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MIMICRY IN A MULTIPLE POSTCOLONIAL SETTING

NETWORKS OF TECHNOCRACY AND SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN PIŁSUDSKI'S POLAND

Technocracy as a concept with this name is historically a young and inherently modern idea: It evolved at the end of World War I in the U.S.A. and has its ideological roots in conceptions developed by Saint-Simon at the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹ Thus, the idea must be situated in the very broad cultural context of the pivotal roles that science and technology play in any concept of societal 'modernity'.² The euphoric belief in scientific progress and the hopes to organize and improve mankind and the economy through science are central elements of the Industrial Revolution and the profound societal changes that characterized the late eighteenth century, intensifying from the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. These concepts were also connected to models of societal change, as far as they envisaged the political rule of an elite over the masses. While

¹ FRANK FISCHER, *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*, Newbury Park 1990, p. 68-71; ROBERT B. CARLISLE, *The Birth of Technocracy. Science, Society, and Saint-Simonians*, in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35/3 (1974), p. 445-464; BRUNO BELHOSTE, KONSTANTINOS CHATZIS, *From Technical Corps to Technocratic Power. French State Engineers and their Professional and Cultural Universe in the First Half of the 19th Century*, in: *History and Technology* 23/3 (2007), p. 209-225, p. 216-217; a philosophical sketch: HERMANN LÜBBE, *Technokratie. Politische und wirtschaftliche Schicksale einer philosophischen Idee*, in: *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 25/1 (2000), p. 119-139. See also the contribution by Kenneth Bertrams in this volume. I am obliged to Dirk Uffelmann for numerous helpful remarks.

² Cf. SAMUEL N. EISENSTADT, *Tradition, Wandel und Modernität*, Frankfurt am Main 1979, p. 259-262; MARK ERICKSON, *Science, Culture and Society. Understanding Science in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, MA 2005, p. 11-13. FISCHER, p. 59-60; *Moderne Zeiten. Technik und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by MICHAEL SALEWSKI/ILONA STÖLKEN-FITSCHEN, Stuttgart 1994; exemplary: KLAUS GESTWA, *Technik als Kultur der Zukunft. Der Kult um die 'Stalinschen Großbauten des Kommunismus'*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30 (2004), p. 37-73.

some writers – in the framework of these plans – imagined a dichotomy between a ruling, technocratic elite and the governed masses, others simply visualized how technicians and engineers could better cooperate with authorities and governments. Politics would then be legitimized through the knowledge of experts, who would in turn be legitimized by their education. Soon the term ‘technocracy’ came to imply governing through technically conceived modes of decision making. With the entry of the United States into World War I in 1917, scientific experts rather than private entrepreneurs began to manage the militarization of economy and society.³

The concept scientific management, developed by Frederick Taylor at the end of the nineteenth century, emerged in this broad socio-cultural context of an ever increasing belief in the importance of science and technology for the progress of countries and their societies. According to Taylor, scientific procedures were to rationalize the process of production by enhancing the division of labour. While scientific management was intended to make the work of humans more efficient, technocrats wanted to substitute it with automation. Taylor’s scientific management has been described as ‘one of the most famous of all technocratic theories’ that has ‘at times been elevated to a basic American ideology’.⁴

This contribution focuses on the development of these and similar concepts by exemplary actors in the specific setting of interwar Poland, including their social networking with fellow scientists or experts – sometimes within, sometimes across national boundaries – and government authorities. Thus, following the key questions of this volume, central themes addressed in this contribution are the historical relationships or networks between experts, as well as their relations to the state and the media in national as well as international contexts. The focus will be less on a one-to-one transfer of cultural practices from West to East than on the reinvention and adaption of concepts in a process of transnational communication, challenging national narratives and stressing phenomena of entanglement as well as a pluralization of perspectives.⁵ This transnational historical perspective

³ WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft. Faschismus, Nationalsozialismus, New Deal. 1933-1939*, München 2005, p. 50-51.

⁴ FISCHER, *Technocracy*, p. 25. See also the contribution by Elisabeth van Meer in this volume.

⁵ Cf. *Transatlantischer Kulturtransfer im ‘Kalten Krieg’*. Perspektiven für eine historische vergleichende Transferforschung, ed. by HELKE RAUSCH, special issue of *Comparativ. Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung* 16/4 (2006); KIRAN KLAUS PATEL, *Der Nationalsozialismus in transnationaler Perspektive*, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 9 (2004), p. 1123-1134; ANDREAS ACKERMANN, *Das Eigene und das Fremde. Hybridität, Vielfalt und Kulturtransfer*, in: *Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften. Themen und Tendenzen*, ed. by FRIED-

underscores relations and developments that transgress the boundaries of nation states on the one hand, while sharpening comparisons between national societies on the other.⁶

First, I will briefly outline the role of Czechoslovakia as a sort of 'communication link' that facilitated the transfer of ideas from the United States to Poland. In the 1920s, Czechoslovakia briefly became the spearhead in the quest for the reorganization of work in Central Eastern Europe. The resulting perceived subaltern position of Poland, which aspired to a leading role in this regard, significantly influenced the thoughts and actions of prominent Polish scientists at the time, among them also the technical engineer Karol Adamiecki.

Second, I will explore in depth the technocratic visions of Tadeusz Dzieduszycki, one of the first conservative scientists in Poland to comment on Mussolini's corporatist changes in Italy, which tried to circumvent class warfare by integrating both entrepreneurs and working people in a combined, albeit illiberal, political system. Dzieduszycki was an important Polish publicist and one of the most significant voices in the contemporary debate, propagating societal and political ideas strongly influenced by fascism in the interwar period.⁷ His case can exemplarily show the entanglement of discourses in Poland with the at this time widespread propensity to change the political system in Western and Central Europe, as well as in the United States, always with Mussolini's reforms in mind⁸: His voluminous writing concentrates on the role of scientists and technicians as ex-

RICH JAEGER/ JÖRN RÜSEN, vol. 3, Stuttgart 2004, p. 139-154; exemplarily on technology, i.e. technocracy: JUTTA SCHERRER, 'Einholen und überholen.' Amerikanische Technologie aus sowjetrussischer Sicht. Die zwanziger und frühen dreißiger Jahre, in: *Vom Gegner lernen. Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by MARTIN AUST/ DANIEL SCHÖNPFLUG, Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 179-208; OLIVIER DARD/ DIETER GOSEWINKEL, Planung, Technokratie und Rationalisierung in Deutschland und Frankreich während der Weltkriegsära, in: *Vom Gegner lernen*, p. 209-233.

⁶ MICHAEL WERNER/ BÉNÉDICTE ZIMMERMANN, Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002) p. 607-636; *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, ed. by GUNILLA BUDDE/ OLIVER JANZ/ SEBASTIAN CONRAD, Göttingen 2006; MARTIN KOHLRAUSCH, Technologische Innovation und transnationale Netzwerke. Europa zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: *Journal of Modern European History* 6/2 (2008), p. 181-195. Working on cultural historical dimensions of the history of technology in the 20th century: www.histech.nl/Tensions, accessed 25 February 2009; *Kooperation trotz Konfrontation. Wissenschaft und Technik im Kalten Krieg*, ed. by KLAUS GESTWA/ STEFAN ROHDEWALD, Special issue of *Osteuropa* 59/10 (2009).

