Gilligan, Kohlberg and 20th-Century (C.E.) Moral Theory: Does Anglophone Ethics Rest on a Mistake?

Abstract

In response to Kohlberg's theory of moral development, Gilligan (1982, 2nd edition: 1993, pp. 18-9) emphasizes that his theory depends entirely on its postulated goal, namely a principled judgment. Here is now analyzed, to what extent only the tip of a moral and theoretical iceberg is illuminated by the fact that their investigations of clarification serve to what extent Kohlberg's stages "five" and "six" require a specific theory of "moral point of view", in the questions of justice and too much of what we are neglected and also neglected. In order to show this, I first examine how classic justice issues for teleological ethics theories have not only been lost once, but also lost twice (§ 2). An important example of this is the radical sweeping in the "ethical theory" at the beginning of the Anglophone 20th century (C.E.), represented by the turns from Moore, Prichard and Ross to particularism and intuitionism and their principle disregard for the actual behavior in the actual context of any agent (§ 3). A second important case concerns the liberal-individualistic basis of studies on "the" moral perspective from the middle of the 20th century (C.E.) and ideas of "impartiality", which are often but incorrectly attributed (§§ 4-7). These considerations make it possible to identify some central methodological confusion (§ 8), which inevitably also generate some serious moral confusions - confusion that is based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development, some of which are identified against his theory by Gilligans (§ 9). These critical considerations then allow me to characterize essential features of Kant's critical approach to moral philosophy (§ 10). Kant's ingenious theory of moral judgments and moral justification does not require a calling to the only incidential value of the "dignity"; It is also not individualistic: the “universality” that is necessary to identify and evaluate principles, actions and our moral obligations, permits or prohibitions is in principle and in practice cosmopolitan. Kant's 'constructive' approach to these questions is not that of Rawls; Rather, it is correctly identified by Onora O’Neill. Kant's explication of the rational judgment and rational justification can dissolve the Pyrrhonian criterion dilemma; Alternative methods that have been preferred in moral philosophy cannot.