Ursula Woolley

The Securitization of Entangled Historical Identity?

Local and National History Discourses in Dnipro During the Poroshenko Presidency

Introduction

This paper considers the construction of local and national historical narratives associated with the identity of the city of Dnipro from 2014 to 2019. The historical tropes, narratives, and approaches in the primary sources, it is argued, indicate the 'securitization' of a complex, historicized 'Dnipro identity', responding to the *Russkiĭ Mir* securitization of identity constructed by the Russian government and influencing wider perceptions of the war in the Donbas nearby. The paper examines the different historical identity discourses recurring in interacting primary sources. It analyses recurring tropes in recent popular history and academic history on Dnipro, alongside historical tropes used in the discourse and demonstrated in the public history initiatives of influential local actors and institutions, and historical narratives of Dnipro supplied externally by the national content providers *Istorychna Pravda* and the Ukrainian Institute for National Memory (UINM).

The paper initiates an investigation of what is achieved by the use of historical tropes in discourse, in public history, and in commemorative practices in terms of identity securitization and the consolidation of new institutions of society and state on the basis of a civic, rather than an ethno-nationalist, political vision. It focuses on the period following the Revolution of Dignity which led to a re-evaluation of different identity-markers in Ukraine and the increasing salience of historical memory as a marker of identity and as an instrument in the imposition of identity, because of the practices of information war on the part of the Russian

government[1] which were then beginning to be revealed more widely.[2] The highly-politicized recurrent use of historical tropes in what was now interpreted by the Ukrainian government and its allies as information war required the drawing of new distinctions between shared, separate, or conflicting narratives of events in the past and their often imperceptible impact on the political or social allegiances to which they might superficially bear no immediate relation.[3] It has been argued elsewhere that there is a connection between adherence to a particular set of historical narratives, from either a Ukrainian or a Russian perspective, and allegiance to one side or the other in the war in the Donbas.[4]

This study of the construction of historical identity in and of Dnipro during 2014–19 forms part of a broader piece of research aiming to discover how the discursive construction of historical identity in conditions of war impacted on and was impacted by a spectrum of post-Soviet Ukrainian aspirations for self-determination and a separate but closely-intertwined spectrum of aspirations to understand the collective past. It is argued that the aspirations to research and write history freed from the hitherto constraining prevailing ideology of Soviet communism and to commemorate events, the public memory of which had been entirely suppressed, were central ambitions of post-communist experience. Iaroslav Hrytsak has maintained, synthesizing these points, that shared historical memory is more important for Ukrainian state-building than borders or institutional reform.[5]

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[1] It is argued that much of the impact of Russian government 'information war' derived from the much longer-term history of the dominance, locally and internationally, of Russian discourse over Ukrainian discourse in narratives of Ukraine.

[2] Tetyana Matychak, 'Octopus Tentacles: The Structure of the Kremlin's Propaganda Influence on Ukrainian Information Space', in *Words and Wars: Ukraine Facing Kremlin Propaganda*, ed. A. Kulakov (Kyїv: KIS, 2017), 40.

[3] Tetiana Orlova, 'Faktory vplyvu na formuvannia istorychnoї pam"iati: kazus suchasnoї Rosiї', in 'Transformatsiї Istorychnoї Pam"iati', ed. N. Temirova et al., *Istorychni i Politolohychni Doslidzhennia*, special edition (2018): 23–7, available at http://jhpr.donnu.edu.ua/article/view/5108 (last visited 28 July 2020).

[4] Olena Stiazhkina, 'Dyskurs okupatsiї iak mekhanizm osmyslennia rosiїs'koї ahresiї proty Ukraїny', in *Novi storinky istoriї Donbasu – Zbirnyk stateĭ* (Vinnytsia, 2016), 71; Serhii Plokhy, 'Goodbye Lenin: A Memory Shift in Revolutionary Ukraine', *MAPA Digital Atlas of Ukraine* (Harvard University Ukrainian Research Institute, 2018), available at http://gis.huri.harvard.edu/goodbye-lenin.html (last visited 1 November 2019), map 5.

[5] Iaroslav Hrytsak, 'Istoriia v osobakh: do formuvannia istorychoï pam"iati v Ukraïni, 1991–2011' in *Kul'tura istorychnoi pam"iati: ievropeĭs'kyĭ ta ukraïns'kyĭ dosvid*, ed. Iuriĭ

Hrytsak's perception about the relationship between shared historical memory and successful state-building introduces in other disciplinary terms ideas concerning the use of history in the securitization of identity. Maria Mälksoo in a recent paper has introduced the concept of "mnemonical security" as a way of linking ideas about the societal role of public history with ideas about the security implications of the political capacity to influence perceptions of identity.[6] She implicitly combines a perception of Russian government instrumentalization of identity with an extension of ideas about the societal operation of memory politics proposed by Etkind and Blacker and also with an extension of the concept of securitization of identity proposed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde.[7]

Iurii Opal'ko, in a 2008 policy paper for the Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic Studies, explored what was in effect a practical policy version of these ideas in relation to the development of the work of the UINM.[8] The Ukrainian Decommunization legislation was, it is argued, a response to Russian government securitization of contested historical narratives and constituted in itself the partial securitization of key parts of the Ukrainian ethno-national historical narrative. In this respect the concepts of securitization and de-securitization of societal and national identity help to conceptualize recent historical policy and historical politics in Ukraine.

This paper divides into the following parts: First, it reviews the discursive contributions of different influential actors (mostly institutional, some individual) and high-profile physical public history initiatives to current historical identity in Dnipro. Secondly, it investigates the intersubjectivity between local and national discourses during the period in question and partly arising from the implementation of the Decommunization legislation. Thirdly, it reviews a number of key tropes in the historical narrative of Dnipro to investigate the modified values which have been attached to them, partly as a consequence of the work of the

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Shapoval (Kyïv: Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsional'nykh doslidzhen' im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukraïny, 2013), 231.

[6] Maria Mälksoo, ' "Memory Must Be Defended": Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security', *Security Dialogue* 46, 3 (2015): 221–37.

[7] Ibid., 222; Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind, eds., *Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

[8] Iu. Opal'ko, 'Vzaiemodiia Ukraïns'koho Instytutu Natsional'noï Pam"iati z Hromads'kymy Orhanizatsiiamy u Rozvytku Svidomosti Suspil'stva', *Stratehichni Priorytety*, 4 (2008): 55–61.

initiatives and the actors in the first two sections, and considers the consequences of these discursive modifications.

Local Actors and Public History Initiatives

The contribution of local political actors to the moulding of emphases in the local historical narrative has often been by their physical association with, or distancing from, the historical initiatives of others. During the decade preceding 2014, local and regional administrations in the city had been in the hands of Yanukovych's Party of Regions (and, latterly, the OpoBlok grouping which superseded it) and local politicians selectively dissociated themselves from commemorative initiatives instigated from Kyïv. They were conspicuous by their absence from the public events for Holodomor Remembrance Day, for example, in the year of Yanukovych's election to the presidency.[9] Also conspicuous has been their willingness to associate publicly with the Moscow Patriarchate wing of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[10]

With the growing emphasis in Russian government propaganda on a particular state narrative of WWII as a Soviet victory over (Western European) fascists, overlaid on the direct local experience of Nazi occupation, competing emphases in interpretations and commemorations of the war have often dominated the local historical script, with the Ukrop Party and the Party of Regions vying for overlapping voting demographics by deploying modulated versions of the local war narrative.[11] The weight of the big local factories and associated professional organizations and per-

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[9] 'Dnipropetrovs'ka vlada proihnoruvala Den' pam''iati', *Istorychna Pravda*, 27 November 2010, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2010/11/27/6572/ (last visited 26 May 2019).

