace activism now accompanied images of (German) victimhood. Thus, protest appeared less as a means to an end than as an end in and of itself: 'peace needs movement', as a famous initiative from 1982 put it. Such images of peace activism already contained at least some of the aims of overcoming fear and creating security. Peace protest became the premeditated realisation of the end of fear.³⁹

East and West German peace movement activists interpreted their own activism within the broader context of an ecologisation of politics in which different events and processes were intimately, yet often invisibly, connected. The use of nuclear energy to generate electricity and the building and stationing of nuclear weapons as well as other types of environmental damage thus became part of the collective phenomena through which human actions destroyed the ecosystem. Welfare had now been de-coupled from the notion of being and feeling well. Knowledge itself - and technological knowledge in particular - had become dangerous. Fear had become a virtue. 40 Given the importance of 'peace' as one of the key contested terms during the cold war, the semantics of peace were, however, highly ambiguous. It was especially obvious with the beginnings of the independent peace campaign 'Create Peace without Weapons' in the GDR (and the West German copy of this slogan) in 1979-80 and of the campaign 'Swords into Ploughshares' in 1981. 41 The slogan stemmed from the Bible verse Micah 4, 3 which had been engraved into the statue in front of the UN building in New York that the Soviet Union had donated to the United Nations at the beginning of the cold war in order to highlight its global fight for peace. Western activists who used the slogan and sticker were consequently accused of being communists.

In the GDR, by contrast, those who displayed the symbol risked being arrested (even if they removed the actual images and just wore an empty badge), even though official GDR publications still carried a picture of the statue and several publications had just interpreted Micah approvingly from

³⁸ Wolfgang Templin, 'Arbeitspapier für "Frieden konkret" III/Schwerin 1985', quoted in Martin Gutzeit, 'Der Weg in die Opposition: Über das Selbstverständnis und die Rolle der "Opposition" im Herbst 1989 in der DDR', in Walter Euchner, ed., *Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 84-114, at 91, fn. 3.

³⁹ Ziemann, 'Code of Protest', 254.

⁴⁰ On the semantics of fear see Susanne Schregel, 'Konjunktur der Angst. "Politik der Subjektivität" und "neue Friedensbewegung"' in Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller and Dierk Walter (eds.), *Angst im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2009), 495-520.

⁴¹ Anke Silomon, "Schwerter zu Pflugscharen" und die DDR: Die Friedensarbeit der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR im Rahmen der Friedensdekaden 1980 bis 1982 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999).

the perspective of Marxism-Leninism.⁴² The same was true for the white dove on a blue background, the symbol of the communist-sponsored World Peace Council. Conservative commentators in West Germany referenced the symbol as evidence for the proliferation of communist propaganda. In the GDR, however, the government became increasingly worried about the use of the image outside the context of its own organisations.

It is with regard to this issue that the histories of the West and East German movements diverged. Whereas the West German peace movement continued to campaign under its original concept of 'peace', the East German movement, faced with substantial repression, increasingly focused on the domestic dimensions of peace, rather than international ones. The issue of peace thus came to be intricately linked with issues of human rights. ⁴³ By highlighting fears that transcended the two superpower blocs, activists challenged some of the key ideological tenets of the cold war, namely, antitotalitarianism in the west and the direct link between state socialism and progress in the east. Instead, they stressed one element that had remained submerged: nationalism and the role of the nation-state as the decision and 'identity space' (Charles S. Mayer) in domestic and international politics.

Activists in the GDR and the Federal Republic were united in trying to develop a third way between the superpowers and frequently linked this to a new role for the German nation.⁴⁴ Whereas East German activists could find in grassroots socialism and their struggle for civil rights an alternative to Soviet domination of the eastern bloc, West German protesters filled the conceptual void left by the dissociation from the US and the western alliance with a renewed emphasis on the German 'nation'.⁴⁵

⁴² Helmut Zander, *Die Christen und die Friedensbewegungen in beiden deutschen Staaten: Beiträge zu einem Vergleich für die Jahre 1978-1987* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989), 259-262.

⁴³ See, for example, the 'Initiative for Peace and Human Rights' founded in 1985-86 by Ulrike and Gerd Poppe, Bärbel Bohley, Wolfgang and Regina Templin and others; as well as the 'Peace Circle Dresden Johannstadt' and various eco-pacifist groups across the GDR. See Peter Eisenfeld, 'Innerer Frieden schafft äußeren Frieden: Erfahrungsbericht über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Friedensarbeit im Raum Dresden', in Ferdinand Kroh, ed., "Freiheit ist immer Freiheit...": Die Andersdenkenden in der DDR (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1988), 119-140; and the discussions in Karsten Timmer, Vom Aufbruch zum Umbruch: Die Bürgerbewegung der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), ch. 2.