⁷ MACIEJ MARSZAŁ, Włoski faszyszm w polskiej myśli politycznej i prawnej 1922-1939, Wrocław 2007, p. 243, 324.

⁸ SCHIVELBUSCH, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft*, p. 17.

perts, promoting his own various socio-political conceptions, such as 'solidary imperialism', as he calls American Fordism.⁹

Third, I will elucidate the specific nature of Poland's multiple postcolonial situation at the time, as Dzieduszycki's ideas must be regarded as deeply embedded in this historical context. The postcolonial perspective¹⁰ helps explain the functions of the discourse technocrats used and established in building Poland as a newly independent and up-to-date, technologically sophisticated modern country. Are there forms of 'mimicry', 'mockery' or 'parody'¹¹ of the leading American example to be found in the process of transforming parts of the former, early modern Polish-Lithuanian multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Commonwealth into a modern Polish nation state with its own civilizational or 'technocratic' mission? As I will discuss later in more detail, Poland historically played an ambivalent role in this regard: Having colonized Ruthenia, i.e. today Ukraine and Belarus, it later became the object of Prussian, Russian and Austro-Hungarian imperial ambitions.¹² I will thus also investigate if strate-

⁹ WŁODZIMIERZ MICH, Tadeusza Dzieduszyckiego utopia technokratyczna, in: *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio K* 4 (1997), p. 59-65.

¹⁰ Here only two exemplary titles: BILL ASHCROFT/ GARETH GRIFFITHS/ HELEN TIFFIN, *Post-Colonial Studies. The Key Concepts*, London 2000; Habsburg postcolonial. Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis, ed. by JOHANNES FEICHTINGER/ URSULA PRUTSCH/ MORITZ CSÁKY, Innsbruck 2003.

¹¹ HOMI K. BHABHA, *Of Mimicry and Man. The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse*, in: HOMI K. BHABHA, *The Location of Culture*, London 1994, p. 121-131; '[M]imicry is never very far from mockery, since it can appear to parody whatever it mimics.' ASHCROFT, GRIFFITHS, TIFFIN, 'mimicry', in: ASHCROFT/ GRIFFITHS/ TIFFIN, *Post-Colonial Studies*, p. 139-142, p. 139.

¹² On Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia, cf. HANS-JÜRGEN BÖMELBURG, *Czy Rzeczpospolita była imperium? Imperial turn w historiografii, struktury państwowe w Europie Środkowoschodniej i 'imperialna' warstwa pojęciowa w XVI-XVII wieku*, in: *Rzeczpospolita w XVI-XVIII wieku. Państwo czy wspólnota?*, ed. by BOGUSŁAW DYBAŚ/ PAWEŁ HANCZEWSKI/ TOMASZ KEMPA, Toruń 2007, p. 43-57; STEFAN ROHDEWALD/ STEFAN WIEDERKEHR/ DAVID FRICK, *Transkulturelle Kommunikation im Großfürstentum Litauen und in den östlichen Gebieten der Polnischen Krone. Zur Einführung*, in: *Litauen und Ruthenien. Studien zu einer transkulturellen Kommunikationsregion (15.-18. Jahrhundert)/ Lithuania and Ruthenia. Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th-18th Centuries)*, ed. by STEFAN ROHDEWALD/ DAVID FRICK/ STEFAN WIEDERKEHR, Wiesbaden 2007, p. 7-33, p. 19-20. On the role of Germany, see PHILIPP THER, *Imperial instead of National History. Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires*, in: *Imperial Rule*, ed. by ALEKSEJ I. MILLER/ ALFRED J. RIEBER, Budapest 2004, p. 47-66, p. 49-50. Not only on the cultural consequences of Russian rule: DIRK UFFELMANN, 'Ich würde meine Nation als lebendiges Lied erschaffen'. *Romantik-Lektüre unter Vorzeichen des Postkolonialismus*, in: *Romantik und Geschichte. Polnisches Paradigma, europäischer Kontext, deutsch-polnische Perspektive*, ed. by ALFRED GALL et al., Wiesbaden 2007, p. 90-107. On the role of the Habsburgs in Poland: HANS-CHRISTIAN MANER, *Zum Problem*

gies to give Poland an excessive, compensative self-confidence in the international competition of new empires in the interwar years can be considered an adapted version of the strategy labelled 'signifying nation', discernible in the nineteenth-century writings of Adam Mickiewicz to describe a future, never quite achievable national ideal as a means to subvert the imperial discourses of others.¹³ Was it the aim of the actors in question to share in the 'symbolic capital'¹⁴ linked to the idea of becoming an accepted member of an imagined¹⁵ modern¹⁶ national as well as global community in the nineteenth century and the interwar years?

1. Scientific Management as an Opportunity for the Czechs to Become the 'Yankees of Europe'

Before turning to Europe, let us take a last brief excursion to the United States: There, the emergence of the concept of technocracy went hand in hand with the development of social networks. Technocrats organized themselves into several groups after World War I. Associations such as the Soviet of Technicians – obviously inspired by the Soviet Union – or the Technical Alliance, whose members were scientists and engineers, emerged. The latter was renamed Technocratic Inc. in 1933.¹⁷ Yet, although there was a lively technocratic movement and a 'technocracy craze, with technocracy organizations springing up across the country',¹⁸ only few engineers embraced the socialist elements of their conceptions.¹⁹ Thus,

der Kolonisierung Galiziens. Aus den Debatten des Ministerrates und des Reichsrates in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: *Habsburg postcolonial*, p. 153-163.

¹³ UFFELMANN, 'Ich würde meine Nation als lebendiges Lied erschaffen', p. 92-100; DIRK UFFELMANN, *Litauen! Mein Orient*, in: *Orientalismus in slavischen Kulturen und Literaturen. Konstellationen einer anderen Moderne*, ed. by WOLFGANG S. KISSEL, forthcoming. On shared Russian and Polish orientalism: IZABELA KALINOWSKA, *Between East and West. Polish and Russian Nineteenth-Century Travel to the Orient*, Rochester 2004.

¹⁴ PIERRE BOURDIEU, *Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l'action*, Paris 1994, p. 56

¹⁵ BENEDICT ANDERSON, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition, London 1991.

¹⁶ SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT, *Multiple Modernities*, in: *Multiple Modernities*, ed. by SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT, New Brunswick 2002, p. 1-29.

¹⁷ FISCHER, *Technocracy*, p. 84-85.