[10] Maksym Bezpalov, *Likhiie dev"ianosti: Kuznia kadriv Dnipropetrovs'k* (Kyïv: Tempora, 2016), 30; Ivan Murakha, 'Mer Dnipropetrovs'ka stav "velykomuchenykom" ', *Dniprograd.org*, 29 January 2013, available at https://dniprograd.org/2013/01/29/mer-dnipropetrovska-stav-velikomuchenikom_22632; idem, 'Dnipropetrovs'ka ieparkhiia ne ahituvatyme za Vilkula – ofitsiïno', *Dniprograd.org*, 19 October 2015, available at https://dniprograd.org/2015/10/19/dnipropetrovska-eparkhiya-ne-agituvatime-za-vilkula-ofitsiyno_33403 (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[11] 'Prezentatsiia predvybornoï programmy Viktora Marchenko', *Gorod.dp.ua*, 21 October 2015, available at https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/109906 (last visited 1 November 2019); 'Vilkul: 9 maia v Dnepre tysiachi gorozhan speli pesniu den' pobedy vozle Monumenta Slavy', personal website of Oleksandr Vilkul, 9 May 2017, available at http://www.vilkul.ua/news/vilkul-9-maya-v-dnepre-tysyachi-gorozhan-speli-pesnyu-den-pobedy (last visited 1 November 2019).

sonal networks, especially Interpipe, DMZ (the Dnipro Metallurgical Factory), KBP (the Pivdenmash Design Bureau), and Pivdenmash (a major state-owned aerospace manufacturer) itself, is also significant in giving public emphasis to particular local historical narratives, with the high-profile celebrations of the 60th anniversary of Pivdenmash and KBP in 2014 a case in point.[12]

The notable contribution of the Dnipro Historical Museum is in its open-access library of local historical sources, from texts of key works by Iavornyts'kyĭ to work influencing local political narratives today.[13] The Tkuma Institute, the Ukrainian Institute for the Study of the Holocaust, provides the research capacity informing the content of the Museum of Jewish Memory at the Menorah Centre discussed below and is the largest and most significant contributor to scholarship, publication, and public engagement on Jewish history in Ukraine, advocating for and raising the profile of pluralistic, especially Ukrainian and Jewish, historicization.[14]

The Institute of Dnipro History, existing at the time as a department of the Dnipro Development Agency, advocates for the historicization of urban regeneration projects: it raises the profile of elements of local history generally more associated with a Ukrainian ethnonational historical narrative and at the same time seeks to improve public awareness of the political motivations behind public history projects.[15]

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[12] Oleksandra Haĭdaĭ et al., *Polityka i Pam"iat': Dnipro – Zaporizhzhia – Odesa – Kharkiv: Vid 1990-kh do s'ohodni* (L'viv: FOP Shumylovych, 2018), 48–9; Irma Bohuts'ka, 'Lehendarne KB "Pivdenne" sviatkuie iuvileĭ', *Dniprograd.org*, 10 April 2014, available at https://dniprograd.org/2014/04/10/legendarne-kb-pivdenne-svyatkue-yuviley_26465; 'Na sviatkuvannia iuvileiu Pivdenmashu pryïkhav holova sluzhby zovnishnoï rozvidky Ukraïny z 2005 po 2010 roky Mykola Malomuzh', *Novyny Dnipra*, 11 April 2014, available at http://uanews.dp.ua/society/2014/04/11/41883.html; 'Mitropolit Irineĭ pozdravil kollektiv Iuzhmasha s 70-letnim iubileem sozdaniia predpriiatiia', website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchat), diocese Dnipropetrovs'k, 26 May 2014, available at http://eparhia.dp.ua/novosti/mitropolit-irinej-pozdravil-kollektiv-yuzhmasha-s-70-letnim-yubileem-sozdaniya-predpriyatiya/ (all last visited 1 November 2019).

[13] See Dnipropetrovs'k National History Museum (*Dnipropetrovs'kyĭ natsional'nyĭ istorychnyĭ muzeĭ im. D. I. Iavornyts'koho*), available at http://www.museum.dp.ua/library.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

[14] See Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for the Study of the Holocaust, available at http://tkuma.dp.ua/index.php/ua/; 'U Dnipri prezentuvaly knyhy pro Holokost', *Ukrinform*, 30 September 2018, available at https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-culture/2548654-u-dnipri-prezentuvali-knigi-pro-golokost.html (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[15] See Dnipro Development Agency, available http://dda.dp.ua/; Instytut istoriï Dnipra, available at https://www.facebook.com/iid.dp.ua/; 'Ahenstvo rozvytku Dnipra podilylosia dosvidom provedennia prosvitnyts'kykh zakhodiv z predstavnykamy orhaniv

The earlier contrasting and complementary cultural constructions of the historian-ethnographer and museum director Dmytro Iavornyts'kyĭ, the novelist Oles' Honchar, and the academic Mykola Koval's'kyĭ figure significantly in the pre-existing historical identity landscape. It is argued that the value of historicization they each represent has been influential in enabling the articulation by local political and cultural actors during the period in question of a local historical identity which defied divisive political instrumentalization. Emblematizing iterations of retellings of local history by local cultural actors, Honchar popularized the image of Iavornyts'kyĭ as a historian-leader for the sixties generation; while two influential expatriate historians, Andrii Portnov and Serhii Plokhy, raised the profile of Koval's'kyĭ (and, in Portnov's case, Iavornyts'kyĭ also) for the current generation.[16]

The figure of Iavornyts'kyĭ unites an emphasis on pride in Ukrainian heritage and Cossack past with a commitment to local scholarship and public history which is also important to the self-image of the city.[17] He wrote a widely-read local history of the Cossacks (*Istoriia Zaporoz'kykh Kozakiv*), taught history at the first Katerynoslav commercial college, and established, with the backing of the funding and the collections of the local industrialist Oleksandr Pol', a museum to preserve local Cossack heritage.[18] His promotion of Ukrainian Cossack identity was important to the Ukrainian national movement at the turn of the 19th–20th century

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mistsevoï vlady Dnipropetrovshchyny', official website of the Dnipro City Council (*Dniprovs'ka mis'ka rada*), 28 September 2017, available at https://dniprorada.gov.ua/ uk/articles/item/21887/agentstvo-rozvitku-dnipra-podililosya-dosvidom-provedennya-prosvitnickih-zahodiv-z-predstavnikami-organiv-miscevoi-vladi-dnipropetrovschini; Sviatoslav Chyruk, 'Skam"ianile oblychchia zastoiu. Skil'ky rokiv dekomunizovanym pam"iatnykam Dnipra?', *Instytut suspil'nykh doslidzhen'*, 22 December 2017, available at https://uaterra.in.ua/2017/12/22/skamyanile-oblychchya-zastoyu-skilky-ro/ (all last visited 1 November 2019).

[16] Oles' Honchar, *Sobor* (L'viv: Apriori, 2018) (republished from idem, *Tvory u dvokh tomakh* (Kyïv: Naukova Dumka, 1993)), 187–202; Serhii Plokhy, 'Zhyttieva misiia Mykoly Koval's'koho', *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 10 November 2006, available at https://dt.ua/ SOCIETY/zhitteva_misiya_mikoli_kovalskogo.html (last visited 1 November 2019); Andrii Portnov, 'Buty naukovtsem u totalitarniï derzhavi: dnipropetrovs'ki istoryky ta radians'ka vlada (1918–1939), in *Istoriï istorykiv: Oblychchia i obrazy ukraïnskoï istoriohrafiï XX stolittia* (Kyïv: Krytyka, 2011), 15–38.

[17] Portnov, 'Buty naukovtsem' (see note 16), 18; Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 16; Ia. Tymoshenko, 'Dmytro Iavornyts'kyĭ. "Kozats'kyĭ Bat'ko" z Sicheslava-Dnipra', *Istorychna Pravda*, 24 December 2018, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/ 2018/12/24/153459/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

[18] Portnov, 'Buty naukovtsem' (see note 16), 16.

and until his death in 1940 and he still looms large as a guiding spirit of the city's Ukrainian identity today.[19]

Two stories about him represent a popularized version of the similar stories of political fine judgement told about Koval's'kyĭ by his pupils (see below). When the last Tsar visited the new Katerynoslav historical museum, Iavornyts'kyĭ gave him a tour entirely in Ukrainian, which the Tsar, uncomprehending but undeterred, duly complimented him on in the visitors' book.[20] In the second story, during the civil war of 1917–21, Makhno's anarchists entered the city twice and on one occasion proclaimed it the capital of their own republic.[21] Their marauding also took them to the museum, but Iavornyts'kyĭ so inspired them with his story of the Cossack heritage it preserved that he persuaded them not to harm it as a result.[22]

So he represents a responsibility towards the local past as part of preserving its centrality to local identity, but also an association with icons of Russian imperial culture (he was proud of being the model for the scribe in Repin's famous painting, *Zaporizhian Cossacks Writing a Letter to the Turkish Sultan*, 1880–91) and an accommodation with the new Soviet regime: although his pro-Ukrainian approach was criticized at the height of Stalin's terror he was not arrested and was incorporated into the public Soviet representation of Ukrainian history after WWII.[23]

Oles' Honchar's dramatization of the relationship between Makhno and Iavornyts'kyĭ in his influential novel *Sobor* extended the reach of this image of Iavornyts'kyĭ as the conduit of Ukrainian culture and wisdom.[24] With its central message of historical memory as the foundation of decency in human relationships, it was significant in the formation of a shared Ukrainian historical and cultural narrative about and projection of the Dnipropetrovs'k region both for Honchar's local contemporaries in the confident but isolated closed "Rocket City" and elsewhere in the

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[19] Ibid., 18; Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 15–17.