On the 'third way', see Ulrike Poppe, 'Der Weg ist das Ziel: Zum Selbstverständnis und der politischen Rolle oppositioneller Gruppen der achtziger Jahre', in idem et al., eds., *Zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anpassung: Formen des Widerstands und der Oppostion in der DDR* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1995), 244-272, at 271.

⁴⁵ This aspect is highlighted by Benjamin Ziemann in his important essay 'A Quantum of Solace?', 376-378 and is brought out succinctly in the contemporaneous assessment by Dan Diner, 'The "National Question" in the Peace Movement – Origins and Tendencies',

What contemporaries called 'new nationalism' was often linked to demands for the withdrawal of foreign forces from German soil so that Germany could finally fulfil its mission to create peace in Europe by regaining its sovereignty. 46 From the mid-1980s onwards, this topic was taken up by East German peace groups, whose members explicitly addressed the implications of such a view for the politics of memory in Germany. 'The division of Germany', argued members of the East German Peace Circle Friedrichsfelde (Friedenskreis Friedrichsfelde) in a letter to their West German friends, 'was not the result of the Second World War, but of the Cold War.'47 By expressing their protest in this way, both movements fundamentally challenged the boundaries of the political in their respective polities. Stressing the importance of 'direct' or 'grassroots' democracy, they gave voice to a vision of the political process that lay outside the parameters of state socialism in the east and the model of bureaucratic party politics and elections that had emerged in West Germany and western Europe since 1945.48

This conception of 'democracy' found expression in the structure of the protests the activists took part in – 'peace camps' and 'workshops' as well as 'dialogues' as forms of politics that privileged bottom-up interactions, rather than top-down discussions according to bureaucratic rules. ⁴⁹ The images of democracy and community mirrored the images of war that both movements developed. Whereas politics appeared as an anonymous process, devoid of experiences and emotions, protesters highlighted their activism and the emotional warmth of their protest community. Activists in the GDR, in particular, emphasised the role of this community, singing 'We shall overcome!', not only in helping them deal with their fears of

New German Critique 28, 1 (1983), 86-107. For rare evidence of a similar argument in the East German peace movement at this early stage of the protests, see Robert Havemann's open letter to Brezhnev, printed in *die tageszeitung (taz)*, 7 Oct. 1981.

⁴⁶ Ziemann, 'A Quantum of Solace?', 376-378 also citing Erhard Eppler, *Die tödliche Utopie der Sicherheit* (Reinbek: rororo, 1983), 71 and Oskar Lafontaine, *Angst vor den Freunden: Die Atomwaffenstrategie der Supermächte zerstört die Bündnisse* (Reinbek: rororo, 1983).

⁴⁷ Klein, "Frieden und Gerechtigkeit!", 135: Offener Brief des Friedenskreises Friedrichsfelde an die Friedensbewegung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – über den Bundesvorstand der Grünen, 18 Feb. 1985, no shelfmark, Friedenskreis Friedrichsfelde, MDA.

⁴⁸ On the background, see Martin Conway, 'Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model', *European History Quarterly* 32, 1 (2002), 59-84.

⁴⁹ Interview with Jochen Läßig and Bärbel Bohley in Hagen Findeis, ed., *Die Entzauberung des Politischen: Was ist aus den politisch-alternativen Gruppen der DDR geworden? Interviews mit ehemals führenden Vertretern* (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1994), 241 and 251.

nuclear war, but also with the fear of violence meted out by the security forces 50

Connections

The similarity of these interpretations emerged from a multitude of often complicated and controversial connections between the two movements. They took shape within the contexts of personal and institutional contacts as well as mutual observations through movement and the mass media. Many of these connections were highly conflictual, as both movements struggled to come to terms with their positions within fundamentally different political systems. It was especially the frequent contacts and visits by western peace activists, such as that of the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Evangelischen Jugend* (Working Group of Protestant Youth) to the SED and their talks with the official *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (Free German Youth – FDJ) that raised many critical eyebrows amongst East German activists.⁵¹