¹⁸ PETER MEIKSINS, *The Myth of Technocracy. The Social Philosophy of American Engineers in the 1930s*, in: *History of Political Thought* 21/3 (2000), p. 501-523, p. 510.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 511.

many American engineers with access to leading positions remained uninterested.²⁰

Nevertheless, the new discourse was powerful. Quite soon, the new scientific concepts, and with them the nucleus of a social network of enthusiastic scientists, spread to Europe – and not only to countries like Italy, France, Germany and Greece.²¹ During this time, they also took root in Czechoslovakia, Poland and – in a more disguised form – the Soviet Union as well.²² In fact, the American New Deal of the 1930s as well as Italian Fascism and German National Socialism where in a certain way related to the challenge the Soviet Union's attempt to realize a 'world of work and technics' posed – 'fascist intellectuals and technocrats' were highly interested in Stalin's experiment.²³ For the German conservative revolutionary Ernst Jünger, for example, 'political differences were nothing but surface phenomena, that is, different labels for one fundamental change towards increased planning' by experts.²⁴ In this sense, Fascism and National Socialism can be regarded as attempts to adapt Europe to America.²⁵

Czechoslovakia was at this time perceived in the United States as the 'Yankee of Europe', a young and eagerly modern state developing along American lines, not less, but seemingly even more so than the older, established Western European nation states. Professor Tomáš Garrigue Masa-

²⁰ Ibid., p. 511, 523.

²¹ CHARLES S. MAIER, *Between Taylorism and Technocracy. European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 5/2 (1970), p. 27-61; THOMAS ROHRKRÄMER, *Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism. Technocratic Tendencies in Germany, 1890-1945*, in: *Contemporary European History* 8/1 (1999), p. 29-50; STEFAN WILLEKE, *Die Technokratiebewegung in Deutschland zwischen den Weltkriegen*, in: *Technikgeschichte* 62/3 (1995), p. 221-246; YIANNIS ANTONIOU/ MICHALIS ASSIMAKOPOULOS/ KONSTANTINOS CHATZIS, *The National Identity of Inter-war Greek Engineers. Elitism, Rationalization, Technocracy, and Reactionary Modernism*, in: *History and Technology* 23/3 (2007), p. 241-261.

²² HELENA POLREICHOVÁ, 'Yankee of Central Europe'. The First Well-Hidden World Congress of Scientific Management in Prague, July 20th-30th 1924, PIMCO, in: *Prager wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Mitteilungen/ Prague Economic and Social History Papers* 1 (1994), p. 45-98, p. 46; KENDALL E. BAILES, *The Politics of Technology. Stalin and Technocratic Thinking among Soviet Engineers*, in: *The American Historical Review* 79/2 (1974), p. 445-469; SUSANNE SCHATTEBERG, *Stalins Ingenieure. Lebenswelten zwischen Technik und Terror in den 1930er Jahren*, München 2002; PETER TEMIN, *Soviet and Nazi Economic Planning in the 1930s*, in: *The Economic History Review. New Series* 44/4 (1991), p. 573-593. Using the term 'technocracy' only as an analytical tool, and not as an element in the history of a discourse: DON K. ROWNEY, *Transition to Technocracy. The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State*, Ithaca 1989.

²³ SCHIVELBUSCH, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft*, p. 129, 132.

²⁴ ROHRKRÄMER, p. 40-41 (author's translation).

²⁵ SCHIVELBUSCH, *Entfernte Verwandtschaft*, p. 21.

ryk, the founder of the republic and its first president, appears to have deliberately promoted the legitimation and symbolic capital of the young republic by making it and himself the bellwether of modernity in Central Europe. As early as 1919, he succeeded in founding the Academy of Work, supporting scientists such as Stanisław Špaček (1876-1854), the first chairman of the Czech Technical and Economic Union founded after 1918, in their endeavours to institutionalize the association. As far as scientific management is concerned, it has been remarked that Western European and Polish scientific experts were at this time foremost in the development of contents and principals of management, whereas Czech technicians were the pioneers of organizing international conferences about this topic. Indeed, in 1924 the First World Congress of Management took place in Prague. Americans and Czechs founded the *Congrès International de l'Organisation Scientifique* (CIOS), whose European headquarters were in Prague and whose secretary general was Czech – until the French took over after 1927.

In Prague, the Hoover Library was to become the first special library of management in Europe. This quick development not only had its roots in prewar associations of technicians and engineers from Bohemia, but was also from the beginning embedded in an international context: By 1920, besides the usual diplomacy, a team of top Czech experts – including the prominent Špaček – was dispatched to Washington, D.C. to provide technical and economic information in close cooperation with other newly founded scientific institutions in Prague. In fact, PIMCO, as the First World Congress on Scientific Management was called, was the result of long years of scientific exchange and close cooperation between American and Czech specialists.²⁶ Embracing the U.S.A.'s pragmatic scientific, economic and cultural guidance,²⁷ Czech engineers and scientists used the ideology of technocracy to legitimize their own status as well as their new state.

Beside the 614 participants from Czechoslovakia, more than two hundred foreign scientists from all over Europe, as well as fifty from the United States, attended the 1924 congress. Among the European participants were as many as forty-one Polish scientists.²⁸ Interpreting these ciphers, it seems that scientists from the eastern part of Central Europe tried to constitute themselves as central participants in the global project of

²⁶ POLREICHOVÁ, 'Yankee of Central Europe', p. 46-49, 59, 63-69.

²⁷ Cf. FRANK SCHUMACHER, *Die Vereinigten Staaten. Imperialismus als Way of Life? in: Ein Platz an der Sonne. Die Geschichte der Kolonialreiche*, ed. by ROBERT ALDRICH, Stuttgart 2007, p. 278-303.

²⁸ POLREICHOVÁ, 'Yankee of Central Europe', p. 69.

scientific and societal modernity, and to be rather more mainstream ‘modern’ by embracing the American discourses in a voluntary act of self-colonization directly rather than to represent a type of peripheral modernity on the fringe of Europe. On the other hand, the scarcity of Western European scientists attending the conference was probably due to the perceived peripheral location of Prague.

2. The Envy and Ideal of Polish Scientists: Czech Scientific Management

Among the Polish participants were the professors Karol Adamiecki (1866–1933) and Edwin Hauswald (1868–1942) – known for having adapted the American conception of Taylorism in their development of scientific ‘harmonizing and harmonograms’ as well as so-called ‘productivism’.²⁹ Both of them, like Špaček, had received their university training under the imperial regimes before continuing their careers in the newly independent republics. Adamiecki obtained a degree in technological engineering in the imperial capital St Petersburg in 1891. Later, he worked for some time in Southern Russia, i.e. Ukraine. From 1919 onwards, he taught at the Politechnical Institute in Warsaw. Adamiecki, like his Czech colleagues, not only developed concepts, but networks as well: In the years 1923 to 1924, he was to promote several circles and organizations of engineers. His activities were crucial to facilitating the first Polish Congress on the Scientific Organization of Work, or the science of management, by December 1924.³⁰

But apparently, Poland’s scientific experts were at this time still not very successful compared to the achievements of their Czech colleagues, let alone the Americans. The Polish scientist Tadeusz Dzieduszycki wrote about PIMCO that the overly self-confident Polish participants soon became jealous in Prague, remarking that ‘our own accomplishment has

²⁹ Ibid., p. 54. On one of Adamiecki’s inventions: EDWARD R. MARSH, The Harmonogram of Karol Adamiecki, in: *The Academy of Management Journal* 18/2 (1975), p. 358–364; ZYGMUNT CIECHANOWSKI, Hauswald, Edwin, in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 9, Wrocław 1960/61, p. 319–320.