[20] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 16.

[21] Ibid., 15.

[22] Ibid., 16.

[23] Portnov, 'Buty naukovtsem' (see note 16), 26–7.

[24] M. Zhulyns'kyĭ, 'Svitlo viry Olesia Honchara: Rozdumy z nahody 100-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia', *day.kyiv.ua*, 2 April 2018, available at https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/cuspilstvo-osobystist/svitlo-viry-olesya-gonchara (last visited 1 November 2019.

country.[25] Some years after the publication and subsequent banning of *Sobor*, the history department of the local university came to be led by Mykola Koval's'kyĭ, another figure central to the creation of the local narrative and to the approach to the local narrative of influential historians today.[26]

The status of the department was a result largely of his work, highlighted in recent years by alumni of the department assessing his contribution to history in Ukraine.[27] They narrate his protection and development of Ukrainian scholarship and publication on Ukrainian subjects, and the academic and personal compromises he made and risks he took in order to do this, as crucial to preserving the possibility of deriving elements of positivity from an examination of the Soviet period, and reflecting the more general local sense of the post-Soviet need both to cherish self-esteem and to properly confront the past at the same time.[28]

Because of its closed status, the city at the time was allowed to bypass Communist Party political structures in Kyïv and deal directly with Moscow, and this direct line appeared to hold good, as maintained by Koval's'kyĭ, in matters of academic research as well as in matters relating to the defence industry.[29] Whereas the Ukrainian political apparatus in Kyïv was more attuned to the nuances of Ukrainian patriotic discourse in Ukrainian scholarship and also more aware of their responsibility for keeping it under control, academic leadership in Moscow was less attuned, less interested, and more distant, with beneficial consequences for the research quality and independent institutional development of the history department.[30] The story mirrors local narratives of the power over and freedom from Moscow wielded by the structures and networks of

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[25] Honchar, *Sobor* (see note 16), 193; Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 16; Serhii Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 53–8.

[26] Andrii Portnov and Tetiana Portnova, 'Soviet-Ukrainian Historiography in Brezhnev's Closed City: Mykola / Nikolai Kovalsky and his "School" at the Dnipropetrovsk University', *Ab Imperio*, 4, (2017): 270.

[27] Ibid., 266; Plokhy, 'Zhyttieva misiia' (see note 16).

[28] Portnov / Portnova, 'Historiography' (see note 26), 284–5; Plokhy, 'Zhyttieva misiia' (see note 16); Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 302; Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 199.

[29] Plokhy, 'Zhyttieva misiia' (see note 16).

[30] Portnov / Portnova, 'Historiography' (see note 26), 279–80.

Pivdenmash at the same time and both define the putative political and cultural confidence of the city.[31]

Four Major Public History Initiatives

One intention underlying the 2015 Decommunization legislation was to change the physical commemorative landscape in Ukraine as part of a strategic redirection away from the Moscow-led focus on the role of the Soviet Union in WWII as a unifying historical memory for the 'Russian World'.[32] The stories and profiles of four broadly contemporaneous local museum initiatives show how local historical identity priorities supported or modified that intention.

The Menorah Centre, the "biggest Jewish community centre in Europe, or even the world" was founded in 2012, and the Museum of Jewish Memory and of the Holocaust in Ukraine as an integral part of the centre was opened at the same time.[33] The size and location of the Menorah Centre symbolize the significance of Judaism today and historically to the city (fig. 1). The upper floor of the museum, in presenting the Jewish experience of the genocidal anti-semitism of the Holocaust as central to the representation of the local experience of WWII, provides an alternative deideologizing narrative to the current Russian government propaganda narrative of the Great Patriotic War, prevalent in Russian language discourse on the subject.[34] The lower (pre-WWII) floor, in representing contextualized narratives of imperial government anti-semitism, Jewish and Ukrainian pre-revolutionary political collaboration, and Jewish

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[31] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 69; Serhii Zhuk, *Rocket City* (see note 25), 24–6.

[32] Serhii Stukanov, 'Zavdannia UINP: Stvorennia lehitymnykh instrumentiv dlia podolannia totalitarnoï spadshchyny', *Galinfo*, 1 November 2015, available at https://galinfo.com.ua/articles/nashe_zavdannya__stvoryty_legitymni_instrumenty_dlya_dekomunizatsii__volodymyr_vyatrovych_210377.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

[33] Misha Friedman, 'The Ukrainian City That's Become a Haven for Jews Fleeing Another European War', *Quartz*, 21 February 2015, available at https://qz.com/347948/the-ukrainian-city-thats-become-a-haven-for-jews-fleeing-another-european-war/; 'Jewish Ukraine: Five Facts About the Jews of Dnepr', *JewishNews.com.ua*, 31 December 2015, available at https://jewishnews.com.ua/en/en-community/jewish-ukraine-5-facts-about-the-jews-of-dnepr (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[34] Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 'A Divided Nation? Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis', *Die Friedens-Warte* 89, 1/2 (2014): 264.

suffering during collectivization and the Holodomor, contrasts in a different way with the 'anti-West – anti-fascist' tropes deployed by the Russian government.[35]

Fig. 1: Dnipro Cityscape with Towers of the Menorah Centre. 15 June 2019. © Ursula Woolley

Plans for the Rocket Park, using the academic and curatorial expertise of the city's museums and higher education institutions to display the historic technical prowess of Pivdenmash, were announced in 2013.[36] It

[35] Of the lower floor panels and displays in the Museum of Jewish Memory and the Holocaust in Ukraine, of particular interest to us here are a panel describing the infamously anti-semitic 'Beilis Case' of 1913, citing the liberal critical responses of individual members of the Russian intelligentsia and the extreme and explicit anti-semitism of members of the Russian imperial government; a display showing Jewish and Ukrainian candidates standing for the same political parties in the 1917 Constituent Assembly elections of the Ukrainian National Republic; and a display of photographs of Jewish victims of Soviet 'dekulakization' (*dekurkulizatsiia*) during the forced collectivization of agriculture which led to the Holodomor.

[36] 'U Dnipropetrovs'ku pokazhut' rakety dlia pol'otu na Mars', *Istorychna Pravda*, 25 January 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/01/25/109998/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

would project, physically and publicly, a reputational pedigree intellectually superior to that of the Donets'k network of Yanukovych in power at the time.[37] It would simultaneously celebrate publicly the city's recent Soviet industrial and defence heritage in contrast to the commemoration of Cossackdom at Khortytsia in neighbouring Zaporizhzhia promoted by President Yushchenko.[38]

The striking presence of the Rocket Park display (fig. 2) within a stone's throw of the late-Soviet offices of the regional administration has since been eclipsed spatially and in terms of size by the memorials to local lives lost during the Revolution of Dignity and the war in the Donbas in the immediate precincts of the administration building. The recurring themes of pride in local industrial heritage and local investment in public history, notwithstanding and partly because of associations with Soviet Russia, have in this arena been superseded by the narratives of local courage and sacrifice in the conduct of a new war.

The plan for a new out-of-town heritage centre on the site of the local Cossack settlement at Stara Samar' was intended to put a physical manifestation of the roots of the city back in public view and answer the implicitly more Russian-leaning identity politics of those who continued to insist that the city only began with the arrival of the Russian Empire.[39] But it has to date remained on paper.[40]

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[37] 'U Dnipropetrovs'ku khochut' stvoryty Park Raket', *Istorychna Pravda*, 17 January 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/01/17/108561/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

[38] Oleksandr Hrytsenko, *Prezydenty i pam"iat': Polityka pam"iati prezydentiv Ukraïny (1994–2014). Pidhruntia, poslannia, realizatsiia, rezul'taty* (Kyïv: K.I.S., 2017), 530–1.

[39] 'Dnipro 4.0: Rebrendinh ta mis'ki "mify" ', *Instytut suspil'nykh doslidzhen'*, 15 August 2016, available at https://uaterra.in.ua/2016/08/15/%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE-4-0-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B4 %D1%96%D0%BD%D0%B3%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D1%96%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%84%D0%B8/; Volodymyr Panchenko, 'Stara Samar': problemy ta perspektyvy stvorennia istoryko-kul'urnoho kompleksu', *Instytut suspil'nykh doslidzhen'*, 28 July 2017, available at https://uaterra.in.ua/2017/07/28/%D1%81%D1 %82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B8 %D1%82%D0%B0 %D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D0-%BA%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8/ (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[40] 'Fakhivtsi rozpovily pro novyĭ istoryko-kul'turnyĭ kompleks Stara Samar' u Dnipri', official website of the Dnipro City Council, 22 February 2018, available at https://dniprorada.gov.ua/uk/articles/item/23855/fahivci-rozpovili-pro-novij-istoriko-kulturnij-kompleks-stara-samar-u-dnipri (last visited 1 November 2019).