Nonetheless, connections between the two movements can be traced back to their origins in the mid-1970s when the dissidents Rudolf Bahro and Wolf Biermann were expelled from the GDR and settled in the Federal Republic. The two intellectuals acted as transmission belts for ideas between the two movements. They professed an environmentally conscious form of socialism that found its realisation in grassroots activities and thus were attractive to both the environmental and peace movements in West Germany as well as the growing peace activism in the east.⁵² Likewise, journalists close to the West German Green Party and with tight links to the East German peace movements, such as Wilhelm Knabe, Peter Wensierski and Wolfgang Büscher, ensured that a modicum of reports reached the West German movement and general mass media. In particular, the West Berlin newspaper tageszeitung, which had emerged out of the social movement milieu in the 1970s, turned into a clearing house for information. The Green Party, which had developed from a variety of environmental and peace movements on the state and federal levels between the late 1970s and early 1980s and thus had many natural and personal affinities to the peace activists, was especially open to interactions with East German peace

⁵⁰ See the first-hand account by the East German historian Hartmut Zwahr on Leipzig: *Ende einer Selbstzerstörung: Leipzig und die Revolution in der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), especially 25.

⁵¹ Klein, "Frieden und Gerechtigkeit!", 181-182.

⁵² See, for example, 'DDR: Die Bürger werden aufsässig', *Der Spiegel*, 17 Oct. 1977, 46-65, at 46-48.

groups, mainly through Marie-Luise Lindemann, Elsbeth Zylla and Willi Magg from its West Berlin branch, the *Alternative Liste* ('Alternative List'). Green politician Petra Kelly made a keen effort to bridge the 'iron curtain', often in the context of the European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (END). Other connections took place in the more general context between Protestant youth organisations.⁵³

Likewise, if and when they were allowed to travel, East German activists tried to make a contribution to West German campaigns. For example, on 10 June 1982 Jürgen Fuchs spoke at a major peace protest in Bonn and, after some internal debate in the movement, East German peace activist Heino Falcke addressed the big anti-NATO demonstration in Bonn in October 1983. On a more personal level, and connecting ideas of peace with their enactment, the East and West German peace movements organised 'personal peace treaties' between activists in both Gemanys in order to achieve 'disarmament from below' and contribute to the demise of the concept of two superpower blocs.⁵⁴

Importance and Legacies

As Benjamin Ziemann has emphasised, the impact of movement activism at the time did not lie in changing governmental policies. Rather, it lay in the ways in which the movements' challenges to a key element of governmental legitimacy – the guarantee of security for its citizens – led to gradual adaptations within political-cultural assumptions about the role government plays vis-à-vis society. ⁵⁵ In the Federal Republic, the popularity of Willy Brandt's policies of détente and his support for the peace movement in the early 1980s meant that 'peace' and 'understanding between East and West' also gradually entered into the governing Christian Democrats' conception of foreign and defence policies later in the decade.

⁵³ See, for example, Volkmar Deile, 'Vorwort' in Theologische Studienabteilung, eds., *Leben und Bleiben in der DDR* (West Berlin: Aktion Sühnezeichen, 1985), 3-4; Brief von Wolfram Tschiche an Birgit Arkenstette, 21 Feb. 1985, in Karlheinz Lipp, et al., eds., *Frieden und Friedensbewegung in Deutschland 1892-1982: Ein Lesebuch* (Essen: Klartext 2010), 385-386. On the background, see Neubert, *Geschichte der Opposition*, 478-479 and 637-643. For Dutch German-German connections see Beatrice de Graaf, *Über die Mauer: Die niederländischen Kirchen, die Friedensbewegung und die DDR* (Münster: agenda, 2007).

⁵⁴ Andreas Schaller, 'Die persönlichen Friedensverträge', in *Spuren 1987*, 66-69 and Saskia Richter, 'Petra Kelly als Mittlerin in der transnationalen Friedensbewegung gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss', *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen* 44 (2010), 7-28.

⁵⁵ Benjamin Ziemann, 'Situating Peace Movements', 20-22.