³⁰ BOLESŁAW ORŁOWSKI, Adamiecki, Karol, in: *Słownik polskich pionierów techniki*, ed. by BOLESŁAW ORŁOWSKI, Katowice 1984, p. 13–14; PIOTR DRZEWIECKI, Adamiecki, Karol, in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 1, Kraków 1935, p. 24–25; MARIA WOJDAK, Sylwetki Profesorów Politechniki Warszawskiej. Karol Adamiecki (1866–1933), Warszawa 1983, <http://bcpw.bg.pw.edu.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=815&dirids=7>, accessed 21 February 2009.

appeared to be unexpectedly small'.³¹ In Dzieduszycki's narrative, it was this disappointing experience that provoked an intensification of Polish scientists' efforts. By 1925, they had accomplished the foundation of the Institute for Scientific Organization in Warsaw. This initiative by the Polish government in cooperation with Adamiecki and others was explicitly tied to the congress in Prague, where a delegation of the Ministry of Work and Societal Welfare had been present,³² emulating the examples already existing in Prague and the United States. The project was backed by a developing network of Polish scientists and technicians. The resolution to found the institute was accepted in 1924 under the protection of the government in the hall of the Association of Technicians, where 'four hundred representatives of different societal and governmental spheres' approved it.³³

In addition to the development of this institution and his didactic efforts at the Politechnicum in Warsaw, in the last years of his life Adamiecki enhanced the role of Poland in the international movement of scientific management and developed an intense effort to publicize and popularize his ideas.³⁴ In his writings, Adamiecki sketched visionary outlooks – for example in a speech he gave in 1923 at the conference of engineers and mechanics in Warsaw, published in 1923 in *Przegląd Techniczny*, a leading Polish periodical, in which he conceived the 'Societal Meaning of the Work of an Engineer in Industry'.³⁵ With the help of the new science of organization, the technician would become a manager, working for the 'benefit of the whole people'.³⁶

If the conference in Prague was dominated by foreign, American concepts, Adamiecki was seen by many Polish scientists and experts as one of the European academics to show the country a new direction, especially in what he called the 'scientific organization of work'. This science was to be implemented as soon as possible: Adamiecki spent some time in the then Polish region Silesia to promote the scientific organization of the mining

³¹ TADEUSZ DZIEDUSZYCKI, U Podstaw usprawienia pracy i państwowości naszej, Toruń 1925, p. 142 (author's translation).

³² Ibid., p. 143.

³³ Ibid. (author's translation).

³⁴ KAROL ADAMIECKI, O nauce organizacji. Wybór pism, ed. by ZBIGNIEW HEIDRICH, Warszawa 1970, p. 16.

³⁵ KAROL ADAMIECKI, Znaczenie społeczne pracy inżyniera w Przemysle, in: *Przegląd Techniczny* 41, 42, 43, 44 (1923), as cited in: ADAMIECKI, O nauce organizacji, p. 107-139, p. 109.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 139 (author's translation).

industry, at places such as Huta Pokój (Friedenshütte).³⁷ On the other hand, he participated at congresses on scientific organization not only in Prague in 1924, but also in Rome in 1927 and in Paris in 1929, where his concepts were well received, especially his idea of the harmonization of work. In 1929, he became vice-president of the International Committee of Scientific Management in Geneva³⁸ – a position in which, as can be assumed, he strove to adequately represent the position of Polish science in the transnational context.

3. Dzieduszycki's Mimicry of Ford: The Adaptation of American 'Solidary Imperialism'

Not only adaptations of Taylorism had an echo in Poland, technocracy itself was embraced as well. Tadeusz Dzieduszycki (1896-1976), who came from an old noble family whose members had played an important role in politics and natural sciences in Galicia under Habsburg reign and in the renewed Republic – one of his first publications was on the *Kresy* and Ukraine,³⁹ i.e. on territories Poland had just been waging war for – conceived a quite extreme version of technocracy to regulate the economy. Wishing not to lose political independence (or territory) again, he advocated that Poland had to succeed in international economic competition. He saw the remedy for improving Poland's situation in the mobilization of all of society's energy and in the directing of this energy towards the most efficient usage in production.⁴⁰ It has been argued that although Dzieduszycki worked with technocratic concepts, he did not accept the term technocracy. As a matter of fact, he simply rejected the version of technocracy concentrating exclusively on engineers, which, in his view, overestimated rational action and underestimated irrationalism. However, his concepts were based on technocratic elements such as the idea of total governance by a meritocracy, elitism, the exuberant belief in the power of science and the control of social processes by scientists.⁴¹ At the time, numerous political publicists from the entire political spectrum were more-

³⁷ KAROL ADAMIECKI, Postępy w zastosowaniu metod naukowej organizacji w Zagłębiu Dąbrowskim i Katowickim, in: *Przegląd Techniczny* 6 (1926), as cited in: ADAMIECKI, O nauczanie organizacji, p. 205-215.

³⁸ ORŁOWSKI, Adamiecki, p. 13-14; WOJDAK, Sylwetki.

³⁹ [TADEUSZ DZIEDUSZYCKI], Nasze kresy i Ukraina. Kilka myśli o wojskowo-gospodarczym zabezpieczeniu się, [Warszawa 1921].

⁴⁰ MICH, Tadeusza Dzieduszyckiego utopia, p. 59.

⁴¹ Ibid.

over influenced by fascist conceptions. Dzieduszycki's stance most closely converged with that of the conservatives, and less so with that of the nationalists (*narodowcy*) or the *Sanacja*, the political faction supporting Józef Piłsudski.⁴² All in all, however, 'Polish political and juridical thinking in the years from 1922 to 1939' was quite interested in Mussolini and 'distinguished itself through its thoroughness in defining the phenomenon of Italian Fascism and its forms'.⁴³

Dzieduszycki's visions developed in this context and concerned society and the state as a whole. This is vividly illustrated in his book, *At the Foundations of the Improvement of our Work and Statehood*, which is based among other things on the idea of scientific management as embraced and developed by Adamiecki. According to Dzieduszycki,

'[the] further development of the economy and global civilization is the consequence of this amazing cultural movement under the collective name scientific management. [...] This process has gone beyond the spheres of technical-economic problems, and reaches today deeply into the heart of societal life and promotes in our eyes also a violent evolution of international relations'.⁴⁴

In 1924, he wrote in the monthly *Ameryka – Polska* about 'socio-technics' (*socjo-technika*) [*sic*] and 'positive politicians' as 'sociotechnicians' (*socjo-technicy*) [*sic*], as a remedy for the 'violent criticism' of parliamentarianism.⁴⁵ His engagement to establish the Institute for the Scientific Organization of Work and Societal Life has already been mentioned.⁴⁶ Citing American, Czech and Russian examples, Dzieduszycki concluded in 1925, a "dictatorship of the intellect" is the only way to overcome the virulent [...] "esprit de corps" of specific party- and economic groups'.⁴⁷

To realize such a dictatorship, he helped promote the foundation of an Institute for Scientific Economic and Societal Mediation (*Instytucja Naukowego Pośrednictwa Gospodarczego i Społecznego*).⁴⁸ The Polish Confederation of Intellectual Workers propagated this project with the aim

⁴² MARSZAŁ, Włoski faszyszm, p. 324.