Fig. 2: Rocket Park Installations in Central Dnipro. 15 June 2019. © Ursula Woolley

When President Yushchenko had prioritized the restoration of Khortytsia there was nothing on a comparable scale in Dnipro, which at the time was in the hands of his political opponents.[41]

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[41] Hrytsenko, *Prezydenty* (see note 38), 530–1; Andrii Portnov, ' "The Heart of Ukraine?" Dnipropetrovsk and the Ukrainian Revolution', in *What Does Ukraine Think,* ed. Andrew Wilson (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), 67, online

The reconstructed cottages of Kodak and Staryĭ Kodak had been part of the cityscape of Dnipro for some time and had been woven successfully into the Soviet narrative of Cossacks as fighters on behalf of the peasantry.[42] The media coverage given to the plans for the commemoration and commercialization of the Cossack history of the city through the redevelopment of the Stara Samar' site gave new opportunities for the recommunication of the significance of this history to local Ukrainian identity with each iteration of the local political and planning process. In the heightened circumstances of 'information war' this opportunity for the articulation of this particular narrative perhaps compensated somewhat for the significance of delays to the actual execution of the project.[43]

The ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) Museum, opened in 2016, presenting the ongoing war in the Donbas, is co-located with the local WWII Diorama of the Battle of the Dnipro River.[44] The surround video screens recreating the Donbas war experience of members of a Ukrainian volunteer battalion (with voiceover narrating their experience and resisting identity securitization as part of the narrative) and the battlefield memorabilia outside (bullet-marked signposts, munitions, banners, bombed-out vehicles) arranged as walk-through art installations (fig. 3), sit like a study in presentational contrasts with the archetypal late-Soviet hemispherical diorama of the WWII Battle of the Dnipro River on the first floor upstairs.[45]

The display on the ground floor frames, or is the point of entry to, the display commemorating WWII on the upper floor, which was refurbished in time for the 8 May celebrations in 2018.[46] The walk-through installa-

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publication available at https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/ what_ does_ ukraine_think3026 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[42] Andrii Portnov and Tetiana Portnova, 'The "Imperial" and the "Cossack" in the Semiotics of Ekaterinoslav-Dnipropetrovsk: the Controversies of the Foundation Myth', in *Urban Semiotics: The City as a Cultural-Historical Phenomenon*, ed. Igor Pilshchikov (Tallinn: TLU Press, 2015), 225.

[43] 'Fakhivtsi rozpovily' (see note 40).

[44] See Ukraines First ATO Museum / Pershyĭ Muzeĭ ATO Dnipro, available at https://www.facebook.com/UkrainesFirstATOMuseum/?rf=1635789670075000 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[45] 'Zavershyly restavratsiiu naĭbil'shoĭ v Ukraïni dioramy "Bytva za Dnipro" ', *Ukrinform*, 4 May 2018, available at https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-culture/2453621-zaversili-restavraciu-najbilsoi-v-ukraini-diorami-bitva-za-dnipro.html; see http://www.museum.dp.ua/dioramaevents.html (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[46] 'Zavershyly restavratsiiu' (see note 45).

Fig. 3: Part of the Outside Display at the ATO Museum in Central Dnipro. 15 June 2019.© Ursula Woolley

tion in the space outside takes the incoming visitor off the main road on a journey past road signs commemorating recent battles in the war in the Donbas and arranged west to east; the diorama in the hall upstairs, on the chronological journey of historical memory back into the past, faces in the opposite direction: here the city is defending itself against invasion from the west and this opposition is underscored by the physical position- ing of the two contrasting displays. In the ground floor hall, between the installations outdoors and the diorama upstairs, video-walls explore visu- ally the experience of war, rather than any single verbal narrative of it, and through these floor-to-ceiling surround film projections it is hard to tell directionally where the threat may come from next.

So a re-emphasis on, and an investment in the communication of, the significant Jewish history of the city, is one factor which characterizes and influences local emphases in public history over the period in question. The political imperative of articulating a unifying civic, rather than ethno- national, response to the nearby war in the Donbas is another. The con- tinuing presence of discourse emanating from Moscow on the central shared experience of WWII re-enacted for the next generation in the Donbas is another, amplified by the discourse of significant numbers of more Russia-leaning local politicians. The emphasis on an inheritance of

industrial, scientific, economic, and political power is another. In practice, the large quantities but different balances of financial and social impetus behind the projects which came to fruition (the Museum of Jewish Memory, the Rocket Park and the ATO Museum) meant that, in terms of physical manifestation, local Cossack history remains relatively invisible; the Rocket Park and the ATO Museum are centre stage and although the scale of the Menorah Centre gives it physical prominence, the scholarly, liberal, carefully multi-ethnic approach of the Museum of Jewish Memory is public, but hidden from immediate view.

<div style="text-align: center;">

A Common Historical Narrative:
National-Local Intersubjectivity

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A number of less widely-known tropes about Dnipro in public and academic discourse were used and developed by national content providers, in particular *Istorychna Pravda*, in the domain of historical politics over the period in question, to build certain elements of the story of Dnipro, and the messages associated with them, more overtly into the public national narrative.

The Dnipro region as the centre of activity of the anarchist leader Makhno during 1917–21 was the first of the tropes which had not figured largely in widely-shared historical narratives, with the important exception of the (fictionalized) image in Honchar's *Sobor* of Makhno's band of anarchists being brought to a consciousness of their Ukrainian Cossack inheritance and prevented from looting by Dmytro Iavornyts'kyĭ in the abandoned wooden Cossack cathedral.[47] Developing this theme, and to counteract the prevailing Soviet emphases in depictions of Makhno's anarchists as perpetrators of random destruction and anti-semitic violence, *Istorychna Pravda* promoted a perspective showing them as organized and egalitarian fighters for the rights and livelihoods of ordinary people.[48]

For the WWII period, coverage of the 'Ukrainian Katyn' list', involving mass-shootings in 1940 by the Soviet state of Polish prisoners of war, including ethnic Ukrainians and Jews as well as Poles, in various Ukrainian regional centres including Dnipropetrovs'k, contributed to the

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[47] Honchar, *Sobor* (see note 16), 191.

[48] Mykola Borovyk, 'Sekretar maknovs'koï rady Petro Rybin: Portret anarchista', *Istorychna Pravda*, 26 November 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/research/2013/10/26/138561/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

subversion of the central Russian trope of unalloyed heroism.[49] During the war, Dnipropetrovs'k was also the centre of the activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) for central and eastern Ukraine. *Istorychna Pravda* communicated this narrative, emphasizing the historical antecedents for Dnipro as the 'Heart of Ukraine': contacts between OUN activists and Dnipro-based anti-Nazi partisans; the OUN hero Vasyl' Kuk marrying a Dnipro girl; the network hub in Dnipro allowing OUN activists to extend their reach and their message over the whole region.[50]

Following WWII, high-profile political narratives pertaining to Dnipro related to the establishment and growth of Pivdenmash and Pivdenne Konstruktors'ke Biuro, the ascent of Leonid Brezhnev, and the associated relative prosperity and status enjoyed as a result.[51] *Istorychna Pravda* emphasized contrasting stories, of new research on the notorious Dnipropetrovs'k Soviet psychiatric 'hospital' for political dissidents;[52] on the time in the GULag of a local member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Vitaliĭ Kalynychenko;[53] and on Dnipro as the home in adulthood of Vasyl' Makukh, the *Smoloskyp* (human firebrand) whose public suicide by self-immolation in Kyïv in 1968 was carried out to demonstrate Ukrainian solidarity with the victims of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[54]

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[49] 'Dnipropetrovs'k, Nizhyn ta Odesa – novi mistsia Katyns'koho rozstrilu?', *Istorychna Pravda*, 14 February 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/02/14/112456/; 'In Memoriam. Pomer chlen UHH Vitaliĭ Kalynychenko', *Istorychna Pravda*, 1 May 2017, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2017/05/1/149753/ (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[50] Pavlo Solod'ko, 'Vasyl' Kuk: "U mene nemaie ordeniv". Ostannie interv"iu z komandyrom UPA', *Istorychna Pravda*, 13 January 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013/01/11/107682/; Ihor Bihun, 'Ukraïns'kyĭ rukh na Donechchyni 1917–1958. Lektsiia Oleksandra Dobrovol's'koho', *Istorychna Pravda*, 28 December 2015, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2015/12/28/148842/ (both last visited 1 November 2019).

