Abstract

AbstractThe article proposes a rational choice theory explanation of unwanted and persistently restrictive socio-religious norms in the Arab world based on Timur Kuran’s model of preference and knowledge falsification. The model shows that individuals often suppress their true beliefs out of fear of religious backlash and a desire to maintain social approval – what Kuran calls reputational utility. This tendency to conform to perceived social expectations outweighs the personal benefits – expressive and intrinsic utility – that would come from openly expressing their private preferences. People who rely on skewed public information to inform themselves about other people’s beliefs – and, if the distortion persists, incrementally adapt their own convictions to what they perceive as public opinion – further impoverish any debate on the costs of the ultra-religious status quo. The result has been a self-reinforcing equilibrium of religious suppression in the Arab world.It is demonstrated how encouraging minorities to express their true preferences creates an anti-falsification force. In economic terms, it would lead to a flatter reputational utility curve, resulting in shifting the maximum of the total utility curve closer to the maximums of the expressive and intrinsic utilities curves. The effect can be observed realistically in areas with a higher concentration of minorities, characterized by a more pluralistic environment in which more opinions may be tolerated and religious rules becoming more relaxed. We then shall illuminate ways in which minorities could be empowered and economically incentivized to enact positive social change. Ultimately, a media-focused strategy is doomed to fail due to political economic considerations – religious state-owned outlets dominate the media landscape, and minorities are rarely present. The text concludes by pointing towards external NGOs as the organizations best situated to amplify minority voices and break the hold of preference falsification.