⁴³ Ibid. (author's translation).

⁴⁴ DZIEDUSZYCKI, U Podstaw usprawnienia pracy, p. 35 (author's translation).

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 58, 60.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 127.

⁴⁸ JOANNA KURCZEWSKA, Przeszłość, przyszłość i technokrati (Analiza kategorii czasu w ideologii technokratycznej), in: Archiwum historii filozofii i myśli społecznej 32 (1987), p. 199-237, p. 226; MICH, Tadeusza Dzieduszyckiego utopia, p. 61. JOANNA KURCZEWSKA, Technokrata i polityka, in: Archiwum historii filozofii i myśli społecznej 34 (1989), p. 57-70.

to institutionalize a “third power” of society, i.e. an organized elite of the people’, as Dzieduszycki wrote.⁴⁹ On 5 March 1926, seven professors from the University of Lvov⁵⁰, supported by thirty-seven professors of the universities of Krakow, Vilnius (Polish: Wilno), Poznań, Lublin and Warsaw, asked the president of the Polish Academy of Arts in Krakow in a ‘plebiscite’ signed by the marshals of both the Sejm and the Senate, to agree to the foundation of such an institution in the form of a Polish Academy of Work ‘for the systematic and exclusively objective analysis of the current national defeat’, having in mind specifically the ‘American, Czech, Italian etc.’ examples.⁵¹ The second organizing conference in this matter, convened by the Academy of Arts, could not take place, however, because of Marshal Piłsudski’s coup in May of 1926.⁵²

In a book published in 1927, *The Theory of the Fascist Movement and the Syndicalist Corporationist State*,⁵³ Dzieduszycki sketched a global geographic mind map of his endeavours, propagating a ‘solidary imperialism’ (as he called American Fordism) that should encompass the whole world:

‘The Puritan habitus of the Yankees, giving us various charitable missions, supplies and loans, is the avant-garde of an imperialism, that is, of all [versions of imperialism, S.R.] known to date, the closest to the Christian ideal of the “peace of God” on earth. This is *solidary imperialism* [*sic*], or the development of the principle of “interdependence”, the expansion of the ideology of *Ford*, possibly around the whole world. *Ford* restricts the unproductive bureaucracy, gives rise to the wish of cultural necessities, of the dollar, of comfortableness, the understanding of the logic of business with solidary creativity among the broad masses etc., or works in the spirit of the solidary expansion (of scientific management).’⁵⁴

‘[M]ilitaristic-political competition’ should, according to this logic, be substituted with ‘cultural-economical competition’ – this was the reason why, in his view, the United States did not participate at Versailles in the

⁴⁹ TADEUSZ DZIEDUSZYCKI, O teorię nowoczesnej sprawnej państwowości (Hoovera – Mussoliniego – Piłsudskiego). Problem państwowej władzy czwartej (obok zreformowania trzech moteskjusowych) i społecznej siły trzeciej (względem pracy i kapitału), Warszawa 1928, p. 8.

⁵⁰ Polish: Lwów, Ukrainian: L’viv.

⁵¹ DZIEDUSZYCKI, O teorię nowoczesnej, p. 11-12 (author’s translation).

⁵² Ibid., p. 13.

⁵³ TADEUSZ DZIEDUSZYCKI, Teoria ruchu faszystowskiego i państwa syndykalistycznego korporacyjnego, Warszawa 1927. Cf. MARSZAŁ, Włoski faszyszm, p. 243.

⁵⁴ DZIEDUSZYCKI, Teoria ruchu, p. 161 (author’s translation).

‘division of colonial German “mandates”’.⁵⁵ In this discursive strategy, Fordism turns into an anticolonial version of a modern, ‘solidary’ form of ‘imperialism’.

Dzieduszycki further wrote about the ‘mimicry’ of Fordism as a tactic allegedly pursued by the Italian Fascists, which, according to him, should be considered by Poland as well:

‘Both the inevitable finality of the economic integration of Europe, in which we want to avoid the Berlin model, as well as the question of expansion to the East – where we, too, have, in competition to the Prussian model, to relate ourselves architecturally to the American style of societal and intersocietal constructions – compel to take a closer look at the huge advantages Italy assures for itself by these “mimicries” (*takie “mimicri” [sic]*) in domestic as well as in international politics.’⁵⁶

Thus appreciating Mussolini's attempts to establish himself as a statesman in Albania, Libya and Locarno, as well as in Italy itself, Dzieduszycki concludes, ‘*Taylor, Ford, Hoover* in America, and MUSSOLINI in Europe are the BEGINNINGS of an awakening INTELLECTUAL-FEUDAL ERA [*sic*]’ that should become the ‘[p]ioneer of the RENAISSANCE OF HELLENIC EUROPE [capitalized in the original, S. R.]’. Against the Bolsheviks, he formulates the motto: ‘Intellectuals of all states, enterprises and countries, unite. Hail to the dictatorship of the common sense of all classes of the people!’⁵⁷ Indeed, Lenin and Stalin were Dzieduszycki's main enemies: The version of the ‘modern engineer-organizer’ and the elements of ‘scientific organization’ he observed as used by the Bolsheviks where without exemption negative, although the transfer of these ideas was – purportedly – influenced by the Fascists.⁵⁸

Due to a lack of an ‘active intelligentsia’, the ‘organizing models imported from the best examples of the West become [...] like caricatures’.⁵⁹ The Soviet versions of scientific organization hence evoked Dzieduszycki's repeated criticism. His own sketch of technocracy, derived from American and Italian examples, can thus be regarded as an answer to this challenge, too.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 161-162 (author's translation).

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 162 (author's translation).

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 167.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 103-106.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 90.

In the same book, he defined *socjotechnika* as well as ‘scientific organization’ as synonyms for the term *psychotechnika*⁶⁰ – thus connecting his conception with psycho-technics, a cipher for another conception of Taylorism, i. e. scientific management, developed in Germany and in England, and characteristic of the scientific discursive practices of the interwar period in the Soviet Union as well.⁶¹

After the mobilization of associations such as the academy and parliament had proven to be insufficient – not least of all because of Piłsudski’s coup – Dzieduszycki disseminated information about the project by contacting opinion makers, active and former top-rank politicians, engineers, professors and leading journalists, trying to launch a media campaign in newspapers and journals. Dzieduszycki, ‘as an old ardent sympathizer of the independent ambitions’,⁶² thus tried to support the wish of the Academy of Arts and the Confederation of Intellectual Workers to found an Academy of Work by sending an inquiry to ‘twenty leading minds of different spheres of knowledge and societal confidence’⁶³ as a ‘supplement to this wish of the obvious heads of Polish science and “neutral” cultural activity’.⁶⁴ This initiative at least led to a somewhat intensified, controversial public debate in the new republic. Articles responding to his inquiry appeared in the newspapers and journals *Dzień Polski*, *Robotnik*, *Epoka*, *Przełom*, *Wiadomości Literackie* and *Ruch Prawniczy*.⁶⁵ Obviously, besides *Robotnik*, Dzieduszycki characterized these journals as ‘supporting the reformist ambitions of the government’.⁶⁶ *Epoka* and *Przełom* played an outstanding role in discussing and propagating fascist ideas at this time, while *Robotnik* was an important platform for leftist critique of fascism.⁶⁷ I will quote only a few of the responses from these alleged ‘leading minds’: Władysław Grabski, former prime minister and president of the Warsaw

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 109; cf. DZIEDUSZYCKI, U Podstaw usprawienia pracy, p. 41-42.