[51] Serhii Svitlenko and Oleh Repan, 'Vstupne slovo: Istorychna pam"iat' Dnipropetrovshchyny v natsional'nomu ta rehional'nomy vymirakh', in *Istorychna pam"iat' Dnipropetrovshchyny: Kolektyvna monohrafia*, by Serhii Svitlenko et al. (Dnipropetrovs'k: Monolit, 2012), 6.

[52] 'Dokumenty dysydentiv z psykhlikarni Dnipra peredadut' v INP – Suprun', *Istorychna Pravda*, 31 August 2017, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2017/08/31/150189/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

[53] 'In Memoriam' (see note 49).

[54] Iryna Iezers'ka, 'Smoloskypy svobody. Samospalennia iak forma protestu', *Istorychna Pravda*, 22 March 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013/03/22/117970/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

More prosaically during the period in question, the City Council reported rigorously on its effectiveness and cooperativeness in respect of Decommunization and *Istorychna Pravda* relayed this as an exhortatory demonstration of the alignment with Kyïv of the big, eastern frontline city with a national reputation built on Soviet political and industrial power.[55] Correspondingly, the impact of the opening of the Museum of Jewish Memory and the Holocaust in Ukraine in Dnipro meant that the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM) was able to communicate its support for Holocaust Remembrance Day and publicly associate itself with some of the commemorative activities of the Menorah Centre to answer the criticism, stoked by Russian government narratives, of Ukraine as a place of abiding anti-semitism.[56]

After the Revolution of Dignity it was important for national media to talk about Dnipro confidence, that trope which is traced locally back both to its nineteenth century industrial heyday and its Soviet power, as belonging more universally to Ukraine and to draw on the 'Dnipro talent pool' trope to reinforce the idea of Dnipro's capacity for political leadership.[57]

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[55] Dniprovs'ka mis'ka rada, 'Rozporiadzhennia pro pereimenuvannia toponimiv m. Dnipropetrovs'ka', official website of the Dnipro City Council, 24 November 2015, available at https://dniprorada.gov.ua/upload/editor/882-%D1%80.pdf; 'U Dnipri u zv"iazku z dekomunizatsieiu demontuvaly 46 ob"iektiv', official website of the Dnipro City Council, 30 August 2017, available at https://dniprorada.gov.ua/uk/articles/item/21474/u-dnipri-u-zvyazku-z-dekomunizacieyu-demontuvali-46-obektiv; 'V Dnepropetrovske pridumali, kak bez zatrat pereimenovat' gorod', *Gorod.dp.ua*, 17 December 2014, available at https://gorod.dp.ua/news/98435; 'Dnepropetrovshchina izbavilas' ot bolee chem poloviny simvolov totalitarnogo rezhima', *Gorod.dp.ua*, 11 February 2016, available at https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/113923; 'U Dnipropetrovs'ku "dekomunizuvaly" 57 toponimiv – vulytsi, ostriv i metro', *Istorychna Pravda*, 24 November 2015, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2015/11/24/148799/ (all last visited 1 November 2019).

[56] Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM), 'Prohrama zakhodiv do 75-kh rokovyn trahediï Babynoho Iaru', 23 September 2016, available at http://www.memory.gov.ua/news/programa-zakhodiv-do-75-kh-rokovin-tragedii-babinogo-yaru; idem, 'V Dnipri vidbuvsia vseukraïns'kyĭ seminar, prysviachenyĭ mizhnarodnomu dniu pam"iati zhertv Holokostu', 2 February 2018, available at http://www.memory.gov.ua/news/v-dnipri-vidbuvsya-vseukrainskii-seminar-prisvyachenii-mizhnarodnomu-dnyu-pamyati-zhertv-goloko; 'Anons: Vystavka "Kontstabir Aushvits. Ukraïns'kyĭ vymir" ', *Istorychna Pravda*, 22 January 2015, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2015/01/22/146949/ (all last visited 1 November 2019).

[57] Portnov, 'Ukrainian Revolution' (see note 41), 64, 70.

Historical Politics: Focuses of Dispute

The three most high-profile debates which were a focus for displays of disagreement and tests of strength over political power during the period in question were on the public commemoration of Leonid Brezhnev; on the city's 'official' foundation date; and on the renaming of the city and the region.

The attachment in Dnipro to Leonid Brezhnev was given additional public legitimacy, from a certain perspective, by polling from the Levada Centre in Moscow in 2011, which found that he was considered by the public in the Russian Federation to have been "the most successful Russian leader of all time", more so even than Stalin.[58] Plans for a memorial museum in his birthplace, the town of Dniprodzerzhyns'k (now Kam''ians'ke), were publicized under Yanukovych and the political reign in Dnipro of his Party of Regions.[59] Brezhnev's likeness had already been included in a new late-Soviet-style display of granite-mounted bronze bas-reliefs of local dignitaries and historical figures, alongside Shcherbyts'kyĭ and Kuchma, opened outside the regional administration buildings in central Dnipro in 2012.[60] While this last Brezhnev likeness was removed from its mount during the legislated Decommunization implementation period in 2015–16, the bronze bas-relief head at the door of a house he had lived in elsewhere in central Dnipro remains, though out of the news, in place at the time of writing.[61] Supporters of the memorial museum in Kam''ians'ke suggested that the new Brezhnev bust erected by them in the nearby park was actually an outpost of the museum itself and therefore (legally) constituted cultural heritage, rather than a contravention of the Decommunization legislation: the monument was then mysteriously vandalized: the local council, in the face of vociferous public criticism

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[58] 'Rosiiany vvazhaiut' Ukraïntsia naĭkrashchym pravytelem XX storichchia', *Istorychna Pravda*, 22 May 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/05/22/124476/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

[59] 'U Dniprodzerzhyns'ku vidkryiut' muzeĭ Brezhnieva', *Istorychna Pravda*, 19 February 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/02/19/112707/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

[60] 'U Dnipropetrovs'ku Shcherbyts'koho, Brezhnieva i Kuchmu uvichniuiut' u bronzi, opozytsiia oburiuiet'sia', *Radio Svoboda*, 9 September 2012, available at https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/24702729.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

[61] 'Pamiatnik Brezhnevu v Kamenskom dolzhen byt' snesen – Viatrovich', *Gorod.dp.ua*, 28 October 2016, available at https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/124367 (last visited 1 November 2019).

from the UINM, voted to apportion part of the local budget to restoring it.[62] The public commemoration of local historical memory, beyond the most egregious high-profile instances in the city itself, remained sometimes, in contravention of the spirit of the national legislation, within the purview of more local centres of power.

The public dispute over the foundation date of the city had been sporadically a local focus of historical politics since soon after independence and has regained profile more recently as one strand of the post-colonial / post-imperial identity debates defining difference between the Ukrainian national historical narrative and the Russian and Soviet imperial and neo-imperial versions.[63] The rationalization for the city foundation date in use at the end of the Soviet period was connected with the initiative of the Communist authorities to commemorate the foundation of the city as a way of expanding and consolidating the celebration of a significant Brezhnev birthday.[64]

The Russian imperial centenary anniversary of the founding of Katerynoslav in 1887 had been chosen following a similar rationale in support of an overarching political narrative to mark the centenary of Catherine II's first visit.[65] The local historian Maksym Kavun, who wrote his *kandydat* dissertation on the early years of the imperial development of Katerynoslav, has argued consistently that the city was predominantly an imperial creation as a way of resisting all recent public attempts to change the official foundation date.

During Perestroika and later, Ukrainian historians, led by Iuriï Mytsyk, sought to highlight the earlier origins of the city in order to associate it with the pre-imperial Cossack trading posts which had existed on the site before Russian imperial expansion.[66] In the spring of 2019, with presidential elections imminent and the fortunes of the Kyïv government waning, Kavun returned to the subject in an interview with *Depo.ua*, taking issue once again with Volodymyr V''iatrovych and the

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[62] 'V Ukrainskom institute natsional'noï pamiati vozmushcheny tem, shto nedekomunizovanyï pamiatnik Brezhnevu v Kamenskom otremontiruiut za schet biudzheta", *Gorod.dp.ua*, 27 February 2017, https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/128688 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[63] Portnov / Portnova, 'The "Imperial" and the "Cossack" ' (see note 42), 238.

[64] Haĭdaï, *Polityka i Pam"iat'* (see note 12), 54.