Up to the early 1980s, some CDU politicians had vigorously denounced the stress on 'peace' in Brandt's *Ostpolitik* as a sign of his communist past and of a dangerous undermining of West German national security. ⁵⁶ This gradual realignment was not simply a function of the internal party battles between fundamentalists and modernists within the CDU, but was also the result of an engagement with the ideas that the peace movement and its most prominent opponents professed. The ways in which many of the peace movement activists in East and West Germany linked their activities to the human rights demands of the Helsinki process further contributed to this. Likewise, signs of superpower détente in the mid-to-late 1980s made talking about peace respectable. ⁵⁷

The tentative shift in conservative politicians' attitudes to conscientious objectors, which was strengthened by the engagement with the peace movement, underlines this: discussions in the CDU – and expressions of this in legislation – moved from notions that conscientious objectors lacked the essential quality of citizens ready to die for their country towards ones that highlighted commitment to social service in the local community. Together with the growing success of the recently founded Green Party in state and federal elections, these changes in party-political attitudes mirrored a more general trend in West German public opinion towards nonviolent conceptions of statehood and government that had already begun in the debates on 'terrorism' in the 1970s and had now reached significant proportions. These conceptions emphasised the role of government in society as an essentially non-violent one.

Similar shifts occurred in the GDR. Because of the fundamentally different character of the political system, however, the ambiguities of such non-violent definitions of government were thrown into much sharper relief. When the SED, the secret services and the police forces were confronted with peace activism, they were increasingly at pains to avoid any violent confrontations and were under increasing pressure to justify it when it happened. Yet governmental control now took on an entirely different and much more sinister form. Rather than trying to jail members of the opposition, the SED government sought to retain its domestic legitimacy and international reputation by attempting to infiltrate peace groups with secret service agents and instigate debates that would occupy peace move-

⁵⁶ Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ost-politik* (Durham: NC and London: Duke University Press, 1989), chs. 2-4.

⁵⁷ See the reports in *Die Zeit*, 31 Oct. 1980 and *Die Welt*, 30 Oct. 1980. By contrast, see Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 8/1014, 68. Anfrage Dr. Mertes, (20.9.1977), 40.

⁵⁸ Patrick Bernhard, Zivildienst zwischen Reform und Revolte: Eine bundesdeutsche Institution im gesellschaftlichen Wandel 1961-1982 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).

ment activists with themselves rather than with the issues. This led to betrayals even amongst married couples and within families. At the same time, rather than using criminal law as a measure against the activists, the GDR regime shifted the focus to public order legislation. As a result of this, several activists were arrested. The most prominent were probably Ulrike Poppe and Bärbel Bohley who were kept at the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen secret service prison for six weeks before they were released in the wake of protests by western governments and news media. ⁵⁹

While a period of seeming toleration of peace and environmental groups began after the discussions between the SPD and the SED on a common socialist heritage and Erich Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic in 1987, direct suppression continued nonetheless. In September 1987, police raided the environmental library in Berlin and independent demonstrations on 17 January 1988 to mark the anniversary of the killing of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht led to the arrest of a number of activists and the expulsion of others. It was only during the wave of protests in the summer and autumn of 1989 that the turn in rhetoric came to be connected with changes in actual practices. Given the size and resilience of the protests and the international context – the lack of Soviet support for an armed backlash, the contemporaneous non-violent protests across eastern Europe – the GDR government and the security services could no longer plausibly justify violent actions. Whereas before the summer of 1989, many of the partycontrolled media had labelled the peace and civil rights protesters 'rowdies', this term lacked any credibility as entirely peaceful and pronouncedly disciplined protesters held vigils, prayed in public and displayed posters reading 'we are not rowdies, we are non-violent'.

The repercussions this had on the legitimacy of the state security apparatus among both its members and the general public were enormous. They led the SED to modify its position, especially because it had, from September 1989 onwards come under growing international scrutiny by the western news media. The media were sensitive to this issue as the Tiananmen Square massacre in China in June 1989 had drawn significant criticism and had already become a topic in the GDR protests. 60

Although party newspapers still called activists 'dangerous rowdies bent on violence' in early September and while Honecker had prepared the security forces for a national state of emergency, by early October 1989 the

⁵⁹ See Sung-Wan Choi, *Von der Dissidenz zur Opposition: Die politisch alternativen Gruppen in der DDR von 1978 bis 1989* (Cologne: Wissenschaft & Politik, 1999), 149-151.