⁶¹ TORSTEN RÜTING, Pavlov und der Neue Mensch. Diskurse über Disziplinierung in Sowjetrussland, München 2002, p. 196-197; SABINE MECK, Das Verhältnis von Arbeit und Körperkultur in der Sowjetunion. Versuch einer theoretischen Standortbestimmung, Frankfurt am Main 1986, p. 30-35; MARGARETE VÖHRINGER, Avantgarde und Psychotechnik. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik der Wahrnehmungsexperimente in der frühen Sowjetunion, Göttingen 2007; KURT JOHANSSON, Aleksej Gastev. Proletarian Bard of the Machine Age, Stockholm 1983.

⁶² DZIEDUSZYCKI, O teorję nowoczesnej, p. 10 (author’s translation).

⁶³ Ibid. (author’s translation).

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 13 (author’s translation).

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 27-40.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 27 (author’s translation).

⁶⁷ Cf. the bibliography in MARSZAŁ, Włoski faszyszm, p. 326-367.

Economic Association, answered on 14 June 1928, stating that he supported Działusiński in his ambition to make the intelligentsia a 'fourth power' in the state, 'directing and deciding' as an 'organized state adviser', following the examples of the 'West'.⁶⁸ The president of the Economic Society of Lvov, Professor Leopold Caro (1864–1939), as well as Professor Stefan Biedrzycki (1876–1936), 'one of the official pioneers of "Scientific Management"',⁶⁹ also supported Działusiński's letter. The latter wrote on 19 June 1928:

'Worthy of support is especially the idea of a Polish Academy that would have the aim to improve all forms of national production, unifying the now countercurrent efforts of different existing economic councils, poll commissions, the Institute of Scientific Management etc. Respecting in the construction of such an Academy the analogous experiences and aims of especially Hoover, Masaryk and Mussolini, this would bring us to the front line of development of the most intensively working societies of today.'⁷⁰

Among the supporters were also the 'former minister of justice' (who held this position after Piłsudski's coup in 1926) Professor Wacław Makowski and Dr Mieczysław Szawleski, the then head of the Office of Economics of the Bank of Poland.⁷¹ Szawleski analysed on 1 February 1928: "Classless" America relies on tests of intelligence [...]. *Fascism explicitly declares the dictatorship of intelligence* [italics in the original, S.R.]. Bolshevism has actually [...] handed over the state administration to the intelligence of the disciplines (*specy*).'⁷² However, he did not see a good position for Poland in this international situation of competition, but perceived rather a menace by the U.S.S.R. and Germany: '[O]ne cannot be of the opinion that, in relation to our neighbours, time is still working for us.'⁷³

Of course there were critical voices as well. The journalist Kazimierz Czapieński criticized Działusiński's project in the worker's newspaper *Robotnik* with a pejorative neologism as a fascist *technarchia*.⁷⁴ Indeed, in a version of his project published in 1928, Działusiński without restraint lumped together concepts of Hoover, Mussolini and Masaryk and thus

⁶⁸ DZIAŁUSIŃSKI, O teorję nowoczesnej, p. 14.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 13–15 (author's translation).

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 14 (author's translation).

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 20–23.

⁷² Ibid., p. 23 (author's translation).

⁷³ Ibid. (author's translation).

⁷⁴ KAZIMIERZ CZAPIEŃSKI, 2 July 1928, *Robotnik*, as quoted in DZIAŁUSIŃSKI, O teorję nowoczesnej, p. 30–32.

conceived a ‘new man in public life’⁷⁵: He documented this project in 1928 in a book entitled *On the Theory of Modern Organized Statehood (Hoover – Mussolini – Piłsudski)*. Here, Dzieduszycki again contextualized his endeavours in relation to Soviet Russia: He differentiated between “[s]chools” of systematic enhancement of blind Chauvinism, be they national-imperialistic (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche [*sic*], Hegel, Bismark [*sic*], slavophile etc.) or class-imperialistic (and pan-Semitic) beginning with Marx, then Lenin, Trocki [*sic*] and ending with belligerent Zionism’.⁷⁶ Dzieduszycki’s ideas found – albeit neither overwhelming nor sustained – support in leading intellectual, political and societal circles.

At the end of 1930, he became the sole secretary of a committee for the preparation of a Polish Academy of Work under the leadership of Professor Stefan Biedrzycki, then rector of the Main School of Agronomy in Warsaw. Among the eleven high-profile members (six professors, leading persons of economic institutions) was Waclaw Makowski, then head of the constitutional commission of the Sejm⁷⁷ as a member of the Nonparty Bloc for the Collaboration with Government (BBWR). When Piłsudski vacated his position as vice-marshal of the Sejm, Makowski was elected to this honour on 1 October 1931.⁷⁸ As secretary of this institutionalized network, Dzieduszycki published the book *Committee for the Preparation of a Polish Academy of Work*⁷⁹ in 1931, promoting this project. It appeared as the first volume of the series *Materials*, published with support of the Ministry of State-owned Banks. Under the motto ‘Ex Occidente Lux’, he defined ‘Rational Organization’ as a ‘Criterion of Civilization and the Way to Welfare’. He then sketched analogous institutions in leading countries (in the following order: United States, Germany, United Kingdom, British Dominions and Japan, France, Czechoslovakia) that had inspired the members of the committee – in a transnational way – to found a similar organization in Poland.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ DZIEDUSZYCKI, O teorję nowoczesnej, p. 31, 74. On the fascist ‘New Man’ in Europe between the wars: L’homme nouveau dans l’Europe fasciste (1922–1945). Entre dictature et totalitarisme, ed. by MARIE-ANNE MATARD-BONUCCI, Paris 2004.

⁷⁶ DZIEDUSZYCKI, O teorję nowoczesnej, p. 52.

⁷⁷ TADEUSZ DZIEDUSZYCKI, Sociotechnicum Polonorum. Scientia pura cum arte vitae conjugenda, czyli Polska Akademia Pracy Racjonalnej. Precedensy zagraniczne i projekt organizacji, Warszawa 1931, p. 14–15.

⁷⁸ A short biography of Makowski is available on the website of the Sejm: Waclaw Makowski (1880–1942), <http://edukacja.sejm.gov.pl/historia-sejmu/marszalkowie-sejmu/ii-rzeczypospolita.html>, accessed 26 February 2009.

⁷⁹ DZIEDUSZYCKI, Sociotechnicum Polonorum.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 7–8.