[65] Portnov / Portnova, 'The "Imperial" and the "Cossack" ' (see note 42), 223.

[66] Ibid., 238; Iurii Mytsyk, *Kozats'kyĭ kraĭ* : narysy z istoriï Dnipropetrovshchyny XV–XVIII stolit' (Dnipropetrovs'k: Promin', 1997), 128–53.

UINM for attempting to set the foundation date of the city on the basis of Cossack, rather than imperial, beginnings.[67]

The debate over renaming the city in its latest iteration had started some years before the Decommunization laws were passed in 2015. Calls to rename it Sicheslav (English: city of glory of the Cossack settlements, called *Sich*) and the surrounding region Sicheslavs'kyĭ had been voiced publicly some years earlier, when national legislation passed in 2007 under President Yushchenko required the removal from the local toponymy of the names of individuals associated with repressions under Stalin, although in Dnipro this requirement had been voted down by the city council.[68] The city had been called Sicheslav briefly during the period of the Skoropads'kyĭ Hetmanate almost a century earlier, as proposed by Dmytro Iavornyts'kyĭ and decreed by the National Rada: locals noted that whereas Katerynoslav had been a name imposed during the period of Russian control of the city, Sicheslav had been used while it was, via Hetman Skoropads'kyĭ, "under the control of the Austrians".[69] Petrovs'kyĭ (for whom the city was named Dnipropetrovs'k in 1926) had been part of the local Bolshevik apparatus which had gradually wrested control of Ukrainian territory for Moscow during the Civil War and the first years of Soviet rule; had subsequently become leader of the Ukrainian SSR through the structure known at the time as the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee; had advocated during Ukrainianization in the 1920s for Ukrainian language legislation; and been instrumental locally in coordinating the grain expropriations and dekulakization (*dekurkulizatsiia*) which led to the Holodomor.[70]

When in 2015 the UINM on behalf of the government in Kyïv had insisted that the name of the city be changed, the city council had at first

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[67] 'U Dnipri istoryk vidpoviv V"iatrovychu shchodo zminy daty zasnuvannia mista', *Depo.ua*, 18 March 2019, available at https://dnipro.depo.ua/ukr/dnipro/u-dnipri-istorik-vidpoviv-vyatrovichu-shchodo-zmini-dati-zasnuvannya-mista-20190318932577 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[68] Olha Guliaeva and Pavlo Dinets', 'Grigoriĭ Petrovskiĭ prevratilsia v... Petra Pervogo', *KP v Ukraine*, 20 January 2009, available at https://kp.ua/dp/69697-hryhoryi-petrovskyi-prevratylsia-v-petra-pervoho (last visited 1 November 2019).

[69] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 15; 'Chy stane Dnipropetrovs'ka oblast' Sicheslavs'koiu?', *Ukrinform*, 1 March 2018, available at https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2412580-ci-stane-dnipropetrovska-oblast-siceslavskou.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

[70] Mikhail Shatrov, *Gorod na trekh kholmakh* (Dnipropetrovs'k: Promin', 1969), 74; Guliaeva/Dinets', 'Grigoriĭ Petrovskiĭ' (see note 68).

responded by saying that the city would keep the name but change the relevant documentation to explain that it was now named on behalf of St. Peter.[71]

For those who argued that '-petrovs'k' no longer retained an association with Petrovs'kyĭ himself, it was suggested, factually incorrectly but perhaps plausibly, that it would imply a connection with Peter the Great of Russia, who was associated by some Ukrainians with the death and suffering of Ukrainian serfs during the building of St. Petersburg. Or '-petrovs'k' would suggest an excessive readiness on the part of the Dnipropetrovs'k authorities to resort to saints' names as uncontentious, when in different quarters what they represented was the strength of the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Dnipropetrovs'k and the local OpoBlok politicians who made up the majority on the city council.[72]

A public vote on various options under consideration for a new name for the city was held in 2015, with retention of the existing name the clear favourite, the short form of Dnipro, widely used informally in any case, coming a strong but distant second, Sicheslav polling less than ten per cent, and the arguably more historically accurate original names of Kodak and Novyĭ Kodak polling one per cent and under one per cent respectively.[73] Activists and local backers of the Sicheslav option, undeterred when their preferred option was not approved for the city itself, were still campaigning for the region to be renamed Sicheslavs'kyĭ in 2018.[74] Although the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) approved the name change on 3 April 2019 the regional government website to date retains

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[71] 'Filatov: Iedynyĭ variant pereimenuvannia Dnipropetrovs'ka – 'Dnipro' ', *Istorychna Pravda*, 3 December 2015, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/ 2015/ 12/3/148776/ (last visited 1 November 2019).

[72] 'Filatov vvazhaie, shcho "Dnipropetrovs'k ne asotsiiuiet'sia z Petrovs'kym" ', 3 December 2015, *Depo.ua*, available at https://dnipro.depo.ua/ukr/dnipro/filatov-vvazhae-shcho-dnipropetrovsk-na-asotsiyuetsya-z-petrovskim-03122015094500 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[73] 'Na saĭti mis'koï rady vidnovleno holosuvannia za pereĭmenuvannia Dnipropetrovs'ka', *Gorod.dp.ua*, 28 July 2015, available at https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/ 106610 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[74] 'U Dnipri obhovoryly pereĭmenuvannia oblasti na Sicheslavs'ku', *Ukraïns'ka Pravda*, 11 February 2018, available at https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/02/11/ 7171241/; 'Na saĭti prezidenta zaregistrirovali petitsiiu o pereimenovanii Dnepropetrovskoĭ oblasti', *Gorod.dp.ua*, 26 January 2018, available at https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/ 141388 (both last visited 1 November 2019).

the previous name, and the possibility of revisiting the legislation was voiced after the election of the new president.[75]

The current Mayor of Dnipro, Borys Filatov, in speaking about his response to the 2015 Decommunization legislation and the naming debates discussed above, has consistently articulated, and more or less simultaneously, local misgivings about Kyïv's initially oblique and then increasingly overt decolonization strategy and a readiness nonetheless to comply with the national government for the sake of national unity.[76] Over the course of the period under investigation he started cautiously expressing, on behalf of the apparently OpoBlok-leaning population, mild misgivings about changing the city's name.[77] During the first years of fighting in the Donbas and of the implementation of the Decommunization legislation he was conspicuously 'on-message' for the Poroshenko government on matters of public history.[78] By the last months of the Poroshenko presidency, as polling showed increasingly clearly against it, he had reverted to a more even-handed position, coming out firmly, at the time of the debate in the Rada, against the proposal to change the name of the oblast' to Sicheslavs'ka and not stinting his criticism of Iuliia Tymoshenko for equivocating on the same subject.[79]

Competing Modifications of Key Historical Tropes

This section reviews a number of important tropes in the Dnipro historical narrative and how they were modified by the different actors and

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[75] 'KSU opryliudnyv rishennia shchodo pereĭmenuvannia Dnipropetrovs'koï oblasti na Sicheslavs'ku', *Radio Svoboda*, 3 April 2019, available at https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ksu-pereymenuvannya-dnipropetrovskoyi-oblasti/29858435.html; see official website of the Dnipropetrovs'k Regional Council, available at https://oblrada.dp.gov.ua/; 'Razumkov: Pytannia dekomunizatsiï maiut' vyrishuvatysia na mistsevykh referen-dumakh', *Ukraïns'ka Pravda*, 14 July 2019, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/ 2019/07/ 14/7220894/ (all last visited 1 November 2019).

[76] 'Borys Filatov rozpoviv pro pliusy i minusy pereĭmenuvannia u Dnipropetrovs'ku', *Gorod.dp.ua,* 3 December 2015, available at https://www.gorod.dp.ua/news/111535 (last visited 1 November 2019).

[77] 'Filatov vvazhaie' (see note 72).

[78] '57 toponimiv' (see note 55).

[79] Zoriana Kvitka, 'Filatov "naïhav" na Tymoshenko cherez pereĭmenuvannia Dnipropetrovs'koï oblasti', *UAportal*, 7 February 2019, available at https://www.uaportal.com/ukr/news/filatov-naihav-na-timoshenko-cherez-perejmenuvannya-dnipropetrovskoi-oblasti.htm (last visited 1 November 2019).

processes discussed above. During the period under consideration, local actors drew in particular on the following six broad historical tropes as emblematic of the local identity narrative, though with different degrees of political profile: the 'Cossack heritage' trope; the 'southern capital of the (Russian) Empire'; the 'Manchester of Ukraine'; 'victors of WWII'; 'Rocket City'; and the 'talent pool'.