 $^{^{60}\,}$ Martin Sabrow, '"1989" und die Rolle der Gewalt in Ostdeutschland', in idem, ed., 1989, 9-31.

situation looked decisively different. 61 The 'cold civil war' (Patrick Major) had become real on Dresden's streets at the beginning of the month, leading to much bloodshed between protesters and the police around the railway station. 62 But rather than resulting in a strengthening of the government's authority, widespread criticism of police action even from within the ranks of the SED led to a remarkable change in tone. 63 Even party newspapers now emphasised the non-violent character of the demonstrations and demanded: 'No violence!' Dialogues emerged between protesters and local party and government officials in towns and cities across the country. 64 At the same time, Honecker's position in the party became increasingly weaker as a group of SED politicians around Egon Krenz and Hans Modrow promoted similar dialogues on a national level and ultimately toppled him on 18 October 1989 as SED Secretary General. For the short period between autumn-winter 1989 and the local and state elections in spring-summer 1990 this process fostered the emergence of a specific type of movement society within what was still formally the GDR. It took the form of ad hoc participatory democracy that circumvented more highlyorganised means of politics: dialogues on the local, regional and national levels, symbolised by the metaphor of the 'round table' ('runder Tisch'), which sought to carry not only the contents, but also the form of the protests forwards.65

The different contexts in which East and West German protesters operated led to a disjuncture between East and West German politics in 1989, which expressed significant differences in the temporalities of the last decade of the cold war. Although non-violent conceptions of government and statehood had become influential in both political systems, they had divergent meanings. Whereas they had percolated through West German political culture and thus lost most of their oppositional potential, East German peace campaigns had become aligned with movements for civil

⁶¹ Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, eds., *Ich liebe euch doch alle! Befehle und Lageberichte des MfS Januar-November 1989* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1990), 200.

⁶² Eckhard Bahr, et al., Sieben Tage im Oktober: Aufbruch in Dresden (Leipzig: Forum, 1990). On the general background, see Michael Richter, Die Friedliche Revolution: Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen, vol. 1, 2nd edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).

⁶³ 'Sicherheitskräfte hielten sich bei Demonstrationen in Leipzig zurück', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 27 Sep. 1989; Walter Süß, *Staatssicherheit am Ende: Warum es den Mächtigen nicht gelang, eine Revolution zu verhindern* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999).

⁶⁴ See Zwahr, *Ende*, 76-77, 98.

On SPD and peace movement integration and the Green Party, see Detlef Pollack, 'Was ist aus den Bürgerbewegungen und Oppositionsgruppen der DDR geworden?', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 40-41 (1995), 34-45.

rights. In West Germany, activists had, paradoxically, learned to live with the Bomb. The top-down structure of the GDR's political system denied East German activists that opportunity.

Although GDR governmental discourse and practices (from the autumn of 1989) shifted towards non-violent conceptions of rule and moved away from direct and violent interventions at demonstrations, the political system remained a 'dictatorship of borders' (Thomas Lindenberger) in which the forms and contents of politics were not only limited discursively (as in the west), but also in the shape of 'hard power' and direct regulation. Even in the autumn of 1989, the space for what counted as legitimate politics in the eyes of the SED remained, therefore, much more narrowly drawn than in the Federal Republic; and demonstrating for peace itself was automatically a claim for fundamental civil rights.⁶⁶

Such claims came to be directly linked to the Wall as the symbol and manifestation of the borders that structured life in the GDR. When East German activists campaigned for an end to visualising international politics in a bipolar way, they always meant the geographical scope of the East German polity as well even if they wished to maintain a distinct identity from the Federal Republic.⁶⁷

The fact that East German activists had connected their fears and desires to create peace with demands for basic civil rights and more far-reaching forms of participatory democracy (that could not be channelled into the framework of the GDR's political system) meant that for them the sociopolitical history of the cold war ended later than 1989-90. And yet, peace activism and the discussions about it on both sides provided the conditions for the end of the cold war and the *peaceful* character of the revolution of 1989-90.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Thomas Lindenberger, 'Diktatur der Grenze(n): Die eingemauerte Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde', in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Konrad H. Jarausch and Christoph Kleßmann, eds., Mauerbau und Mauerfall: Ursachen – Verlauf – Auswirkungen (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2002), 203-213.

⁶⁷ Ludwig Drees, 'Aus der Isolation zu Wegen der Identifikation', in Stephan Bickhardt, et al., eds., *Recht ströme wie Wasser: Christen in der DDR für Absage an Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung: Ein Arbeitsbuch* (West Berlin: Wichern, 1988), 44-49.

⁶⁸ This transformation did not, of course, imply that violence disappeared entirely from German society. Nor did it lead to an absence of violent practices in governmental forms of rule. What is meant here is that the norms through which violent behaviour was assessed in both societies changed. Cf. Thomas Lindenberger, 'From the Chopped-off Hand to the Twisted Foot: Citizenship and Police Violence in 20th Century Germany', in Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth Century Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 108-128.