However, despite the fact that Dzieduszycki had some influence on the neoconservative political publicists of the journal *Bunt Młodych* (Revolt of the Young), where Jerzy Giedroyc and Aleksander Bocheński published,⁸¹ his project apparently remained on paper: Dzieduszycki's ideas were unpopular among conservatives, as he conceived a 'dictatorship ruled by specialists of different technologies' without respecting political representation of 'organic society and the opinions of [its] entities'.⁸² According to a political project based on the 'Ideology of Scientific Management', conceived in 1931 by Eustachy Sapieha,⁸³ Tadeusz Dzieduszycki and Władysław Gizbert Studnicki, twenty per cent of the senate should consist of 'experts in special spheres of administration' appointed by the president.⁸⁴ Moreover, technological progress or *maszynizacja* itself was criticized.⁸⁵

4. Polish Colonialism as Postcolonial Technocratic Utopia?

Let us now return to 'solidary imperialism'. As noted above, Dzieduszycki himself wrote in 1927 about 'mimicry' as a tactic employed by Italian Fascists. Thus, his call for Polish 'solidary imperialism' might be analysed in a postcolonial context: Comparable to Wilhelmine Germany⁸⁶ or Italy after 1890,⁸⁷ who tried rather belatedly to look for 'a place in the sun' or colonies in Africa, there where even more belated compensatory discourses in interwar Poland, situating the country in a position of global competition between colonial empires – a challenge that was to be met by the adaptation, emulation or mimicry of the discursive strategies of these global actors.

⁸¹ MICH, Tadeusza Dzieduszyckiego utopia, p. 60. Cf. JANUSZ LEWANDOWSKI, Neo-liberalowie wobec współczesności, Gdynia 1991, p. 154-156; WŁODZIMIERZ MICH, Między integralizmem a liberalizmem. Polscy konserwatyści wobec kapitalizmu, Lublin 1996, p. 18, 50, 248-253; MARCIN KRÓL, Style politycznego myślenia wokół 'Buntu Młodych' i 'Polityki', Paris 1979.

⁸² BOGDAN SZLACHTA, Polscy konserwatyści wobec ustroju politycznego do 1939 roku, Kraków 2000, p. 217 (author's translation).

⁸³ Sapieha had been minister of foreign affairs in 1920, proposed Piłsudski's idea of a union with Lithuania in Bruxelles in 1921 and was a member of the BBWR supporting Piłsudski in 1930.

⁸⁴ SZLACHTA, Polscy konserwatyści, p. 299-301.

⁸⁵ MICH, Między integralizmem a liberalizmem, p. 55, 79.

⁸⁶ JOACHIM ZELLER, Das Deutsche Reich. Der Nachzügler, in: Ein Platz an der Sonne, p. 238-253.

⁸⁷ IRMA TADDIA, Italien. Das letzte Imperium, in: Ein Platz an der Sonne, p. 254-277.

Leopold Caro, an early supporter of Dzieduszycki, wrote in 1930 about the *Essence of Solidarity*, also citing Ford and Mussolini.⁸⁸ As a pioneer of Catholic solidarity, he became vice-president of the Societal Council of the Polish Primas in 1932.⁸⁹ President Ignacy Mościcki along with the Polish Primas Cardinal August Hlond and Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz became sponsors of the 'Week of the Sea' in 1937, which had been proclaimed by the Maritime and Colonial League as a climax of its publicistic success in interwar Poland.⁹⁰ Poland's belated wish for colonies can be interpreted from a postcolonial perspective as a form of mimicry with a touch of mockery (which is characteristic of postcolonial mimicry)⁹¹ without serious hope for realization.

The same can be said about *Polska Idea Imperialna* (The Imperial Polish Idea), published in 1938 with a foreword by Jerzy Giedroyc, a leading conservative publicist, by the journalists and supporters of *Bunt Młodych*⁹² – with which Dzieduszycki, apparently, had been connected. Today, the project is considered 'publicistic maculature' 'already in the moment of publication'.⁹³ In the chapter 'colonies', the publishers were at least realistic enough to judge the Polish 'wish for colonies' for the time being only as a 'prestigious postulate'.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, they considered 'the current colonial campaign as useful to prepare a base for our future necessities in time; when we will have developed ourselves better, we will be able to attempt an expansion of capital on foreign territories'.⁹⁵ The publication supported Piłsudski's *Sanacja* – with some adjustments⁹⁶ – as well as

⁸⁸ LEOPOLD CARO, Istota solidaryzmu, in: Przegląd Powszechny 186/5 (1930), no. 557, p. 149-161.

⁸⁹ www.polonica.net/Istota_solidaryzmu.thm, accessed 1 March 2009. Cf. JAROSŁAW MACAŁA, Polska katolicka w myśli politycznej II RP, Głogów 2004, p. 34, 252 et al.

⁹⁰ TARAS HUNCZAK, Polish Colonial Ambitions in the Inter-War Period, in: Slavic Review 26/4 (1967), p. 648-656, p. 651-652; GRAŻYNA BORKOWSKA, Polskie doświadczenie kolonialne, in: Teksty drugie 4 (2007), p. 15-24; ZBIGNIEW BUKIEWICZ, Aspiracje kolonialne w polityce zagranicznej Polski, Zielona Góra 1998.

⁹¹ ASHCROFT, GRIFFITHS, TIFFIN, Post-Colonial Studies, p. 139-142.

⁹² Polska idea imperialna, ed. by Zespół 'Polityki', Warszawa 1938; SZLACHTA, Polscy konserwatyści, p. 36, 38.

⁹³ A. STANISŁAW KOWALCZYK, Kult państwa. Program polityczny śródkowiska 'Polityki' Jerzego Giedroycia z roku 1938, in: For East is East. Liber Amicorum Wojciech Skalmowski, ed. by WOJCIECH SKALMOWSKI/ TATJANA SOLDATJENKOVA/ EMMANUEL WAEGEMANS, Leuven 2003, p. 75-86, p. 76 (author's translation); KRÓL, Style politycznego myślenia, p. 24-29.

⁹⁴ Polska idea imperialna, p. 70.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 70 (author's translation).

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 77.

his conception of Polish nationhood, although, in contrast to him and apparently also to Dzieduszycki, who avoided writing about Jewish Poles in his publications, without a benevolent stance towards Jews:⁹⁷ '[W]e have to force the Jews into mass emigration by ruthless economic pressure.'⁹⁸ The economic programme of *Bunt Młodych* adopted not only an imperial discourse, but technocratic elements as well: 'With the aim of coordination and improvement' of the economy, a 'Ministry of National Economics' should be established, so that '[e]conomic life becomes an organic whole.' An 'economic committee' 'composed of first-rate experts (*fachowcy*)' should assist the ministry. Several 'offices of economy' should help and 'give programmatic character' to the different state-owned enterprises. They should convey 'advice obtained among experts (*rzeczoznawcy*) beyond the state administration'. Corporatist elements were also approved of: 'We see the cooperative movement as one of the most able forms of collective economic action to lead as an evolution to the realization of a healthy corporative constitution'.⁹⁹ Honouring Piłsudski, the 'dictatorial' elements of his actions were condoned – to let 'grow the great tree of the newborn Polish nationalism, capable of building the new Polish Empire'.¹⁰⁰ Yet, in another passage, they favoured parliamentarism to adopt 'the benefits of corporatist constitution' without the state turning 'authoritarian'.¹⁰¹ The authors wanted to establish a political group parallel to Piłsudski's BBWR after the next elections, but the war prohibited this. In any case, their programme 'had nothing new to propose'¹⁰² to the public – all of these ideas were already widespread in conservative Polish political discourse. Even if the publication was not important, then, it was representative of the contemporary political discourse.