The Dnipro Cossack heritage trope, underpinned by the idea that there had been more Cossack siches on the territory of what is now the wider Dnipro region even than in neighbouring Zaporizhzhia, was initially given profile in local historiography by Dmytro Iavornyts'kyĭ in his history of the *Cossack Siches* (*Istoriia i topohrafiia vos'my Zaporiz'kykh sicheĭ*) and it underlaid the campaign for the Sicheslav name discussed above.[80] The post-1991 re-emphasis on the pre-imperial history of the trading centre at Stara Samar' highlights the "entrepreneurial success" strand in the Cossack story.[81] This trope remains more a favourite of pro-Ukrainian voices, with the city council during the period under consideration adroitly giving it 'air-time', but generally attributing it to others (civic organizations or less pro-Russian historians), rather than choosing to own it.[82]

The imperial policy trope of the city which was to be a southern capital of the Russian Empire was associated in the case of Dnipro during the period in question with the idea of the city as a southern centre of the Russian Orthodox faith, partly because of a perception of the Russian Church as an institution of state and instrument of government.[83] Over recent years, the idea of Dnipro as a centre of Orthodoxy had been revived, with saints' names and names from the church calendar figuring

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[80] Dmytro Iavornyts'kyĭ, *Istoriia Zaporoz'kykh Kozakiv* (Kyïv: Naukova Dumka, 1990) (first edition 1892); Denys Shatalov, *Uiavlennia pro Kozatstvo: Ukraïns'ke kozatstvo u suspil'niĭ dumtsi druhoï polovyny XVIII – pershoï polovyny XIX st.* (Dnipro: Dominanta Print, 2017), 217–18.

[81] Panchenko, 'Stara Samar' ' (see note 39).

[82] 'U meriï Dnipra ukhvalyly prohramu Ukraïnizatsiï mista', official website of the Dnipro City Council, 15 November 2017, available at https://dniprorada.gov.ua/uk/articles/item/22535/u-merii-dnipra-uhvalili-programu-ukrainizacii-mista (last visited 1 November 2019); 'Fakhivtsi rozpovily' (see note 40).

[83] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 30; Orest Sukhodol's'kyĭ, 'Filiia RPT na Dnipropetrovshchyni: ternystyĭ shliakh do "Rus'koho myru" ', *Dniprograd.org*, 19 November 2018, available at https://dniprograd.org/2018/11/19/filiya-rpts-na-dnipropetrovshchini-ternistiy-shlyakh-do-ruskogo-miru_73318 (last visited 1 November 2019).

largely in the lists of revised street names adopted under the Decommunization legislation, and saints' days and church rededications providing an opportunity for local OpoBlok politicians to signal simultaneously and with helpful ambiguity an implied Orthodox faith and an implied allegiance to the *Russkiĭ Mir* Russian Orthodoxy project.[84]

The ideas of faith in opposition to Communism and Cossack orthodoxy in opposition to Russian imperial orthodoxy as one of the themes of Honchar's *Sobor* discussed above exemplifies in literary form this contestation over the interpretation and designation of focuses of identity.[85] Expressions of adherence to Orthodoxy during the period in question were a nicely ambiguous means of implying allegiance simultaneously both to the popular post-Soviet enthusiasm for religious ritual; and to the twentieth-century Ukrainian pattern of adherence to faith in defiance of Soviet atheism; and to the *Russkiĭ Mir* promotion of the Russian Orthodox Church as a means of keeping Ukraine closer to Moscow.[86] This ambiguity and the potentially contradictory allegiances it concealed was one reason that the dispute over the renaming of the city, discussed in the previous section above, was so heated.[87]

Local historians now trace a narrative thread between the commercial hub of the first local Cossack trading-posts, the nineteenth-century entrepreneurship of Oleksandr Pol'[88] depending likewise on the city as a commercial centre in different circumstances, and its status as the defence industry capital of the Soviet Union a hundred years later.[89] Stories of Pol' combine tropes of local initiative with impressive commercial results,

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[84] Sukhodol's'kyĭ, 'Filiia RPT' (see note 83); Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 30; Haĭdaĭ, *Polityka i Pam"iat'* (see note 11), 46–47; Dniprovs'ka mis'ka rada, 'Rozporiadzhennia' (see note 55).

[85] Honchar, *Sobor* (see note 15), 194, 293.

[86] Kostiantyn Kohtiants, 'UPT MP khoche vsydyty mizh dvokh stiltsiv', *Dniprograd.org*, 26 December 2014, available at https://dniprograd.org/blogs/247 (last visited 1 November 2019); Bobo Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015), 34.

[87] Haĭdaĭ, *Polityka i Pam"iat'* (see note 12), 46–7.

[88] Oleksandr Pol' was the local nobleman who discovered iron ore deposits at Kryvyĭ Rih in the mid-nineteenth century and obtained the licences from the imperial government in St. Petersburg to link the mines he developed there by railway with the city, then Katerynoslav, and with the coal mines of Donets'k, then Iuzivka (Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10)).

[89] Ibid., 13; Maksym Kavun, 'Dnepropetrovsk – Znamenitye Liudi Goroda i Kraia', undated, available at http://www.mkavun.narod.ru/persons.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

skilful handling of Russian centres of power and commitment to local cultural causes strengthening local identity, though by tradition it was Iavornyts'kyĭ who proposed the 'Manchester of Ukraine' trope.[90] The idea of the possibility of vast wealth-creation in Dnipro symbolized by Pol' is also used by Filatov to historicize municipal entrepreneurship initiatives.[91] This trope of recurrent periods of formidable economic power has mutated to encompass the putative trading success of the Cossack palankas and the post-Soviet economic renaissance symbolized by PrivatBank, uniting political actors, civic activists, and academic voices across a broad spectrum of attitudes to Russia.[92]

The attributed suffering and heroism, and experience of violence and loss, involved under occupation in WWII in Dnipro was drawn on extensively by local OpoBlok politicians during the period in question.[93] It remained central to the discourse imposed by the Moscow-orchestrated administrations in Donets'k and Luhans'k throughout the period under investigation and, initially at least, that meant it was also widely broadcast in neighbouring Dnipro.[94] For this reason the broadly synchronous reinvestment in and focus on the communication of the city's important Jewish heritage and in particular the experience in Ukraine of the Holocaust as part of WWII was a skilful counterweight, as discussed above.[95]

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[90] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 13–14.

[91] Oksana Bohdanova, 'Mėr Dnepra Boris Filatov: "Ia ne 100-grivennaia kupiura, chtoby vsem nravitsia" ', *KP v Ukraine,* 8 September 2016, available at https://kp.ua/politics/550272-mer-dnepra-borys-fylatov-ya-ne-100-hryvennaia-kupuira-chtoby-vsem-nravytsia (last visited 1 November 2019).

[92] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 22–3.

[93] 'Vilkul: 9 maia v Dnepre tysiachi gorozhan speli pesniu den' pobedy vozle Monumenta Slavy', personal website of Oleksandr Vilkul, 9 May 2017, available at http://www.vilkul.ua/news/vilkul-9-maya-v-dnepre-tysyachi-gorozhan-speli-pesnyu-den-pobedy (last visited 1 November 2019); Zhurzhenko, 'Divided Nation' (as in note 34), 264.

[94] Stiazhkina, 'Dyskurs okupatsiï' (see note 4), 74.

[95] 'Novyĭ muzeĭ Holokostu ne unykatyme skladnykh pytan' ', *Deutsche Welle*, 16 October 2012, available at https://www.dw.com/uk/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%B9%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%85-%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%8C/a-16307508; 'Muzeĭ "Pam"iat' ievreĭs'koho narodu i Holokost v Ukraïni" ', official website of the Menorah Cultural and Business Centre, available at http://menorah-center.com/ua/about/siritual-life/jewish-memory-holocaust-ukraine/ (both last visited 1 November 2019).