Read in this context, Dzieduszycki's publications were not totally extraordinary, albeit extravagant: In 1939, he criticized Nazi Germany's concentration camps as well as Hitler's youth movement and projected an axis Warsaw-London-Washington as '*urbs aeterna*' to defend the '*pax supra romana*' and 'Jagiellonian Poland' against Moscovitians, 'Germanized' Czechs and 'Italo-Turkish-Slavic' Southern Slavs as allies of Hitler. Thus, Dzieduszycki did not adapt National Socialist models, al-

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 81-82; ULRICH SCHMID/ SABINA SCHAFFNER/ ISABELLE VONLANTHEN, *Die Ästhetik des nationalistischen Diskurses in Polen (1926–1939)*, forthcoming 2010.

⁹⁸ Polska idea imperialna, p. 70 (author's translation). More discriminatory details on p. 46-47.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 71-73 (author's translation).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰² KOWALCZYK, *Kult państwa*, p. 86.

though some might have been as well adaptable as Mussolini's – another hint at the importance of situative political frames in Dzieduszycki's conceptions. This book, written and then confiscated by the censors shortly before the German and Soviet assaults on Poland in 1939, already in its title¹⁰³ once more exemplified the wish of a visionary Polish academic to formulate an increasingly desperate ideological answer to the mortifying challenges his resurrected fatherland faced in these years by its former colonial rulers. Like his earlier 'technocratic utopia',¹⁰⁴ Dzieduszycki's text, written in 1939, had the aim of securing and legitimizing a peculiar Polish project of modernity in the context of the multiple modernities competing for existence: He advocated the foundation of a national 'brain' following the examples of the British Privy Council, the Great Council of Fascists and the Soviet GOSPLAN. A renewed Polish 'intellectual imperialism' should fight German 'materialist imperialism' as a federation of Slavic peoples and their neighbours – led by Poland. This imperial project was a transnational and technocratic template, too: The 'Jagiellonian Empire' should, together with the U.K. and the U.S.A., 'flood' the Soviet Union with scientists as well as machines.¹⁰⁵

It is imperative to read these texts as written in a multiple postcolonial situation – in opposition to the binary dichotomic relationship between one dominator and one victim – as a subversive mimicry of neocolonial 'euphoric dreams'.¹⁰⁶ They were written by a member of a former colonial power colonized by its neighbours already at the end of the eighteenth century: Dzieduszycki's rhetoric was a proactive '*Unterdrückungsabwehr*'¹⁰⁷ or 'strategic mimicry'¹⁰⁸ of sorts to delegitimize ongoing claims of domination over Poland, expressed for example by Germany in its

¹⁰³ TADEUSZ DZIEDUSZYCKI, *Ruch Jagielloński Młodych i Duchem Młodych. Wielki zryw narodu z nizin 300 lat upadku i z barłogu przydługiej rekonwalescencji. Nowy Grunwald. Szalonym rozmachem twórczego ducha polskiego na miarę 500 lat bezprzykładną, przewyżczymy i unicestwimy niszczycielskie szaleństwo teutońskie grożące zablokowaniem się z Moskwą na naszym grobie*, Warszawa 1939, p. 15-19, as quoted in WŁODZIMIERZ BORODZIEJ/ BŁAŻEJ BRZOSTEK/ MACIEJ GÓRNY, *Polnische Europa-Pläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Option Europa. Deutsche, polnische und ungarische Europapläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1, Essays, ed. by WŁODZIMIERZ BORODZIEJ et al., Göttingen 2005, p. 43-134, p. 97-98.

¹⁰⁴ See the title of Mich's book: *Tadeusza Dzieduszyckiego utopia*.

¹⁰⁵ DZIEDUSZYCKI, *Ruch Jagielloński*, as quoted in BORODZIEJ et al., vol. 2, *Regesten*, no. 259, p. 508-510, p. 509-510.

¹⁰⁶ PAUL N. HEHN, *A Low Dishonest Decade. The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930–1941*, New York 2002, p. 118-119.

¹⁰⁷ UFFELMANN, 'Ich würde meine Nation als lebendiges Lied erschaffen', p. 92.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

conception of *Lebensraum* or in its derisive rhetoric of Poland as a 'seasonal state' (*Saisonstaat*).¹⁰⁹

5. Conclusion

In the framework of the Second Republic, Polish experts – scientists and technicians – developed the wish and the ability to struggle for the enhancement of their institutions and their influence on societal affairs. These deliberations and projects stood in a very close relationship to the earlier American and Czech examples. Indeed, the experience of seeing Czechoslovakia become more successful in this realm than Poland was one of the transnational motivations to move ahead more quickly – even if the Czech phenomenon turned out to have been quite short-lived. Polish scientists and technicians organized themselves in new or renamed older associations, wrote in new and established journals and newspapers, and enjoyed at times the support of the government. Yet, Polish governments apparently did not develop the willingness to act in a comparably decisive manner until the mid 1920s – and with Piłsudski's coup, the possibilities for influence again changed.

Looking at the examples mentioned here, a transfer of knowledge or concepts can be observed rather from the United States via Czechoslovakia to Poland than from Western Europe to the eastern part of Central Europe – with the exception of the influence of corporatism as conceived by Mussolini.

As remarkable, then, may be underlined the role of experts of the 'older generation': Adamiecki, like Hauswald, had been educated long before the founding of the new republics. In their eyes, their actions were, perhaps, simply a continuation or the culmination of Czech or Polish intellectual brilliance in the new Atlantic context, rather than the beginnings of a new Europe. When Adamiecki became a leading representative of the International Committee of Scientific Management in Geneva, the global context was probably more important than the European one. On the other hand, Dzieduszycki certainly belonged to a young generation desiring a new Europe (he participated as an observer at the first Paneuropa Congress in Vienna in 1926¹¹⁰), but at the same time he was the child of an old noble tradition, living on old economic and political symbolic capital.

¹⁰⁹ HEHN, A Low Dishonest Decade, p. 66.

¹¹⁰ STEPHANIE ZLOCH, Blick nach Westen? Polen und die europäischen Einigungsbestrebungen zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (1918–1939), in: Vision Europa. Deutsche und polnische Föderationspläne des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. by HEINZ DUCHHARDT/ MALGORZATA MORAWIEC, Mainz 2003, p. 65–84, p. 76.

Compared to ambitious projects like PIMCO in Prague, or Dzie duszycki's even less successful endeavours to found a similar Academy of Work in Poland, the main function of his surreal 'counter-imperialist' project of 1939 could be summed up from a postcolonial perspective as the mimicry of the ideologies of Poland's menacing neighbours, i.e. the self-confident notion linked to its desperate expression in the sense of 'signifying nation'.

As a final point, one might stress the obvious, namely that, as Dzie duszycki's concepts and his explicit adaption of fascist elements have illustrated, at the time the euphoric propagation of technical and societal progress was closely linked – and not only in Poland – to illiberal conceptions of modernity.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT, *Multiple Modernities*, p. 12.