The science and engineering universities created to support and develop the city's industrial and, subsequently, defence industrial capacity reinforce the 'Rocket City' trope of industrial success in their active promotion of the history of the city and their role in it.[96] For the spring and summer of 2014, the 'Rocket City' trope combined a sense of international military power with cutting-edge scientific and intellectual capacity and, critically in the circumstances of intensifying Russian military and information aggression pertaining at the time, the combined notional access to Moscow, understanding of Moscow, and power to force Moscow to back down which was so narratively powerful in the circumstances of the war in the Donbas.[97] A return, after the implementation of Decommunization, to the 'Rocket City' trope which had been boosted during the Yanukovych presidency seemed like a rebalancing towards a different electoral demographic, with the 'Cosmos tours' of the city in 2017 contrasting with the push for the regeneration of Cossack heritage sites under way at the same time.[98]

The 'talent pool' trope, a weak translation of the more visual and more apposite 'blacksmith's forge' of (Communist Party) political leadership cadres in Ukrainian and Russian (*kuznia kadriv / kuznitsa kadrov*), is used widely.[99] It was coined during the Soviet period to refer to the ascent of Brezhnev and his contemporaries, 'forged' in the literal and figurative smelters of Dnipro and then promoted, to Moscow and to Kyïv. But it was a felicitous image for local identity and self-image and was applied retrospectively to the imperial period by Maksym Kavun, who noted, perhaps stretching a point, that a number of senior appointees to the last pre-revolutionary governments in St. Petersburg had also started life in Katerynoslav, thereby uniting narratively the imperial and the Soviet periods with a trope of Dnipro political confidence and success.[100]

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[96] Haĭdaĭ, *Polityka i Pam"iat'* (see note 12), 48–9; 'U Dnipropetrovs'ku rozpochaly buduvaty raketnyy muzey', *Istorychna Pravda*, 18 June 2013, available at https://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/06/18/126382/; 'U Dnipropetrovs'ku – vystavka pro stalevariv', *Istorychna Pravda*, 25 July 2014, available at (both last visited 24 May 2019).

[97] Portnov, 'Ukrainian Revolution' (see note 41), 63–5; Plokhy, 'Zhyttieva misiia' (see note 16).

[98] 'Turystychnyĭ marshrut "Dnipro kosmichnyĭ" nabuvaie populiarnosti', *Ukrinform*, 2 November 2017, available at https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-tourism/2336541-turisticnij-marsrut-dnipro-kosmicnij-nabuvae-popularnosti.html (last visited 1 November 2019); Panchenko, 'Stara Samar' ' (see note 39).

[99] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10).

[100] Ibid, 23–4; Kavun, 'Dnepropetrovsk' (see note 89).

The same 'talent pool' term was used, with different doses of irony from different perspectives, to refer to the variously powerful, high-profile and notorious local protégés and associates of Leonid Kuchma.[101] The term brought with it a set of ideological connotations more pro-imperial, whether Russian or Soviet, than the tropes of individual entrepreneurship and independent self-government associated with others in the city's repertoire of available historical narratives. Superficially a term only suggesting superior local ability, it also carries connotations of the talent to work within the type of political institution often perceived in Ukraine as imposed from elsewhere and without the best interests of Ukraine at its heart.

Conclusion

So in terms of the securitization of a Ukrainian civic national identity, among these locally popular tropes, the 'location of more Cossack siches even than neighbouring Zaporizhzhia' remained an unambiguous signifier and notably, perhaps because of the lack of ambiguity it offered, it was apparently avoided by the Mayor. The 'Manchester of Ukraine' trope partly disaggregated the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century economic success of the region from the Russia-led imperial narrative of the same period.

The underlying historical idea of Katerynoslav as a future southern capital of the Russian empire enjoyed more success during the period in question as a foundation for the local promotion of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a post-colonial lens would frame this success as evidence of an incomplete journey towards decolonization.

The more generalized Katerynoslav imperial narrative was also partly disaggregated during the period in question, with Filatov at the beginning of 2019 in a speech about "built heritage" referring both to the refurbishment of an imperial period Church (not mentioning particular claims on it either by the post-Tomos Orthodox Church of Ukraine or by the lingering Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)) and to the former imperial-period local Duma chamber, which was to be refurbished for the current City Rada and stand as a "symbol of local self-govern-

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[101] Bezpalov, *Kuznia kadriv* (see note 10), 23; Portnov, 'Ukrainian Revolution' (see note 41), 64.

ment", another trope which had emerged over the period as a popular Filatov theme, underpinned by local historians.[102]

'Rocket City' and the 'talent pool', originally part of the narrative of the role of Dnipro-petrovs'k in implicitly pro-Moscow Soviet success, were also partially disaggregated from this storyline by being more locally historicized. The narrative of suffering and valour in the 'Great Patriotic War' remained axiomatic to the securitization of pro-Russian identity.

All the tropes discussed above, despite the different interpretations and associated political narratives adhering to them, have sustained their importance in local historical memory over the long term. The phrase 'entangled history' has been used to describe more precisely and arguably less politically than 'transnational history' the irreducible mesh of interwoven historical narratives and identity narratives of which history, and archetypally the history of Ukraine, is comprised.[103]

The physical public history projects of Dnipro over the period under investigation are a manifestation of different perspectives on the history of the city, relating to different identities and different time periods in contiguous physical spaces, although physical proximity does not necessarily fully embody or incorporate the qualities of multivectoral intersubjectivity which entanglement implies.

Borys Filatov began his campaigning for public office in Dnipro with the launch of a local history "full of the tales of ordinary people" and gave free voice to advocates of plans for Cossack heritage regeneration but it was the creative commemoration and communication of the ongoing war, contextualized by the last in the form of the WWII diorama, which was

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[102] Rostyk Petrovs'kyĭ, 'Povernennia istorychnykh budivel' ta pytannia domovlasnykiv: Borys Filatov rozpoviv pro osnovni rishennia pershoï u novomu rotsi sesiï mis'krady Dnipra', *Nashe misto*, 23 January 2019, available at https://nashemisto.dp.ua/2019/01/23/povernennja-istorichnih-budivel-ta-pitannja-domovlasnikiv-boris-filatov-rozpoviv-pro-osnovni-rishennja-pershoi-u-novomu-roci-sesii-miskradi-dnipra/ (last visited 1 November 2019); L. Markova, 'Istoriia mistsevoho samovriaduvannia v personaliiakh (holovy Dnipropetrovs'koï mis'krady 1920–1930 rokiv)', official website of Dnipropetrovs'k National History Museum, 2009, available at http://www.museum.dp.ua/article0201.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

[103] Andrii Portnov, 'Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies', *Slavic Review* 74, 4 (2015): 731; Andreas Kappeler, 'From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History', in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, eds. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 66.

elevated in importance at the end of the period under investigation.[104] Where Poroshenko and the UINM had become more explicit in their decolonizing intentions towards the end of the presidential term, the city deflected them, preferring to emphasize its own, carefully historicized, capacity for self-government instead.[105]

It was the interpretation of the multi-ethnic history of the city from a Jewish perspective in the displays at the Museum of Jewish Memory, highlighting interactions, whether collaborative, productive, destructive, or violent, over time, which embodied 'entangled history' most clearly in the form of its narration. In fact both the Museum of Jewish Memory and the ATO Museum constitute, in the mode of representation they have chosen, a situationally pro-Ukrainian response without involving the securitization of a Ukrainian ethno-national identity.

Haĭdaĭ et al. described the current approach to public history in Dnipro as "a way of rethinking local culture rather than as an investigation into the past for its own sake", whereas the research discussed in this paper suggests this is perhaps to oversimplify the intersubjectivity between historiography, commemoration, and historical politics it has involved.[106] Mälksoo in her article on "mnemonical security" points to the "security dilemmas" created by the securitization of history and memory and explores the difficulties in addressing these dilemmas caused by opposing and sometimes apparently irreconcilable policy approaches to the political instrumentalization of identity.[107] Discursive contributors to historical politics in and on the subject of Dnipro have deployed a form of instrumentalization of local historical narratives which has sustained a complex, evolving equilibrium, rather than achieving a securitization of local or national identity according to any narrow definition of the term.

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[104] 'Istoriia Dnipropetrovs'ka – tse istoriia ĭoho zhyteliv', *Ukrop Party*, 2 November 2015, available at https://ukrop.party/uk/news/regional/1066-istoriya-dnipropetrovska-tse-istoriya-yogo-zhiteliv-boris-filatov-prezentuvav-unikalnu-knigu-pro-ridne-misto (last visited 1 November 2019); 'Siuzhet dioramy "Bytva za Dnipro" ', official website of Dnipropetrovs'k National History Museum, undated, available at http://www.museum.dp.ua/dioramaevents.html (last visited 1 November 2019).

[105] 'Zavershyly restavratsiiu naĭbil'shoĭ v Ukraïni dioramy "Bytva za Dnipro" ', *Ukrinform*, 4 May 2018, available at https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-culture/2453621-zaversili-restavraciu-najbilsoi-v-ukraini-diorami-bitva-za-dnipro.html (last visited 5 August 2020); Markova, 'Istoriia samovriaduvannia' (see note 102).

[106] Haĭdaĭ, *Polityka i Pam"iat'* (see note 12), 35.

[107] Mälksoo, 'Mnemonical Security' (see note 6), 222, 232.